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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, housing providers-including community associa-
tions-have seen a significant increase in the number of owners and tenants
submitting "prescriptions" for emotional support and comfort animals in pet-
restricted or limited communities.' This increase-in addition to the lack of
* JoAnn Nesta Burnett, Esq., J.D., Nova Southeastern University, 1997, Magna Cum
Laude; B.A., University of South Florida, 1992. Ms. Burnett concentrates her practice in state
and federal appellate practice and procedure, complex commercial and civil litigation includ-
ing, fair housing discrimination, association litigation and general business litigation. Ms.
Burnett has represented numerous association clients in defending discrimination complaints
based upon alleged fair housing violations before local, county agencies and in state and fed-
eral court. Ms. Burnett has extensive experience in representing association clients in cove-
nant enforcement cases in arbitration and state court proceedings. Additionally, Ms. Burnett
has experience with collections and foreclosures.
** Gary A. Poliakoff, J.D., is a founding shareholder of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. where
he served as its Managing Shareholder from inception of the firm in 1973 through March,
2008. Mr. Poliakoff is a former member of the Board of Governors of the Shepard Broad Law
Center of Nova Southeastern University where he is an Adjunct Professor, teaching Condomi-
nium Law and Practice. In 2008, Mr. Poliakoff was recognized as the outstanding Adjunct
Professor of the Year for teaching of Doctrinal Courses. He is co-author of Florida Condomi-
11
: Nova Law Review 36, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
case law governing how these requests should be evaluated, and the ever
increasing number of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) complaints
and unfavorable results facing associations-has, in these authors' opinions,
discouraged many associations from challenging these requests even in situa-
tions where the association is skeptical of the need for the animal. Until re-
cently, many associations believed that challenging a request for a reasonable
accommodation involving an emotional support or companion animal was a
losing battle. In 2009, an association in Florida's panhandle challenged a
unit owner's "prescription" for an emotional support animal, and the out-
come significantly changed the landscape for associations evaluating these
types of requests.
The pendulum seems to be swinging in favor of associations challeng-
ing facially illegitimate requests for reasonable accommodations, such as
emotional support or companion animals, and forcing applicants making a
request to substantiate their request with medical records and treatment
notes. 3 This decision breathes new life into an association's ability to chal-
lenge a facially illegitimate request for an emotional support animal.4 Re-
quests for reasonable accommodations involving emotional support or com-
panion animals have proven to be one of the most litigation-fraught areas of
discrimination law-and for good reason.5 While the need for many service
animals is readily apparent, such as seeing eye dogs for sight-impaired indi-
viduals, that is not the case with most requests for emotional support ani-
nium Law and Practice, The Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education, 2007, and author of a
national treatise, The Law of Condominium Operations, WEST GRouP, 1988. He co-authored,
with his son Ryan, "New Neighborhoods: The Consumer's Guide to Condominium, Co-op
and HOA Living," Emerald Book Group, 2009. He was recognized by the College of Com-
munity Association Lawyers with its highest achievement, the Gurdon Buck Award for his
contribution to the development, nationally of the field of Community Association Law, and
was designated by the Broward County commissioners and the Broward County Historical
Commission as a "Pioneer" for his contribution to the field of Community Association Law.
1. See John Ensminger & Frances Breitkopf, Service and Support Animals in Housing
Law, GPSoLo MAG. (ANIMAL LAW ISSUE), July-Aug. 2009, available at http://www.ameri
can-
bar.org/newsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo-magazine-index/servicesup
portanimals.html.
2. See Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, No. 3:07-cv-97/RVIEMT,
2009 WL 691378, at *1-2, 7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
3. See, e.g., id. at *7.
4. See id.
5. SARA PRATT ET AL., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: TESTING
GUIDANCE FOR PRACTITIONERS 1 (2005) ( "Since 1993, complaints alleging disability discrim-
ination have been the most or second most common type of fair housing complaint received
by HUD.").
452 [Vol. 36
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mals. 6 The majority of mental and/or psychological conditions are not visi-
ble or evident and can be difficult to confirm with a simple "prescription"
stating: "It is medically necessary for my patient, who is extremely de-
pressed, to have a dog."7 While many times HUD and its affiliated inves-
tigative agencies find this type of note sufficient to establish a need for an
emotional support animal, the federal courts properly recognized that many
owners or tenants are abusing the system by submitting "prescriptions" from
family or friend physicians, or simply by soliciting a physician to "prescribe"
an animal even though the person does not suffer from a true mental or psy-
chological disability. Therein lies the potential for improper requests by
those who simply would prefer to have an animal, compared to those who
truly require an animal as a medical necessity.8
Medical providers should not take these requests lightly; in the event of
a legal challenge, their judgment, credibility, and reputation may be ques-
tioned. Many disability rights advocates stress that fraudulent or frivolous
claims undermine the credibility of the process and ultimately insult those
whom the Fair Housing Acts were designed to protect.9 It is in everyone's
interest to maintain the integrity of this legal right.
Requests for service and emotional support animals arise out of the
1988 Amendments to the Federal Fair Housing Act, prohibiting community
associations, landlords, and other housing providers from discriminating
against residents suffering from a handicap or disability or the handicap or
disability of anyone associated with that resident.io This means associations
are required to "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practic-
es, [and] services when . . . necessary" to provide a disabled person with
"equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."" Compliance with the sta-
tute appears simple enough. After all, the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA) and the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) define the terms handi-
cap and disability respectively and provide guidance on what constitutes a
handicap or disability;12 but is compliance really "simple enough" for most
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 12-14 (2004).
7. See id. at 13-14.
8. See Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7.
9. Wayne Roustan, Some Pet Owners Skirting Rules with Fake Service Dogs, SUN-
SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 2011, at Al.
10. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a), 102 Stat. 1619,
1620.
I1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
12. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988 § 5(b).
2012]1 453
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community associations, landlords, and housing providers faced with the
daunting task of determining who is handicapped and what accommodations
are reasonable and required?13 This is an extremely complex and highly fact
specific determination that perplexes even the most astute legal and medical
minds.
This article will address the legal and medical considerations of requests
for service and emotional support animals as reasonable accommodations in
pet restricted or limited communities, after providing a historical analysis of
the statutes and acts resulting in the evolution of the FHAA and its progeny.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY/DISCRIMINATION LAW
The disability and discrimination laws trace their roots back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.14 This was a landmark piece of legislation in the United
States that outlawed unequal application of voter registration requirements
and racial segregation in schools, at the workplace, and by facilities that
served the general public-"public accommodations." 5 Once the Civil
Rights Act was implemented, its effects were far-reaching and had tremend-
ous long-term impacts on the whole country.1 6 It prohibited discrimination
in public facilities, in government, and in employment. 17 Thereafter, Title 8
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act,'8 was
enacted by Congress as a means of preventing housing discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, and national origin. 9 The Act was amended in
1974 to add "sex" as a protected class.20 In 1988, Congress enacted the
21FHAA, which expanded the scope of the Act to include discrimination
13. See discussion infra Part Il.D.
14. See generally, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see Teach-
ing with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, NAT'L ARCHIVEs, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 101, 201-02, 401, 703.
16. See Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, supra note 14.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201, 703; Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 14.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90. For
the legislative history of the FHA, see Fair Housing Act, FAIRHOUSING.COM, http://www.fair
housing.comlindex.cfm?method=page.display&pageid=655 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1968 H§ 801, 804 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604 (2006)).
20. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(l)-(4), 88 Stat. 729, 729 (1974).
21. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 1, 102 Stat. 1619,
1619.
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based upon "familial status" and "handicap." 22 The FHAA requires that
shared ownership housing communities "make reasonable accommodations
in rules, policies, practices, or services," and allow "reasonable modifications
of existing premises . .. to afford . .. [handicapped individuals] full [use and]
enjoyment of the premises."23
On the heels of the FHAA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 1990.24 The ADA is a
comprehensive formulation of the rights of handicapped individuals in the
United States, the purpose of which is:
1) [T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties;
2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
3) to ensure that the [flederal [glovernment plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this [chapter] on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.25
The ADA is designed to prevent discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, commercial facilities, employment, state and local government servic-
es, transportation, and telecommunications,26 while the FHAA is designed to
prevent discrimination in housing. Although the two Acts serve different
purposes, they both seek to redress discrimination based upon disability or
handicap.28 The FHAA uses the term "handicap" 29 while the ADA uses the
22. Id. § 5(a)-(b).
23. Id. § 6(a).
24. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 1, 104 Stat. 327,
327; 3 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-
336 vii (1992). For a history of the ADA, see generally REAMS, JR. ET AL., supra.
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(b).
26. Id. § 2(a)-(b).
27. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 § 6(a).
28. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(b)(1); Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 § 6(a).
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term "disability."30 Both terms have the same legal meaning 3' and both Acts
use the same or similar provisions and definitions, but the ADA has been
litigated far more than the FHAA. 32 Accordingly, the body of case law ad-
dressing the ADA is more expansive than that addressing the FHAA. 33 Fed-
eral courts began addressing FHAA cases and issues by referring to ADA
employment discrimination doctrines. 34 "The almost universal application of
the two Acts lends itself to similarities in interpretation; the very broadness
of their scope virtually necessitates doctrinal equivalence in order to ensure
some degree of consistency in the law."3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals explained that although the Acts "create and protect distinct rights,
their similarities have traditionally facilitated the development of common or
parallel methods of proof when appropriate." 36 Accordingly, while focusing
on the FHAA and requests for emotional support animals, there will be cites
to ADA and employment cases within this article.
Having noted the similarities in the Acts, it is important to understand
that the Acts are beginning to take separate and divergent paths. On Sep-
tember 25, 2008, the ADAAA was signed into law, effective, January 1,
29. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 § 5(b).
30. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3.
31. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that definition of "disabili-
ty" in the Americans with Disabilities Act "is drawn almost verbatim from . . . the definition
of 'handicap' contained in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988").
32. See, e.g., United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417-18
(9th Cir. 1994); City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Reasonable accommodation is borrowed from case law interpreting the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973."). Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, we have
relied on ADA cases in applying the FHAA, because, as a general matter, "there is no signifi-
cant difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created by the two Acts." Vinson v.
Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Bragdon, 524
U.S. at 631 ("The ADA's definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the defini-
tion[s] ... in the Rehabilitation Act . . . [and] the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988");
Reg'1 Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir.
2002); Ryan v. Ramsey, 936 F. Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (relying on ADA precedent
in finding HIV as a disability in an FHA case).
33. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628; City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725,
728 n.1 (1995); Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1148, 1155; Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d
at 1414-16; Ryan, 936 F. Supp. at 422.
34. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629; Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1154; Ryan, 936 F. Supp. at 421.
But see City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 728; Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d at
1416.
35. Edward G. Kramer et al., Causes of Action for Handicapped Discrimination in Hous-
ing in Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq.] and Related
Federal Statutes, in 22 CAUSES OF ACnON § 8 (2d ed. 2012), available at Westlaw.
36. Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1451 (4th Cir. 1990).
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2009.37 The ADA's definition of "disability" was the same three-pronged
definition found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the definition current-
ly found in the FHAA." The proponents of the ADAAA believed the courts
had "narrow[ed] the definition of disability in unexpected ways."39 The
ADAAA was enacted to "provid[e] 'a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination' and 'clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination' by reinstating a broad
scope of protection to be available under the ADA."4 0 Accordingly, the
ADAAA was revised with the intent to lessen the standards for proving dis-
abilities.4' Since this article focuses on whether an association can or should
grant a reasonable accommodation to its pet restrictions and/or limitations
with regard to emotional support animals, the differences between the FHAA
and ADAAA affecting emotional support-and service-animals will be
discussed below.
III. THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPLICATED BY THE FHAA
The FHAA is found in section 3601, et seq of Title 42 of the United
States Code, and every state has adopted an identical or virtually identical
version of the FHAA. 42 In addition to prohibiting discrimination in the sale
or rental of a dwelling based upon race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
and national origin, it is also unlawful
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make un-
available or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap of [the] buyer or renter, [or the handicap of someone] in-
tending to reside in that dwelling . . . or [the handicap of someone]
associated with [the] buyer or renter.43
This includes a "refus[al] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, poli-
cies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(l)-(3)
(2006); see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
39. Jacquie Brennan, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, SOUTHWEST ADA CTR., 7
(2008), http://www.post-polio.org/edu/pphnews/PPH24-4fa08p7.pdf.
40. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
41. See id. at § 2(a)(4)-(8).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006); see Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of State Assistance Animal
laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIsT. CTR, http://animallaw.info/articles/ddusassistanceanimaltable.
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
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afford [such] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."" It is
an established principle of law that a reasonable accommodation to an asso-
ciation's pet restriction or limitation must be granted to a disabled individual
requiring a service and/or emotional support animal.4 5 In other words, grant-
ing an accommodation to allow a person who is disabled to have an emotion-
al support animal is considered "reasonable" as a matter of law. 46
A. Who or What Does the FHAA Govern?
The FHAA applies to condominium and homeowners' associations
alike, unless they fall within an express exemption.47 The Joint Statement of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of
Justice, dated May 17, 2004, explains that the FHAA applies to condomi-
nium and homeowners' associations. 48 The exact power is derived from sec-
tion 3602(d), which defines a "person" to include "one or more individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal repre-
sentatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under [T]itle 11, receivers, and fidu-
ciaries."49
The Joint Statement provides:
Any person or entity engaging in prohibited conduct-i.e., re-
fusing to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, prac-
tices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling-may be held liable unless they fall within an
exception to the Act's coverage. Courts have applied the Act to
individuals, corporations, associations and others involved in the
provision of housing and residential lending, including property
owners, housing managers, homeowners and condominium associ-
ations, lenders, real estate agents, and brokerage services. Courts
have also applied the Act to state and local governments, most of-
ten in the context of exclusionary zoning or other land-use deci-
sions. Under specific exceptions to the Fair Housing Act, the rea-
sonable accommodation requirements of the Act do not apply to a
44. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (2011).
45. See Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and Companion Animals, 11
ANIMALL. 69,74 (2005).
46. See id.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
supra note 6, at 3.
48. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 1, 3.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d).
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private individual owner who sells his own home so long as he (1)
does not own more than three single-family homes; (2) does not
use a real estate agent and does not employ any discriminatory ad-
vertising or notices; (3) has not engaged in a similar sale of a home
within a 24-month period; and (4) is not in the business of selling
or renting dwellings. The reasonable accommodation require-
ments of the Fair Housing Act also do not apply to owner-
occupied buildings that have four or fewer dwelling units.50
Accordingly, condominium and homeowners' associations are governed
by the FHAA, and therefore, are subject to discrimination claims based upon
an alleged violation of the FHAA arising out of an owner's, tenant's, guest's
and/or associated person's disability.5
B. Who Does the FHAA Protect?
The FHAA is designed to protect owners, applicants or residents from
discriminatory practices "because of their disability or the disability of any-
one associated with them," and to prevent housing providers "from treating
persons with disabilities less favorably than others because of their disabili-
ty."52 The Act also makes it unlawful for any person to refuse "to make rea-
sonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled individual or some-
one associated with a disabled person an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling."53 "The Act also prohibits housing providers from refusing resi-
dency to persons with disabilities, or placing conditions on their residency,
because those persons may require reasonable accommodations."54
C. What Is a Disability or Handicap Under the FHAA?
The term "handicap" is defined in the FHAA as:
1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities; 2) a record of having
such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an im-
50. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 3
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(d), 3604(0(1).
52. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 2
(footnote omitted); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604(f)(1-(3).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 2.
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pairment, but such term does not include current, illegal use of or
addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of
[Tlitle 21)."
The definition of "handicap" is further clarified in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations, which provides:
Handicap means, with respect to a person, a physical or men-
tal impairment which substantially limits one or more major life
activities; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
having such an impairment. This term does not include current, il-
legal use of or addiction to a controlled substance. For purposes of
this part, an individual shall not be considered to have a handicap
solely because that individual is a transvestite. As used in this de-
finition:
(a) Physical or mental impairment [as to prong (1) above] in-
cludes:
(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense or-
gans; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
ductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities. The term physical or mental impairment
includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and conditions as or-
thopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy,
autism, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection,
mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction (other than
addiction caused by current, illegal use of a controlled substance)
and alcoholism.
(c) Has a record of such an impairment [as to prong (2) above]
means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a men-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
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tal or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.
(d) Is regarded as having an impairment means [as to prong (3)
above]:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit one or more major life activities but that is treated by another
person as constituting such a limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
other toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (a) of this
definition but is treated by another person as having such an im-
pairment.56
The following conditions are generally not considered impairments:
"environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages, homosexuality and
bisexuality, pregnancy, physical characteristics, common personality traits,
[and] normal deviations in height, weight, or strength."
The ADAAA maintained the same three-prong definition of disability;
however, it clarified that the term disability should be construed to provide
broad coverage, as follows:
4) Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability.
The definition of 'disability' in paragraph (1) shall be construed in
accordance with the following:
(A) The definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in fa-
vor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maxi-
mum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.58
56. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
57. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", EEOC COMPL. MAN., http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902sum.htmi (last modified
Mar. 5, 2009).
58. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
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In these authors' opinions, the courts interpreting the FHAA, HUD and
its investigative agencies have been applying this broad definition of disabili-
ty in the FHAA context.
D. What is Necessary to Establish a Disability?
Many physical impairments are visible and therefore, easily identified
without the need for further medical support.59 For example, someone who
is confined to a wheelchair, or who has lost a limb, or who is blind, can be
visually identified as having a "physical impairment."" If the impairment is
obvious and the nexus between the impairment and the requested service or
support animal is also obvious, no additional documentation should be re-
quested." However, someone who claims a physical or mental impairment
that is not visually apparent-such as diabetes, high-blood pressure, heart
disease, anxiety, depression, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder,
or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder-will most likely be asked to pro-
vide medical support and documentation to establish that a disability exists. 62
The non-visual disabilities pose the greatest challenges for associations
and housing providers alike. 63 How is a board of voluntary officers and di-
rectors, the majority of which have no legal or medical training, supposed to
determine if a person is disabled as a matter of law? Is there a checklist?
Are there guidelines?
The short answer is, no. The long answer is the association's board
must attempt to determine if the requesting party's alleged disability "sub-
stantially limits one or more [of the person's] major life activities."64 Major
life activities are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as, "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
59. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE& U.S. DEP'TOFHous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 12-13.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 12-13; see also Gary Poliakoff & JoAnn Nesta Burnett, Prescription Pets:
Homeowners Are Increasingly Bringing Doctors' Notes as They Seek Waivers of Their Asso-
ciations' No-Pet Rules. When Is a Pet a Medical Necessity Under the Lw?, BECKER &
POLIAKOFF 2 (2008), http://www.becker-poliakoff.com/pubs/articles/poliakoff g/poliakoff
prescription-pets.pdf (explaining in detail the type of documentation an association is able to
request when an impairment is obvious and the need for a service/support animal is also ob-
vious, differing from when the nexus between the impairment and the requested animal is not
obvious, meaning the impairment and nexus cannot be ascertained from a purely visual stand-
point).
62. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 13-14;
Poliakoff & Burnett, supra note 61, at 2.
63. See, e.g., Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D.
Or. 1998).
64. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2011).
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ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.""6 Of course, this list is not
exhaustive.' What qualifies as a major life activity in one situation, may not
qualify in another. If determining what constitutes a major life activity was
not difficult enough, the association's board members must then determine if
the alleged disability "substantially limits one or more [of a person's] major
",67life activities.
The ADAAA revised the definition of major life activities to include:
(2) Major life activities.
(A) In general.-For purposes of paragraph (1), major life ac-
tivities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, stand-
ing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, con-
centrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
(B) Major bodily functions.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a
major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily
function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurologi-
cal, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions. 68
Although this definition provides greater detail about what constitutes a
major life activity, the fact of the matter is, these changes appear to codify
case law that already existed, and that was previously applied in FHAA cas-
es. 69
"The term 'substantially limits' suggests that the limitation is 'signifi-
cant' or 'to a large degree."' 70 The term "substantially limits" is not defined
in the FHAA, but is defined and explained in the ADA and case law, to
mean:
65. Id. § 100.201(b) (defining "major life activities").
66. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (finding reproduction to be a
major life activity under the ADA).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201.
68. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
69. See, e.g., Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D.
Or. 1998) (showing how it is undeniable that partial deafness impacts the major bodily func-
tion of hearing).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 4.
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(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life ac-
tivity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.71
An impairment is generally considered substantially limiting if it prohi-
bits or significantly restricts an individual's ability "to perform a major life
activity" as compared to the ability of "the average person in the general
population [to] perform" the same activity. 72 Determining whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity is dependent on: "1) the
nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration or expected duration of
the impairment; and 3) the permanent or long-term impact of or resulting
from the impairment." 73 "Although very short-term, temporary restrictions
generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not have to be
permanent to rise to the level of a disability;" but, the expected duration of
the impairment is a factor to be considered.7 4 "Temporary impairments that
take significantly longer than normal to heal"-for example, surgeries result-
ing in unexpected infections, "long-term impairments, or potentially long-
term impairments of indefinite duration may be disabilities if they are se-
vere."75 "Chronic or episodic disorders, [such as anxiety and depression] that
are substantially limiting when active or have a high likelihood of recurrence
in substantially limiting forms may be disabilities." 76 "An individual who
has two or more impairments that are not substantially limiting by them-
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2010); see Cato v. First Fed. Cmty. Bank, 668 F. Supp. 2d
933, 941 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
72. Cato, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)).
73. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir.
2009)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
75. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see Cato, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 941; see also Chevron Phillips Chem.
Co., 570 F.3d at 618.
76. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122
Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. 112008)).
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selves, but [in conjunction] substantially limit one or more [of a person's]
major life activities," is considered disabled.77
The definitions above come from the ADA7' and the case law interpret-
ing the term "substantially limits." 79  However, section 12102 of the
ADAAA lessens the standard by stating:
(4)(B) The term "substantially limits" shall be interpreted consis-
tently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008.
(C) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a
disability.
(D) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if
it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.
(E)(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as-
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances,
low-vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing
aids and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices,
mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;
(II) use of assistive technology;
(111) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services;
or
(IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifica-
tions.8
77. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(i)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
79. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-97 (2002),
abrogated as stated in Gonzalez v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No. 0804470, 2010 WL
3731453 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,2010).
80. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a).
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It is unknown if the ADAAA definition above will be applied, and if so,
to what extent, in FHAA cases. Notwithstanding the fact that this definition
is not contained in the FHAA, HUD has been applying these standards in its
investigation of discrimination complaints for quite some time."
Armed with this extensive knowledge and guidance, an association's
board members should be able to apply these definitions and determine
whether a person is disabled, right? To some extent that is true, but for the
most part each request must be decided on a case-by-case basis." As the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly explained, not every impairment
qualifies as a disability protected by the FHAA because not every impair-
ment is substantially limiting.83 The court described the proper disability
determination to be:
A disability determination, however, should not be based on ab-
stract lists or categories of impairments, as there are varying de-
grees of impairments as well as varied individuals who suffer from
the impairments. In fact, the regulations note that a finding of dis-
ability: "is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impair-
ment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be dis-
abling for particular individuals but not for others, depending upon
the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impair-
ments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any num-
ber of other factors." This is why a determination of disability
must be made on an individualized, case-by-case basis. Whether a
substantial limitation upon a major life activity exists depends
upon an analysis of 1) the nature and severity of the impairment, 2)
the duration of the impairment, and 3) the permanent or long-term
impact of the impairment.84
The effect of a particular impairment on several peoples' lives may vary
greatly. Accordingly, a particular impairment might constitute a disability in
one case and not in another.
81. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 5, 102 Stat. 1619,
1620; see Kramer et al., supra note 35.
82. Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2010)).
85. Id.
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IV. THE MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION NECESSARY TO SUBSTANTIATE A
DISABILITY AND NEED FOR AN EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMAL
As referenced above, there are certain criteria HUD and its investigative
agencies apply to discrimination claims concerning the type of documenta-
tion an association can or should request to support a person's claimed disa-
bility and need for an emotional support animal. When the disability and
nexus are obvious, there is no need for additional information. However,
when neither the disability nor the nexus between the requested accommoda-
tion are obvious, HUD provides that an association may request the follow-
ing:
A housing provider may not ordinarily inquire as to the nature
and severity of an individual's disability .... However, in re-
sponse to a request for a reasonable accommodation, a housing
provider may request reliable disability-related information that (1)
is necessary to verify that the person meets the Act's definition of
disability (i.e., has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities), (2) describes the
needed accommodation, and (3) shows the relationship between
the person's disability and the need for the requested accommoda-
tion. Depending on the individual's circumstances, information
verifying that the person meets the Act's definition of disability
can usually be provided by the individual himself or herself (e.g.,
proof that an individual under [sixty-five] years of age receives
Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability Insur-
ance benefits or a credible statement by the individual). A doctor
or other medical professional, a peer support group, a non-medical
service agency, or a reliable third party who is in a position to
know about the individual's disability may also provide verifica-
tion of a disability. In most cases, an individual's medical records
or detailed information about the nature of a person's disability is
not necessary for this inquiry.
Once a housing provider has established that a person meets
the Act's definition of disability, the provider's request for docu-
mentation should seek only the information that is necessary to
evaluate if the reasonable accommodation is needed because of a
disability. Such information must be kept confidential and must
not be shared with other persons unless they need the information
86. See supra Part III.D.
87. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6,
at 12-13.
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to make or assess a decision to grant or deny a reasonable accom-
modation request or unless disclosure is required by law (e.g., a
court-issued subpoena requiring disclosure).
How should an association respond to a person who submits a letter
from an out-of-state physician who specializes in treating pediatric patients
and who shares the same name as the requesting party, but whose documen-
tation is otherwise facially compliant with the FHAA? Under HUD's guide-
lines, the association should simply approve the request and ignore any skep-
ticism the board might have.89 Meanwhile, the condominium owner making
the request has submitted a note from her son who is a pediatrician and has
written a letter stating that his patient suffers from severe mental impair-
ments that require an emotional support animal. 90 While this may seem to be
an extreme situation, unfortunately it is not; it occurs every day. 91 These
authors have encountered several situations in which a requesting party has a
friend or family member physician write a "prescription" for an emotional
support animal, knowing full well that the requesting party does not suffer
from a disability or handicap. HUD and its investigative agencies frightened
most associations from challenging even the most egregious violations-
until recently, that is.92
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida addressed the issue of whether an association is able to request addi-
tional medical information where the board is skeptical of the request made
and/or the documentation supplied.93 The Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I
Condominium Ass'n 94 case involved a unit owner in a pet restricted commu-
nity who brought suit against an association (the Association) for alleged
violations of the state and federal Fair Housing Acts and various other re-
lated causes of action arising out of the Association's denial of Hawn's re-
quest for an emotional support animal.95 Hawn purchased a unit in the Asso-
ciation in 2004 with full knowledge that this was a pet restricted communi-
88. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
89. See id.
90. See HOA Pet Rules & Required Accommodations: The Facts About Comfort Ani-
mals, HOALEADER.COM (July 2009), http://www.hoaleader.com/public/306.cfm.
91. See id.
92. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at
14-15; Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, No. 3:07-cv-97/RV/EMT, 2009 WL
691378, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
93. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
94. No. 3:07-cv-97/RV/EMT, 2009 WL 691378 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
95. Id.at*1-2.
[Vol. 36468
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/1
PRESCRIPTION PETS@
ty.96 In January 2005, about a year after moving in, Hawn wrote to the board
and requested that the Association amend the restriction prohibiting pets to
allow owners to maintain pets and more specifically, to allow Hawn to keep
a pet.97 The letter did not state that Hawn was disabled, but instead, stated
the dog was his close companion. It is unclear what action the board took,
but in June 2006, Hawn wrote another letter to the board-for the first time
claiming a disability and a need for a "service and support animal" due to his
physical and mental disabilities. 99 In support of his request for a reasonable
accommodation to maintain a service/emotional support animal, Hawn pro-
vided the Shoreline Board of Directors with two letters-one from a psy-
chologist and one from a chiropractor.'" The psychologist's letter provided
that "the plaintiff suffered from severe panic attacks; was unable to properly
cope with anxiety and stress; and was particularly vulnerable 'while residing
at his home/condo due to past occurrences on that property."'"o' The psy-
chologist stated that he was "prescribing a service animal" to "help plaintiff
cope with his 'emotionally crippling disability.' 1 02 Additionally, Hawn's
chiropractor submitted a letter in support of Hawn's physical disability stat-
ing that he was "'intimately familiar' with [Hawn's] history and the 'func-
tional limitations imposed by his disability."'l 03 He stated that a "[service]
animal would 'assist Mr. Hawn with his disability.'"'" The letter did not
provide what specific limitations existed.'05
The Association requested additional information "including documen-
tation to support [Hawn's] alleged disabilities and the qualifications of' the
authors of the letters.'" Hawn did not respond because he felt his letters
were sufficient.'07 The board again requested additional information includ-
ing:
[Elxpert evidence under oath of the nature of [Hawn's] impair-
ment, the manner in which it substantially limitfed] one or more of
[Hawn's] major life functions or activities, how the requested [an-
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *1.
100. Id. at *1-2.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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imal] [was] necessary to afford [Hawn] an equal opportunity to use
and enjoy [his] dwelling and if there [were] other corrective meas-
ures which [would] permit such use and enjoyment. 108
Again Hawn failed to respond and instead, filed a complaint with the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).'" The FCHR determined
that "there was cause to believe that the [Association] discriminated against"
Hawn in failing to grant the request for a reasonable accommodation." 0
Hawn then filed suit. 11
In disagreeing with FCHR, and in granting summary judgment for the
Association, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida explained that "[w]hether a requested accommodation is required by
law is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination."ll 2 The
court found that Hawn was unable to establish that he was disabled or that
the Association discriminated against him under the Fair Housing Acts be-
cause he could not establish that the Association knew or should have known
of his alleged disability or that the Association knew an "accommodation
was necessary to afford him [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his]
dwelling.""'
The court explained that given the fact that Hawn lobbied for a change
in the no pet restriction without ever mentioning a disability despite the fact
that the alleged disabilities were diagnosed prior to Hawn's first letter,
coupled with the fact that shortly after the failure to amend the restriction
occurred, Hawn had his dog trained as a service animal and for the first time
claimed a disability, "it [was] understandable that the board was suspicious
of his disability claim."" 4 Further, had Hawn actually provided the addition-
al medical information that was requested, the court believed the Association
would have been justified in denying his request because the treatment histo-
ry revealed that the psychiatrist saw Hawn for only two one-hour sessions
and the chiropractor had not seen Hawn in nearly seven years.'1 Further,
Hawn solicited the letters which he essentially drafted for their signature." 6
"In order to show that the disabled person needs the assistance of a service
108. Id.
109. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4 (quoting Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir.
2002) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at *5-6 (emphasis omitted).
114. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *4.
115. Id. at *4 n.6.
116. See id.
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animal ... it is reasonable to require the opinion of a physician who is know-
ledgeable about the subject disability and the manner in which a service dog
can ameliorate the effects of the disability." "' The letters submitted did not
provide that information and the Association was entitled to that additional
medical information to make a proper determination."' 8 The court explained
that Hawn's refusal to provide any additional medical information, in addi-
tion to the suspicious grounds surrounding his request, prevented any finding
of improper conduct on the part of the Association.11 9
Hawn then appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court's opinion, stating:
We are similarly unpersuaded by Hawn's argument that the district
court erred by failing to consider the documentation made availa-
ble to Shoreline during the course of the FCHR investigation.
First, the district court did in fact consider such evidence; it noted
in its order that Hawn's doctors completed "Medical Certification
Forms," in which they "opined that plaintiff had a disability and
that a service dog was necessary." Second, a review of the Medi-
cal Certification Forms reveals that they lack much of the informa-
tion requested by Shoreline. The Medical Certification Forms ap-
pear to be generic forms obtained from the FCHR that merely re-
quired Hawn's doctors to check "yes" and "no" boxes and, in
some spaces, provided blank lines for brief comments. The forms
did not ask for-and the doctors did not provide-other informa-
tion requested by Shoreline, such as Hawn's doctors' credentials.
Third, aside from the documents addressed by the district court, it
is unclear what other evidence was presented to the FCHR and
made available to Shoreline. The Medical Certification Forms
were the only documents attached to Hawn's response to Shore-
line's motion for summary judgment that appear to have been
created during the pendency of the FCHR investigation. Finally,
the FCHR's opinion, in which it found cause to believe that Shore-
line had discriminated against Hawn, relies predominantly, if not
exclusively, on evidence predating the filing of the FCHR com-
plaint. It is therefore unclear what additional evidence Hawn be-
lieves was presented to Shoreline during the FCHR investigation
117. Id. at *7 (quoting Prindable v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 1245, 1259 (D. Haw. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. See Porter v. Imperial Embassy Condo. Four, Inc., No. 11-48302012, 2012 WL
1451560, (Fla. Div. Admin Hrgs Mar. 2012).
119. See Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *7.
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that put Shoreline on notice of Hawn's disability and the necessity
of a service animal. 120
To prevail on a discrimination claim,
the plaintiff must establish: 1) that he is disabled or handicapped
within the meaning of the FHA, and that the defendants knew or
should have known of that fact; 2) that the defendants knew that an
accommodation was necessary to afford him equal opportunity to
use and enjoy the dwelling; 3) that such an accommodation is rea-
sonable; and 4) that the defendant refused to make the requested
accommodation. 121
Hawn was unable to satisfy the first and second prongs stated above,
and was therefore, unable to prove a claim of discrimination.122 The court
further explained that it was significant that the Association did not outright
deny Hawn's request, but instead, it attempted to engage in an interactive
process and request additional information.123 The Association attempted to
conduct a meaningful investigation of Hawn's claims but his refusal to pro-
vide any additional information resulted in the Association's denial of his
request.124
In the case of United States v. Hialeah Housing Authority,125 the Ele-
venth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the southern district's
entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hialeah Housing Au-
thority (HHA), on plaintiffs (on behalf of Miguel Rodriguez) FHA/disability
discrimination claims.126  The Rodriguez family was a tenant of HHA-
120. Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x 464, 468 (lth Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
121. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *4 (citing Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d
1201, 1218-19 (11 th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107
F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997); Jacobs v. Concord Vill. Condo. X Ass'n, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
D347, D347 (S.D. Feb. 17, 2004)).
122. See Hawn, 347 F. App'x at 468.
123. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7. See Sun Harbor Homeowners' Assoc., Inc. v.
Bonura, No. 4DIO-3038, 2012 WL 2120923, *6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (ex-
plaining that homeowner and his fiancde failed to demonstrate that they requested an accom-
modation and therefore, discrimination claim failed; Further, association never denied the
request); Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher, 813 N.W.2d 618, 624-26 (S.D. 2012)
(finding no discrimination where no action was taken to remove the animal or the tenant pend-
ing the outcome of the litigation to determine if tenant was truly disabled).
124. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7..
125. 418 F. App'x 872 (11 th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
126. Id. at 878.
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Project 16.127 HHA also provided housing to the Amparo and Perez families,
who were neighbors of the Rodriguez family.128 There were several alterca-
tions between the families and HHA attempted to terminate the tenancies of
all three families because it could not resolve or otherwise prevent the alter-
cations. 129 Mr. Rodriguez was served with a thirty-day notice of termination
of tenancy and the family requested an informal hearing to contest the termi-
nation. 13 0 HHA appointed a hearing officer to preside over the proceed-
ings.131
At the hearing, Mr. Rodriguez provided the hearing officer with "docu-
ments showing that [he] was sick."1 3 2 Mr. Rodriguez and his wife advised
the hearing officer that Mr. Rodriguez "had difficulty climbing stairs" and
"needed a unit with a bathroom" on the ground floor.13' HHA offered to
transfer the Rodriguez family to a unit in another project that had a bathroom
upstairs and downstairs.134 The Rodriguez family claimed they were not able
to inspect the unit prior to accepting the transfer agreement, but based on the
representation that there was a downstairs bathroom, Mr. Rodriguez agreed
to relocate to the other housing project and executed a transfer agreement
accepting the new unit.13 5
Upon inspecting the unit, the Rodriguez family wrote a letter to the
hearing officer challenging the transfer because the proposed apartment was
dirty, had no air conditioning, and had no bathroom downstairs.136 The note
stated that Mr. Rodriguez and his wife had surgery and they were unable to
climb stairs every time they needed to use the bathroom.13 7 The hearing of-
ficer responded with a letter stating the decision to terminate was upheld.138
HHA responded by terminating the tenancy and eventually filing an eviction
action.139 In his answer, Mr. Rodriguez asserted that he was "disabled due to
hip and back problems and that he could not constantly go up and down
127. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., No. 08-22679-CIV, 2010 WL 1540046, at *1
& n.4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2010), rev'd per curiam, 418 F. App'x 872 (11 th Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at *L
129. Id.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x 872, 874 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (alteration in original).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; Hialeah Hous. Auth., 2010 WL 1540046, at *2.
137. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 874.
138. Id.
139. Id.
2012] 473
33
: Nova Law Review 36, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
stairs to use [the] bathroom."'40 The parties mediated the eviction claim at
which time, counsel for Rodriguez advised HHA "that Mr. Rodriguez had a
disability that prevented him from going up and down stairs" and that was
the sole reason for rejecting the transfer. 14 ' HHA contended it requested do-
cumentation substantiating the disability.142 It claimed that it had first
learned of the alleged disability at mediation; however, HHA would not al-
low the family to remain in the Project 16 unit and instead, offered the same
unit at the other project with the caveat that the family would be placed on a
waiting list for a suitable unit.143 The Rodriguez family rejected this offer,
and instead, the parties entered into an agreement whereby the family would
"vacate the Project 16 unit by August 31, 2005."'"
Mr. Rodriguez filed a HUD complaint alleging HHA discriminated
against him and his family based upon his disability.145 HUD found cause to
believe discrimination had occurred.'" The United States filed suit against
HHA on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez in the Southern District of Florida.147 The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of HHA finding that "no rea-
sonable jury could conclude that [HHA] knew or should have known Mr.
Rodriguez was disabled and . . . the requested accommodation was neces-
sary."l 48
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded because there
were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether HHA had notice of
the disability and the requested accommodation.149 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the disability defense raised in the eviction claim, coupled
with counsel's explanation at mediation that Mr. Rodriguez was disabled and
required an accommodation so he did not have to go up and down the stairs,
were "sufficient to allow a reasonabl[e] jury to find that Mr. Rodriguez [was
claiming a disability and that he] made a specific demand for an accommo-
dation."so Although Mr. Rodriguez did not use the term "reasonable ac-
commodation," HHA had sufficient information to know of Mr. Rodriguez's
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 877.
143. Id. at 875.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 875.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., No. 08-
22679-CIV, 2010 WL 1540046, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted), rev'd per curiam, 418 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2011)).
149. Id. at 876, 878.
150. Id. at 877.
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disability and his desire for an accommodation.15 ' That "trigger[ed] HHA's
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation."l52 The court further stated
there were material issues of fact concerning whether HHA refused to grant
an accommodation either by an outright denial or a constructive denial.15 3
The court acknowledged that as in Hawn, if the Association is skeptical
of Mr. Rodriguez's disability they could, and should, request additional in-
formation.' The appellate court noted that there were additional issues
raised and required to be addressed on remand.'55 Notwithstanding the re-
versal of summary judgment, the appellate court recognized that the single
most critical issue had not been addressed, which could produce an identical
outcome.15' The trial court assumed Mr. Rodriguez was disabled, but never
made a finding that he satisfied the Fair Housing Act's definition of a person
with a disability.' Similarly, the appellate court agreed that HHA's asser-
tion that it had no duty to grant the requested accommodation "because the
Rodriguez family was a direct threat" to others pursuant to section 3604(f)(9)
of Title 42 of the United States Code, must also be addressed.15 1
These cases demonstrate that an association has the right to request ad-
ditional medical support from a requesting party if the association is skeptic-
al of the alleged disability and/or need for an animal.159
V. Do EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMALS STILL ExIST AFTER THE REVISIONS
TO THE ADAAA?
One of the most significant changes to the ADAAA is the definition of
a "service animal." 60 This definition became effective March 11, 2011,16
and has already created quite a controversy. The revised definition of service
animal is:
[A]ny dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks
for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physi-
151. Id.
152. See Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 877.
153. See id. at 878.
154. Id. at 877 (quoting Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.
1996)).
155. Id. at 878.
156. See id.
157. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 878.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 877-78; Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x
464, 468 (11 th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
160. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011), with 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010).
161. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011).
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cal, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.
Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or un-
trained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.
The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly
related to the individual's disability. Examples of work or tasks
include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind
or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting indi-
viduals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people
or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pull-
ing a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting
individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as
medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assis-
tance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility dis-
abilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological
disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive
behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal's presence and
the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or com-
panionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this
definition.' 62
This definition officially eviscerates emotional support animals, at least in
public.163 It also limits service animals to dogs,'6M and in certain circums-
tances, miniature horses,66 and requires that the animal be trained to work or
perform a task for the disabled individual.'6 Some legal commentators have
argued that this revision to the ADAAA also applies to the FHAA, and there-
fore, associations will no longer have to make accommodations to allow
emotional support animals. 67 To eliminate any confusion, HUD issued a
memorandum dated February 17, 2011,168 explaining:
This memo explains that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) recent
amendments to its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regula-
tions do not affect reasonable accommodation requests under the
Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Section 504). The DOJ's new rules limit the defini-
tion of "service animal" in the ADA to include only dogs. The
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 36.302(c)(9); Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for
Enforcement & Programs, to FHEO Region Dirs. 1 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nwfairhouse.
org/images/1300304582.pdf.
166. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
167. See Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
168. Id.
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new rules also define "service animal" to exclude emotional sup-
port animals. This definition, however, does not apply to the
FHAct or Section 504. Disabled individuals may request a reason-
able accommodation for assistance animals in addition to dogs, in-
cluding emotional support animals, under the FHAct or Section
504. In situations where both laws apply, housing providers must
meet the broader FHAct/Section 504 standard in deciding whether
to grant reasonable accommodation requests. 69
The purpose behind the ADAAA revisions was to prevent people from
having to dine with an emotional support potbellied pig or watch a movie
with a comfort goat. Dogs are considered to be one of the most acceptable
animals and they are easily trained.1 70 However, many other types of animals
provide these same functions.' 7' For example, many people use monkeys to
alert oncoming seizures, to help feed quadriplegics, and for various other
tasks that require fine motor skills.172 Herein lies the quandary: What will
happen when a disabled individual has a trained monkey in his or her home
to perform specific required motor skills, such as turning on a light switch,
opening a bottle or turning a door knob-things the disabled individual can
no longer do? Since the ADA prevents the disabled person from bringing his
or her service monkey to a restaurant or shopping mall, the monkey is
banned, right? 7 3 A city in California addressed this issue and chose to pass
an ordinance to continue to use the original definition of a service animal.174
169. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
170. See Information on Disability Service Animals for Blind and Persons with Disabili-
ties, DISABLED WORLD, http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/serviceanimals/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
171. Robert L. Adair, Note, Monkeys and Horses and Ferrets . . . Oh My! Non-
Traditional Service Animals Under the ADA, 37 N. Ky. L. REv. 415, 418-32 (2010).
172. See Helping Hands Monkey Helpers for Quadriplegics, DISABLED WORLD (Jan. 8,
2009), http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/serviceanimals/monkey-helpers.php (dis-
cussing how a national organization provides and trains monkeys to assist people with spinal
injuries and other mobility impairments); Information on Disability Service Animals for Blind
and Persons with Disabilities, supra note 170 ("Capuchin monkeys have been trained to per-
form manual tasks such as grasping items, operating knobs and switches, and turning the
pages of a book.").
173. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011) (indirectly limiting the definition ofa "service animal"
under the ADA to a dog); Rose v. Springfield-Greene Cnty. Health Dep't, 668 F. Supp. 2d
1206, 1214 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs service monkey did not fall within
the definition of "a service animal under the ADA"), aff'd, 377 F. App'x 573 (8th Cir. 2010),
cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 929 (2011).
174. HESPERIA, CAL. CODE ch. 5.68 (2011); Sue Manning, Rats! Justice Department
Shoos Service Animals: Snakes, Monkeys, Cats Not Accepted Under New Guidelines, WASH.
TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /apr/4/rats-justice-depa
rtment-shoos-service-animals.
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This ordinance allowed a woman to continue to use her trained service rats
that detect, and alert her to, severe muscle spasms. 75 Local government has
the ability to expand the rights provided under the FHAA, but not to restrict
those rights.176 While it is unlikely she will receive the same treatment out-
side the city of Hesperia, at least for now, this woman can dine and shop in
peace with her rats. 177
This is one of the most significant examples of how the ADAAA and
FHAA appear to be deviating. Where the two Acts were once almost com-
pletely uniform in language and application," 8 they are now beginning to
deviate, at least in terms of the definitions of disabilities and service and
emotional support animals.179 These differences will most certainly produce
substantial litigation. If a monkey is permitted in a condominium as an epi-
leptic seizure alert service animal, how will the courts reconcile the fact that
the monkey is not able to accompany its owner in public? It will be interest-
ing to see how the courts deal with these types of issues.
A. Training
While the ADAAA makes clear that training of a service animal is re-
quired,'80 the case law interpreting the FHAA is unsettled. There are cases
suggesting that some form of training is required even for an emotional sup-
port animal,"' and other cases, along with HUD decisions, that suggest oth-
erwise.'82 Some courts insist that there must be some evidence of training of
the emotional support animal, either by a professional or other person, to set
the service animal apart from an ordinary pet and to establish that allowing
an animal on the premises is a necessary and reasonable accommodation.' 83
175. Manning, supra note 174.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2006).
177. See Manning, supra note 174.
178. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (1988), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
179. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2006); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp.
112008)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011); Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
180. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
181. See, e.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995); Prindable v. Ass'n
of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1256-57 (D. Haw. 2003).
182. See, e.g., Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d 850, 861 (S.D.
Ohio 2009); Janush v. Charities Hous. Dev. Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2000). For information regarding the HUD Decisions, see 24 C.F.R. § 5.303 (2008); Pet
Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834, 63835-36 (Oct.
27, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
183. See, e.g., Bronk, 54 F.3d at 431-32; Assenberg v. Anacortes Hous. Auth., No. CO5-
1836RSL, 2006 WL 1515603, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2006); Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d
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Other courts take the position that the plaintiff need not establish that the
animal has any type of training if it can be shown the animal's presence ame-
liorates the effects of the disability.'" In the case of Auburn Woods I Home-
owners Ass'n v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,'85 the California
court stated that it is "the innate qualities of a dog, in particular a dog's
friendliness and ability to interact with humans, that ma[k]e it therapeutic"
without the need for special training.'86 Whether the animal is trained, courts
agree there must be a showing of how the animal "will affirmatively enhance
a disabled plaintiff's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disabili-
ty."' 87
B. Animal Certifications and Records
An association is able to request documentation concerning the pro-
posed animal to ensure that the animal does not pose a threat to other resi-
dents.'8 8 An association can request the vaccination and inoculation records
at 1256-57; Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D. Or.
1998); State ex rel. Henderson v. Des Moines Mun. Hous. Agency, No. 06-1144, 2007 WL
4553350, at *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished table decision); Oras v. Hous.
Auth. of the City of Bayonne, 861 A.2d 194, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Storms v.
Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 120 P.3d 126, 128-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Timberlane Mobile
Home Park v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 95 P.3d 1288, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004); In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d 787, 798 (W. Va. 2001).
184. See, e.g., Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Janush, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1136; Auburn
Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669, 682 (Ct.
App. 2004); Crossroads Apartments Assocs. v. LeBoo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (Rochester
City Ct. 1991).
185. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669 (Ct. App. 2004).
186. Id. at 682. In a recent case in the Southern District of Florida, the Court entered an
Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that although there is
conflicting case law addressing whether an emotional support animal requires any training,
this Court would follow the line of cases that provide that emotional support animals do not
require any training. Falin v. Condo. Ass'n of La Mer Estates, Inc., No. I 1-61903-CIV, 2012
WL 1910021, *3 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2012).
187. Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429; see also Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n,
347 F. App'x 464, 468 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (quot-
ing Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002)); Prindable, 304 F.
Supp. 2d at 1256; State ex rel. Henderson, 2007 WL 4553350, at *5 (citing Edwards v. EPA,
456 F. Supp. 2d 72, 101 (D.D.C. 2006)); Oras, 861 A.2d at 203 (quoting Bronk, 54 F.3d at
429); Landmark Props. v. Olivo, 783 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748 (N.Y. App. Term 2004); In re Kenna
Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d at 799; see Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Ass'n, No. 961591,
1996 WL 1186942, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 6, 1996); LeBoo, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
188. Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834,
63836-37 (Oct. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
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for the animal at the time of the initial request for accommodation and then
annually thereafter. 189
HUD states that an animal's certifications should not be requested."
However, it is these authors' opinions that in many cases, a determination of
whether the animal ameliorates the effects of a disability is dependent upon
what the animal is trained to do. Several courts have agreed with this propo-
sition also.' 9'
VI. CONCLUSION
For virtually every association, claims for reasonable accommodations
to a pet restriction or limitation can be landmines. The manner in which they
are investigated, the information requested, and the decision process are
fraught with pitfalls. Where associations once shied away from challenging
a request for an emotional support animal claimed under suspicious circums-
tances, the case law now gives the association some teeth in requesting addi-
tional medical information.19 2 Although HUD may disagree, at least the
courts have begun to acknowledge and prevent the abuses of the system that
currently plague virtually every association. 93
189. See id. Notwithstanding a disabled individual's legitimate request for an accommo-
dation to maintain an emotional support animal, the animal may not cause a nuisance. See
generally Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher, 813 N.W.2d 618, 624-26 (S.D. 2012).
190. Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. at 63835.
191. See, e.g., Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429; Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57.
192. Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x 464, 468 (11 th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
193. See Roustan, supra note 9.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The short answer is: Yes, a city council can give praise to a deity-at
least through the medium of prayer offered at a council meeting to a generic
"God." But can such a prayer be addressed to, say, "our Lord, Jesus Christ"?
The answer to that question is far from clear, as the disparate decisions ren-
dered by federal appellate courts in two recent cases demonstrate.'
II. A TALE OF Two COUNTY COMMISSIONS
In a decision rendered in 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that even sectarian prayers are constitutionally
permissible at governmental meetings, as long as the governmental entity has
not acted with the impermissible motive of advancing a particular religious
belief or affiliating the government with a specific faith.2 The result of that
decision was the rejection of an Establishment Clause challenge, brought by
* B.A., Columbia, 1968; J.D., Harvard, 1971; Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center, since 1976.
1. Compare Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), with Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty. (Pelphrey III), 547 F.3d 1263, 1278
(11th Cir. 2008).
2. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1271-74, 1278.
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citizens and taxpayers of Cobb County, Georgia, in the following circums-
tances:
Both the Cobb County Commission and the Cobb County Planning
Commission have a long tradition of opening their meetings with a
prayer offered by volunteer clergy or other members of the com-
munity. The clergy have represented a variety of faiths, including
Christianity, Islam, Unitarian Universalism, and Judaism, and their
diverse prayers have, at times, included expressions of their reli-
gious faiths.
... The majority of the speakers are Christian .... The taxpayers
contend that, between 1998 and 2005, 96.6[%] of the clergy . . .
were Christian. During the same period, adherents to the Jewish,
Unitarian Universalist, Muslim, and Baha'i faiths also provided
invocations.
. . . Over the past decade, 70[%] of prayers before the County
Commission and 68[%] of prayers before the Planning Commis-
sion contained Christian references. Often the prayers ended with
references to "our Heavenly Father" or "in Jesus' name we pray."
Prayers also contained occasional references to the Jewish and
Muslim faiths, such as references to Passover, Hebrew prayers, Al-
lah, and Mohammed.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the Forsyth County-North Carolina-Board of Commissioners
was acting in violation of the Establishment Clause in the following circums-
tances:
On December 17, 2007, [plaintiffs] decided to attend a meet-
ing of the Forsyth County Board of [County] Commissioners.
Like all public Board meetings, the gathering began with an invo-
cation delivered by a local religious leader. And like almost every
previous invocation, that prayer closed with the phrase, "For we do
make this prayer in Your Son Jesus' name, Amen."
3. Id. at 1266-67.
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. . . [T]he prayers frequently contained references to Jesus Christ;
indeed, at least half of the prayers offered between January 2006
and February 2007 contained concluding phrases such as "We pray
this all in the name under whom is all authority, the Lord Jesus
Christ," "[I]t's in Jesus' name that we pray[,] Amen," and "We
thank You, we praise You, and we give Your name glory, and we
ask it all in Your Son Jesus' name."
. . . [T]he prayers repeatedly continued to reference specific tenets
of Christianity. These were not isolated occurrences: between
May 29, 2007 and December 15, 2008, almost four-fifths of the
prayers referred to "Jesus," "Jesus Christ," "Christ," or "Savior."
In particular, most of the prayers closed by mentioning Jesus ...
[n]one of the prayers mentioned non-Christian deities.4
The purpose of this essay is to briefly explain and evaluate these deci-
sions.
III. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A. Lemon
Beginning in 1971, in a case known as Lemon v. Kurtzman 5 the Su-
preme Court of the United States has, most often, in cases involving Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to government actions, required the government
to establish that it acted with a secular purpose, that the primary effect of the
challenged action is not the advancement of religion, and that the challenged
action has not resulted in "excessive entanglement" between government and
religion.6 If the government does not prevail with respect to each prong of
this test-known forever after as the Lemon test-it loses.' Note, too, that it
is not a required element of an Establishment Clause violation that a go-
vernmental actor be found to have promoted, or advanced, a particular reli-
gion-although such a finding would almost surely lead to a finding of un-
4. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 342-44.
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-13. The test has been modified in recent years, but remains essentially the
same. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864-65 (2005), cert denied, 131
S. Ct. 1474 (2011); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
7. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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constitutionality;8 the promotion or advancement of religion in general will
suffice.'
B. Marsh
In a 1983 decision, Marsh v. Chambers,'o however, the Supreme Court
of the United States-without applying the Lemon test-rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the offering of prayers, by a paid chaplain, at
the start of each day of a state legislative session." If the Supreme Court had
applied the Lemon test in Marsh, answers to one or more of the following
questions would have been dispositive: Is the offering of a prayer motivated
by a religious purpose?l 2 Is its primary effect the advancement of religion?
Does the practice of bringing members of the clergy to government meet-
ings, for the purpose of offering religious invocations, result in excessive
"entanglement" of church and state? The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
believed that the answer to each of these questions was clearly "yes" -as
did the Supreme Court Justices who dissented in Marsh'4 -but the majority
felt no need to even address those questions.'" Instead, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, relied on historical practice, particularly the fact that
the very first Congress in 1789 adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to
open each legislative session with a prayer.16 "Clearly," he concluded, "the
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amend-
8. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). "The clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another." Id.
9. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
10. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
11. Id. at 784-85, 792-95.
12. Note that Justice O'Connor later argued, more than once, that "[p]ractices such as
legislative prayers . . . serve the secular purposes of 'solemnizing public occasions' and 'ex-
pressing confidence in the future."' Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Such practices, she wrote, were examples of
"ceremonial deism," which, by virtue of their "longstanding existence" and "nonsectarian
nature," "do not convey a message of endorsement of particular religious beliefs." Id. at 630-
31; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35-37 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). But note that she spoke explicitly of "nonsectarian" religious references. See
Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
14. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 784-86, 792-94 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 786-88.
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ment."17 Prayers in public schools, of course, had already been found to vi-
olate the Establishment Clause, 8 and would be again,' 9 but there was no
eighteenth century precedent for these practices, as there was for "legisla-
tive" prayer.2 0 Thus, the practice was constitutional.2' While commentators
continue to criticize this decision,22 there is no reason to believe that it is
likely to be overruled.
C. Endorsement
Another important component of contemporary Establishment Clause
doctrine, which emerged a year after the Marsh decision, should also be
noted: The introduction, by Justice O'Connor, of the principle that the Es-
tablishment Clause should be understood as primarily posing a bar to gov-
ernment "endorsement" of religion. 23 "Endorsement," she wrote, "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the po-
litical community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."2 Thus, government
action would violate the Establishment Clause if it had either the purpose or
effect of conveying a message of endorsing religion.25 She later clarified that
this determination was to be made through the eyes of "an objective observ-
er."2 6 Although this "endorsement" test-as it is now understood-found its
first expression in a concurring opinion, its influence was detectable in Su-
preme Court majority opinions almost immediately.2 7
17. Id. at 788.
18. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433, 436 (1962).
19. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315, 317 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
20. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-88.
21. Id. at 795.
22. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REv. 972, 976-77 (2010) ("Religious liberty, within the sphere of
legislative prayer, thus becomes a perverse sort of zero-sum game-no matter how it is done,
someone's religious liberty will inevitably be lost as a consequence. The only way to really
protect religious liberty, it seems, is by not having legislative prayer at all."); Eric J. Segall,
Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the Establishment Clause,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 725 (2009).
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
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If this test were to be applied, might not the offering of a prayer at a city
council meeting be perceived, by an objective observer, as an endorsement of
religion, particularly if the prayer makes reference to the beliefs of a particu-
lar religion?
IV. DOES MARSH GOVERN?
Because of the Marsh decision, lower courts have agreed that prayers,
benedictions, and invocations can be offered at the start of meetings of the
governing bodies of cities and counties, as well as at state legislative ses-
sions.28 This is a key threshold determination, because the generally applica-
ble Lemon and endorsement tests would presumably govern the question at
hand if the reasoning of the decision in Marsh-a case involving the utter-
ance of prayers at sessions of a state legislature, resolved on the basis of the
age-old practice of our national legislature-were found to be inapplicable at
the local legislative level.29
Should Marsh apply at the local level, or not? Again, the general as-
sumption by lower courts is that it does.30 But Judge Middlebrooks, dissent-
ing in the Cobb County case, took the position that Marsh-"an outlier in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence"-should not govern prayers at govern-
ment meetings at the local level.31 Prayers at meetings of the county com-
missions involved in this case, he argued, "hardly can be considered part of
the fabric of this nation's history."32 He pointed out, in addition, that the
county commission-in contrast to a state legislature-performed executive
and adjudicative, as well as legislative, functions, 33 contrasting a state legis-
lative session "with a county commission acting in a quasi-adjudicative role,
deciding whether to terminate an employee, suspend a liquor license, or grant
a zoning variance. A citizen seeking relief has little choice but to attend."3
28. See the summary of the relevant case law in Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1272-74
(II th Cir. 2008). But a federal appellate court recently held that the Marsh legislative prayer
exception did not apply to meetings of a school board which students routinely attended. Doe
v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784, 787-88 (1983); see, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275. But see Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 380-81, 383 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding Marsh inapplicable to school
board meetings).
31. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1286 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1287.
34. Id. at 1288.
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I would expand upon Judge Middlebrooks' arguments by adding the
following two pertinent contentions. The first is that the core reasoning of
Marsh-i.e., that the practice of the first Congress provides strong evidence
that the generation that drafted and ratified the Establishment Clause did not
believe that the utterance of prayers at legislative sessions violated the
Clause 3 5-- does not apply at the local level because the framers had no reason
to consider the applicability of the Clause at the local level."6 The second-
concededly offered without the benefit of empirical research-is that a meet-
ing of a local "legislature" is qualitatively different from a meeting of a state
or national legislative body. There may be some citizens "in the gallery" at a
state or national legislative session, but ordinary citizens are far more likely
to be in attendance-perhaps regularly, perhaps only occasionally-at
monthly meetings of city or county commissions, not only because they may
have business before the commission, as Judge Middlebrooks noted, but also
because it is common for such a local legislative body to provide the oppor-
tunity for attending citizens to address the commission. 37 Arguably, these
experiential differences-between local legislative entities, on the one hand,
and state and national legislatures, on the other-ought to make a difference
with respect to the applicability of Marsh;3 8 an aberrational legal principle
based solely on a historical practice should not be lightly extended to apply
to situations not wholly analogous to that historical antecedent.3 9
The majority in the Cobb County case, however, was not persuaded that
state and local governments should ever be treated differently, for Establish-
ment Clause purposes.4 0
V. THE LIMITS OF MARSH
Assuming, as the court in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey IJJ)41
held, that Marsh does control the issue of prayer at local government meet-
ings,42 what limitations apply, with respect to the content of such prayers?
35. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983).
36. Indeed, it is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution initially had no
application to state and local governments. Not until 1940 did the Supreme Court declare that
the Establishment Clause was "incorporated" into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thereby applicable to state and local governments. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
37. See Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1287-88 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
38. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88.
39. See id. at 786-89.
40. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275-76.
41. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).
42. Id. at 1271.
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Again, Marsh provides an answer.43 The majority in Marsh was untroubled
by the fact that the Nebraska legislature had, for sixteen years, paid a cler-
gyman of one denomination (Presbyterian) to offer prayers which, according
to the chaplain, were "nonsectarian" and "Judeo Christian"-whatever that
might mean-in nature." The court indicated, as well, that the chaplain
"removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legis-
lator." 45 These facts led Chief Justice Burger to utter the following, fateful
sentence: "The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as
here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."46
That sentence embodies the key consideration in lower court cases involving
prayers at local government meetings. 47 But what does it mean?
It might be understood to mean that "nonsectarian" prayers are permiss-
ible at such meetings, but that sectarian prayers are not.48 But Judge Pryor,
writing for the majority in the Pelphrey III case, rejected that interpretation
as "contrary to the command of Marsh that courts are not to evaluate the
content of the prayers absent evidence of exploitation."49 The Supreme
Court, he added, "never held that the prayers in Marsh were constitutional
because they were 'nonsectarian.'"' 0 "The 'nonsectarian' nature of the ...
prayers [in Marsh, he maintained,] was one factor in [a] fact-intensive analy-
sis.""i In rejecting this suggested dividing line, Judge Pryor went so far as to
say that "[w]e would not know where to begin to demarcate the boundary
between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions," observing that even plain-
tiffs' counsel had difficulty, during oral argument, in deciding whether "king
of kings" was a sectarian reference.52
43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
44. Id. at 793 & n.14.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 794-95.
47. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 394-95, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 191, 202 (5th Cir. 2006); Wynne
v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 294, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2004).
48. Indeed, a few federal appellate courts had, prior to the Eleventh Circuit ruling in
Pelphrey III, interpreted Chief Justice Burger's language that way. See Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at
399-400; Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d at 202; Wynne, 376 F.3d at 299-300; see also
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (discuss-
ing Marsh); Lund, supra note 22, at 1000.
49. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008).
50. Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1272.
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In the Joyner ruling, however, the majority of the three-judge appellate
panel appears to have interpreted Marsh quite differently." Judge Wilkin-
son, virtually at the outset of his opinion, stated that "both Supreme Court
precedent and our own . . . establish that in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny, invocations must consist of the type of nonsectarian prayers that
solemnize the legislative task and seek to unite rather than divide."54 Later in
the opinion, he asserted that "[t]he cases ... seek to minimize these risks"-
the appearance of religious preference and sectarian strife-"by requiring
legislative prayers to embrace a nonsectarian ideal." Still later, he quoted
with approval a statement in an amicus brief that "the exception created by
Marsh is limited to the sort of nonsectarian legislative prayer that solemnizes
the proceedings of legislative bodies without advancing or disparaging a
particular faith." Admittedly, Judge Wilkinson distinguished, rather than
disapproved of, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pelphrey III, pointing to
the fact that invocations in Cobb County occasionally featured non-Christian
references, whereas no such non-Christian references had found their way
into Forsyth County Commission meetings during the time period in ques-
tion.57 It must also be acknowledged that Judge Wilkinson's opinion leaves
the reader with some uncertainty as to exactly what is, and is not, forbidden
in terms of the content of future Forsyth County prayers." Still, the Fourth
Circuit appears to have embraced the "sectarian/nonsectarian" distinction
that the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally rejected. 9
53. See Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 347-49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
54. Id. at 342.
55. Id. at 347.
56. Id. at 349 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty at 13, Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1232)).
57. See id. at 352-53.
58. The appellate court affirmed the district court's issuance of "a declaratory judgment
that the 'invocation policy, as implemented, violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitu-
tion' and an injunction against the Board 'continuing the Policy as it is now implemented."'
Joyner, 653 F.3d at 345, 355. Moreover, Judge Wilkinson, immediately after stating that
"legislative prayer[s] must strive to be nondenominational so long as that is reasonably possi-
ble," said this: "Infrequent references to specific deities, standing alone, do not suffice to
make out a constitutional case. But legislative prayers that go further-prayers in a particular
venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put its weight behind a particular faith-
transgress the boundaries of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 349. That statement arguably
implies that Judge Wilkinson was not in fact insisting upon a strict avoidance of all sectarian
prayers. See id.
59. Id. at 348, 354-55. Judge Wilkinson said nothing regarding the feasibility of such a
demarcation, despite the fact that Judge Niemeyer, dissenting, complained that "there is no
clear definition of what constitutes a 'sectarian' prayer." Id. at 364 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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So, is the distinction between "sectarian" and "nonsectarian" prayers in
fact an unworkable one, as the Eleventh Circuit panel concluded?60 "Secta-
rian" is a word with clear meaning.61 Would it perhaps be appropriate to
treat, as "nonsectarian"-and thus permissible-any word or combination of
words like, "king of kings"-which is 1) a common noun-like "lord"-or
adjective-like "heavenly," 2) not generally capitalized, and 3) capable of
usage outside of a religious or historical context? The word "god," even
when capitalized, could be viewed as nonsectarian as well.62 A sectarian
reference, in contrast, typically takes the form of a proper noun-or possibly
an adjective-that is always capitalized-such as "Jesus," "Jehovah," "Al-
lah," or "Buddha." 63  On the other hand, a combination of nonsectarian
words, like "the father, the son, and the holy ghost," may have attained secta-
rian meaning. The matter is thus not entirely subject to bright-line rules, but
does that fact render the distinction unworkable?"
Furthermore, if the distinction between sectarian and nonsectarian ref-
erences does not provide the limiting principle in this context, what does?
The majority in Pelphrey III latched onto the precise language of Marsh,
which again, indicated that legislative prayers would violate the Establish-
ment Clause only if the offering of such prayers "has been exploited to
proselytize or advance" a single religion, and concluded:
The district court did not clearly err when it found that the
County did not exploit the prayers to advance one faith by using
predominantly Christian speakers. Although the majority of
speakers were Christian, the parties agree that prayers were also
60. A powerful argument that the distinction is "illusory" is found in Robert J. Delahun-
ty, "Varied Carols": Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 517,
522-26 (2007) ("However inclusionary or ecumenical a prayer is intended to be, it necessarily
incorporates a particular theological viewpoint or belief . . . ."). But see Lund, supra note 22,
at 1001 ("It is true that there is no clear boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers.
But that does not make the nonsectarian standard incoherent or meaningless.").
61. It is defined, most pertinently, as "confined to the limits of one religious group, one
school, or one party." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2052 (3d ed.
2002).
62. See id. at 973, 2052. Note that the word "god" is defined in Webster's Dictionary-
without capitalization-as, inter alia, "one who wields great or despotic power." Id. at 973.
63. See Lund, supra note 22, at 1005 (quoting Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
64. Professor Lund suggests "a possible response to Judge Pryor" as follows: "Religious
language objectionable to any of the three major monotheistic religions (Christians, Jews, and
Muslims) is overly sectarian and unconstitutional; language acceptable to all three religions is
nonsectarian and constitutional." Id. at 1006.
65. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227,
1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998)); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
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offered by members of the Jewish, Unitarian, and Muslim faiths.
This diversity of speakers ... supports the finding that the County
did not exploit the prayers to advance any one religion. The
speakers . . . represented "a wide cross-section of the County's re-
ligious leaders."
The finding that the diverse references in the prayers, viewed
cumulatively, did not advance a single faith also was not clearly
erroneous. The Xrayers included references from Christianity and
other faiths ....
More guidance, as to the meaning of this "exploitation" concept, may
possibly be derived from the thoughtful opinion of Judge Story, whose ruling
in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey 1)67 at the district court level was af-
firmed by the Eleventh Circuit.68 Judge Story made clear-as Judge Pryor
did not-that "exploitation" was all about legislative motive:
Marsh identifies as the focus of the Establishment Clause analysis
the purpose or intent of the legislature, rather than the effects of its
practices. . . . In this way, . . . Marsh deems the purposeful prefe-
rence of one religious view to the exclusion of others as the prima-
ry evil to be avoided in the arena of legislative prayer.
Judge Story was open, it seemed, to finding such an impermissible purpose
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, as he explained, "[w]here the invoca-
tion of sectarian concepts or beliefs, viewed from a cumulative perspective,
reaches a certain level of ubiquity and exclusivity, the appearance of a legis-
lative preference for one particular faith may well become constitutionally
intolerable."70 But he was not led to that conclusion in this case, and the
Eleventh Circuit panel found no clear error in that regard.7 1
Fairly obviously, that approach raises difficult questions as to how
many religions must be represented at such meetings, and how frequently, in
order to dispel the suggestion of impermissible preference.7 2 Is a municipali-
66. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1277 (citation omitted).
67. 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
68. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1266-67.
69. Pelphrey 1, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
70. Id. at 1339.
71. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1277-78 (citing Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., (Pelphrey II), 448
F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368-70 (N.D. Ga. 2006)).
72. Professor Lund, critiquing Pelphrey III, said this:
It ends up suggesting that the presence of a few non-Christian references or speakers saves a
legislative prayer program, regardless of how frequent the Christian references are. . . . If such
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ty on safe ground if only Christian and Jewish clergy are invited to deliver
prayers, if other religions have a presence in the city? If not, must every
such religion be given its opportunity to offer such prayers, or only those
with a sufficient number of adherents in the local population-and, if so,
what number might that be? Moreover, if the city's practice is evaluated on
a calendar-year basis, does the selection of a non-Christian prayer leader
once during that year supply enough diversity to defeat an inference of pur-
poseful preference for Christianity? Would the answer depend on the demo-
graphics of the municipality? If not, how many such opportunities would
suffice?7 3
The matter of how visiting clergy are selected has also arisen, in cases
addressing these issues.74 Indeed, in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey II)71
itself, at the district court level, it was found that the County Planning Com-
mission had, at one point in time, engaged in a constitutionally unacceptable
method of selecting clergy, because representatives of "certain faiths were
categorically excluded . . . based on the content of their faith."" The Ele-
venth Circuit upheld that finding, but emphasized that "[t]he 'impermissible
motive' standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to
pray. The standard instead prohibits purposeful discrimination."
In an earlier Fourth Circuit case from Virginia involving this issue, a
county resident who identified herself as a "witch" (or wiccan) asked to be
added to the list of religious leaders available to deliver invocations at meet-
ings of the county board of supervisors. When her request was denied, she
brought suit.79 The district court held that "the [c]ounty had engaged in [an]
impermissible denominational preference," but the court of appeals re-
versed.o Given the fact that the Nebraska Legislature's employment of a
single Presbyterian minister was deemed constitutional in Marsh," along
with the fact that Chesterfield County had invited a diverse group of clergy
token diversity is all that the Establishment Clause requires, state[] and local governments will
have no real problem. But little will be left of the requirement of denominational neutrality.
Lund, supra note 22, at 1013.
73. Professor Segall has raised similar questions. Segall, supra note 22, at 734.
74. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 284, 287
(4th Cir. 2005); Pelphrey II, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
75. 448 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
76. Id. at 1373-74.
77. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2008).
78. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.
79. Id. at 280.
80. Id. at 280, 288.
81. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
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to its meetings, the court's rejection of a requirement of all-inclusiveness is
82not surprising.
Indeed, there appears to be no established requirement of all-
inclusiveness with regard to represented religions, in this context. In the
Eleventh Circuit, under Pelphrey III, there is only a ban on purposeful exclu-
sivity.83 But, in determining whether a municipality has crossed the line and
entered the realm of impermissible preference, it seems likely that courts will
have to address the kinds of "diversity" questions that I have raised herein.
Might it not be more challenging for a municipality to try to achieve a satis-
factory balance, in terms of religions represented and frequency of inclusion,
than it would be to simply insist on the delivery of only nonsectarian pray-
ers-a policy that would reduce the significance of who utters the prayer?8
VI. EMPHASIZING THE "ENDORSEMENT" PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court is quite unlikely to overrule Marsh, but even a Su-
preme Court generally regarded as primarily "conservative""8 could conceiv-
ably revisit its holding in Marsh and refine it in light of its later-developed
"endorsement" concept; a refinement that would clarify Marsh as permitting
only nonsectarian prayers at legislative sessions and meetings.86 This would
be consistent with Marsh, because the chaplain in Marsh, as noted above,
described his prayers as "nonsectarian" and had abandoned explicitly Chris-
tian references in his prayers.
The endorsement concept is arguably relevant here, even though it is
not presently applied-given the court's exclusive reliance on Marsh-in the
82. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.
83. Pelphrey Ill, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2008).
84. Again quoting Professor Lund: "The nonsectarian standard has virtues and vices ....
Its chief virtue is that it seems the only workable solution to the problem of denominational
exclusivity." Lund, supra note 22, at 1023. But here, Professor Delahunty is the optimist,
contending that a sufficiently pluralistic approach to diversity of religious speakers can ensure
that legislative prayer does not result in religious preference. Delahunty, supra note 60, at
561-68.
85. As of this writing, four members of the Court have yet to directly address (as Su-
preme Court Justices) any substantive Establishment Clause issue. Justice Kennedy, moreo-
ver, while usually allied with two Justices who have rarely-if ever-found violations of the
Establishment Clause, has parted company with them in school prayer cases. See e.g., Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Justice Kennedy has, however, argued
against the use of the "endorsement" test. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. See id. at 595 (majority opinion).
87. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983).
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legislative-prayer context. " Recall Justice O'Connor's explanation that go-
vernmental endorsement of religion is constitutionally impermissible because
it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community."" I think it very likely that a Jewish resident of
a city, attending even a single meeting of the city commission-much less
repeated instances of the same experience-at which a Christian minister
voices his thanks to "Jesus Christ," would feel like an "outsider." I think it
quite possible, too, that a Muslim resident of the city, attending a rare city
council meeting at which a Jewish rabbi delivered the invocation, would
experience a reinforcement of his belief that only Christians and Jews really
matter in America. Admittedly, in each of these instances, these feelings of
alienation might be alleviated if the Jew or the Muslim knew that his or her
religion would be represented at a future meeting of the city council; but it
might not be represented, or he or she might not know that it would, or it
might not make him or her feel any better about the situation.
In his majority opinion in the Joyner case, Judge Wilkinson displayed
welcome sensitivity to such concerns, saying this:
Take-all-comers policies that do not discourage sectarian prayer
will inevitably favor the majoritarian faith in the community at the
expense of religious minorities living therein. This effect creates
real burdens on citizens-particularly those who attend meetings
only sporadically-for they will have to listen to someone profess-
ing religious beliefs that they do not themselves hold as a condi-
tion of attendance and participation. 90
A reinterpretation of Marsh, to allow only nonsectarian prayers, would
eliminate such unnecessary feelings of alienation.91 Unless Marsh is over-
turned, of course, there will be no judicial relief forthcoming for sensitive
atheists.
VII. CONCLUSION
For now, however, in the Eleventh Circuit, the looser standard of the
Pelphrey III decision governs. But, of course, to say that a municipality is
88. See Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275, 1277.
89. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (2012); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 28
(2d Cir. 2012); Mullin v. Sussex County, No. I1-580-LPS, 2012 WL 1753662, at *10-11 (D.
Del. May 15, 2012).
91. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95.
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free, under our Constitution, to engage in a certain practice is not to say that
it must do so. Every city or county commission in the Eleventh Circuit-
which includes Florida-can weigh the perceived benefits of sectarian ex-
pression against the costs thereof. It may then choose, on its own and free of
judicial compulsion, to decline to allow the utterance of sectarian prayers at
its meetings. Or, per Pelphrey III, it may choose to allow sectarian prayers,
taking care to avoid appearing to prefer one religion over others.92
92. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1271-72; see generally e.g., Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of
Lakeland, No. 8:10-cv-1538-T-1 7-MAP, 2012 WL 589588, (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2012).
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Teenagers, take off your clothes" is what people all over the world be-
gan to hear as word spread that Disney incorporated a hidden message in its
acclaimed movie "Aladdin."' The message, unavoidable, yet undetectable
* Laura R. Salpeter, Esq. is an analyst at Cassel Salpeter & Co., LLC. Laura assists the
firm with M&A, restructuring, and financial advisory services. Laura is a member of the
Florida Bar and the District of Columbia Bar and graduated from Nova Southeastern Universi-
ty's Shepard Broad Law Center with cum laude honors in 2010.
** Jennifer I. Swirsky, Esq. currently serves as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable
Judge Mark E. Polen at the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the State of Florida and will be
joining Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. as an associate beginning in the summer of 2012. Jennifer
is a member of the Florida Bar and graduated from Nova Southeastern University's Shepard
Broad Law Center with magna cum laude honors in 2010.
Both Laura and Jennifer were staff members of Nova Law Review and held board
positions as Articles Editors.
1. See Haley Rinas, Aladdin and the Naked Truth, in Hidden Sexual Messages Found in
Disney Movies, BOWLING GREEN ST. UNIV., 3 (2003), http://www.bgsu.edu/departments/tcom
/faculty/ha/tcoml03fal12003/gpl3/gpl3.pdf.
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unless paid close attention to, has been linked to "the power of suggestion"
because once people were informed of the rumored dialogue, they too began
to hear it.2
Visual hidden messages have also surfaced in Disney movies.3 For ex-
ample, in "The Lion King," Disney artists manipulated their drawings to
briefly flash the word "SEX" on the screen, scrawled out in a cloud of dust.4
This "message[] can be identified as [an] indirect hidden message[], which
mean[s] the viewer was not directly intended to see the message, unless pos-
sibly looking for such material."5 However, a Disney representative argued
that this scene was in a wholesome family film, and anything that might be
viewed as inappropriate for such a film is perceptional.6
Subliminal messaging is not specific to Disney, nor is it solely sexual in
nature.' In several situations, musicians have included messages in their
songs that have not only led to atypical acts by listeners, but have also alle-
gedly led to their self-inflicted deaths. In response to reactions, such as
these suicides, courts have explored the issue of whether subliminal messag-
es are considered speech and covered by the same First Amendment protec-
tions as actual lyrics-which are classified as speech.9
Similarly, this article will explore the conflicting First Amendment
rights of both the entertainment industry and the fans of the particular pieces
of work. Sections H and Ill will discuss the history of attempts at uncons-
cious persuasion and current regulations regarding subliminal messaging.
This article will further explain how subliminal messages work and the sick-
ness these messages have been reported to cause. This article will also dis-
2. Id.
3. Brett Pilkington & Steve Raszka, The Lion King Uncensored, in Hidden Sexual Mes-
sages Found in Disney Movies, BOWLING GREEN ST. UNIV., 4 (2003), http://www.bgsu.edul
departments/tcom/faculty/haltcomI03fall2003/gpl 3/gp1 3.pdf.
4. Id.; see LION KING (Walt Disney Pictures 1994).
5. Pilkington & Raszka, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, 2 Families Sue Heavy-Metal Band as Having Driven Sons to
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1990, at Cl3.
8. E.g., id. The album that was said to influence the suicides of teenage boys was
Stained Class by Judas Priest, and the lyrics at issue included "Let's be dead" and "Do it." Id.
"Both the group and its record label [were] charged in a civil suit with the liability arising
from the manufacture and marketing of a faulty product, as well as negligence and intentional
and reckless misconduct." Id.
9. See Matthew W. Daus, Subliminal Messages in Music: Free Speech or Invasion of
Privacy?, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTs L. REV. 241, 257 (1992) (citing Vance v. Judas Priest,
No. 86-5844, 1990 WL 130920, at *23 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990)). See generally Pamela
Marsden Capps, Note, Rock on Trial: Subliminal Message Liability, 1991 COLuM. Bus. L.
REV. 27.
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cuss the unconscious processing and impact on behavior, as well as the pub-
lic's reactions to these messages and the consequences these messages have.
The final sections will analyze the First Amendment implications, as pre-
viously mentioned, that may exist for both parties to the message-the crea-
tor and the viewer or listener. This article will conclude with recommenda-
tions by the authors and a brief summary of the issue.
II. THE HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS AT UNCONSCIOUS PERSUASION
The word "subliminal" is a Latin word derived from the words "sub,"
meaning below, and "llmen," meaning threshold.'o The Oxford English Dic-
tionary defines subliminal as that existing or functioning "under the thre-
shold of consciousness."" Subliminal messages are generally defined as
"the projection of messages by light or sound so quickly and faintly that they
are received below the level of consciousness."l2 There are various ways to
achieve a subliminal message including: A picture or written command
flashing briefly on the screen, audio messages "prerecorded and later multi-
tracked over regular [music or] promotional" messages, or even inserting
messages into "empty" programming pauses. 3 Many studies have shown the
effectiveness of these subliminal techniques and how they play into the psy-
chodynamic activity of our unconscious mind.14
The concept of subliminal messages can be dated back as early as 400
B.C.; however, the study of their use and the effect they have on the uncons-
cious mind "did not become prevalent until the mid-to-late 1800s."" "The
concern[s] about ... subliminal messages came to the forefront in the mid-
1950s [when] James Vicary [stated at] a press conference . . . that his com-
pany, Subliminal Projection Inc., was ready to offer the use of subliminals to
customers."' 6 Based upon the increase of Coca-Cola and popcorn sales after
flashing the messages, "Drink Coca-Cola" and "Hungry? Eat Popcorn"
"every five seconds for one three-thousandth of a second" over Kim Novak's
face in the movie "Picnic," Vicary was ready to offer his proclaimed success
10. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 40 (2d ed. 1989).
11. Id.
12. Nicole Grattan Pearson, Note, Subliminal Speech: Is It Worthy of First Amendment
Protection?, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 775, 776 (1995) (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 279 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Capps, supra note 9, at 29.
13. Harry Schiller, Note, First Amendment Dialogue and Subliminal Messages, II
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331,332(1982-1983).
14. Id. at 332-35.
15. Pearson, supra note 12, at 776.
16. Id. at 777.
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to the world.17 According to Vicary, the influence was not conscious; how-
ever, if the viewer's predispositions were consistent with the subliminal mes-
sage, the audience would be influenced by it.'8 The public, however, op-
posed these techniques, voicing concerns such as: general uneasiness of the
unknown, the belief that the world was being brainwashed, and an attempt at
mind manipulation." The public grew so concerned that they soon believed
that "the Soviets would use subliminals to turn neutral nations against the
United States, thereby increasing their power throughout the world." 20
Shortly after these concerns grew, all major television networks21 announced
that they "would not accept subliminal advertising or use the technique in
their productions."22 However, this was not the end to experiments in subli-
minal messages and the effects they have on the unconscious mind.
The next year, "in 1957, a television station in Maine conducted . . . [a
subliminal message] experiment" of its own. 23 The station stated "every ele-
ven seconds at one eightieth of a second," every other day for two weeks:
"IF YOU HAVE SEEN THIS MESSAGE, WRITE WTWO." 24 Further, in
1958, CBS-TV in Canada broadcasted subliminals "between one-fifth and
one-half second 352 times in one half hour" the words "Telephone Now."25
Unfortunately, both of these experiments "did not increase mail or calls from
viewers" and were ultimately deemed a failure.26 This upset, however, did
not slow down others from experimenting on their own.
The same year, in 1958, on WTTV in Bloomington, Indiana, two uni-
versity faculty members "superimposed a low-contrast beam, which con-
veyed a subliminal message [over a nightly television movie] at a dimmer
light level than the [original]."27 This message notified viewers to "Watch
17. Id.
18. See Olivia Goodkin & Maureen Ann Phillips, Note, The Subconscious Taken Cap-
tive: A Social, Ethical, and Legal Analysis of Subliminal Communication Technology, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (1981) (quoting JAY KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY, AND LAw 274 (1967)).
19. Pearson, supra note 12, at 777.
20. Id.
21. Daus, supra note 9, at 243. CBS, NBC, and ABC, along with national and state civic
organizations, and the National Association of Radio Television Broadcasters condemned
subliminal messages. Id.
22. Capps, supra note 9, at 30.
23. Pearson, supra note 12, at 777.
24. Schiller, supra note 13, at 332.
25. Pearson, supra note 12, at 777; Schiller, supra note 13, at 332.
26. Pearson, supra note 12, at 777.
27. Id.; Schiller, supra note 13, at 332.
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Frank Edwards," and was intended to make the viewers watch the television
show without changing the channel.28
Following the rage of visual subliminals, audio subliminals soon be-
came popular with radio stations.29 In 1962, the popular network station
CBS announced that "subliminals were used in [its] regular program cre-
dits." 30 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) received an abun-
dant amount of complaints from their viewers, to which CBS declared the
whole "announcement was a hoax."3 1
In 1973, both television and radio were issued a warning against any
further subliminals due to a public outcry when the Premium Corporation of
America superimposed the message "Get It" on a toy called "Husker-Du"
during Christmas.32 "The Premium Corporation of America 'claimed that it
was inserted by an exuberant but misguided young man from the production
house in Minneapolis."' 33
Politics has also been an area that subliminals have boomed in. 34 Ac-
cording to Dr. Key, the use of SEX "embeds" "have been used in every polit-
ical campaign of any magnitude in the United States and Canada for at least
twenty-five years-if not much, much longer."3 Dr. Key reports:
In a recent U.S. congressional election campaign in Virginia's 10th
District, SEX "embeds" were discovered in the campaign literature
of all candidates except one who could not afford to hire an adver-
tising agency. . . . A formal complaint was initiated by one candi-
date with the Virginia Election Commission, charging the use of
subliminal techniques in the candidate's literature. The commis-
sion refused to accept the complaint.36
Subliminals had yet to find their place in the world of advertisements;
however, they had evolved into both encouraging and artistic devices. 37 For
example, subliminals had been used in movies such as "The Exorcist" and
"My World Dies Screaming" to enhance the tension level by projecting the
28. Pearson, supra note 12, at 777-78.
29. Id. at 778.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Schiller, supra note 13, at 332-33.
32. Pearson, supra note 12, at 778; Schiller, supra note 13, at 333.
33. Schiller, supra note 13, at 333.
34. See id. at 335.
35. Id. (quoting WILSON BRYAN KEY, MEDIA SEXPLOITATION 8 (1976)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). SEX embeds is the technique of engraving the letters S-E-X or S-X into
the natural lines of faces or hands of candidates in promotional ads. Id.
36. Id. (omission in original) (quoting KEY, supra note 35, at 8).
37. See Schiller, supra note 13, at 333-34.
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word "BLOOD" 38 or placing a serpent across a villain's chest subliminally.
Furthermore, subliminals had been shown "to induce weight control, pro-
mote safe driving, [and] prevent shoplifters."39 For instance, a television
station in Los Angeles "flashed 'DRIVE SAFELY' during [a] news [pro-
gramming] in an ... attempt to lower the accident rate."40 Additionally, an
audio "Black Box" was used by Dr. Hal Becker playing messages such as,
"do not steal" and "I am honest" over music in department and grocery stores
in order to deter shoplifting.4 1 Research in this area illustrates how sublimin-
al messages affect "the moral and ethical implications" of the unconscious
mind.42
III. CURRENT REGULATION
Since its beginnings in the public eye, subliminals have drawn the atten-
tion of governmental restraints on its use.4 3 "[O]n February 8, 1958, and
March 12, 1958, [r]epresentatives .. . introduced bills H.R. 10802 and 11363
[in order] 'to make unlawful the use of subliminal advertising on television
and [to prescribe] penalties."' There were never hearings held on either bill
and, to date, there is no law dealing with the issue of subliminal messages.45
Despite having power, although limited, the FCC and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have made minimal regulations in the area of sublimin-
als.46 Acting as a quasi-judicial body, the FCC and the FTC have "wide dis-
cretion to determine whether any practice is unfair." 47 Although challenged
38. Id. at 333. "The Exorcist" involved a "subliminal deathmask[] in the old priest's
dream sequence." Id. Purportedly, "after seeing the subliminal deathmask ... a young Indi-
anapolis man fainted and broke his jaw [and was] suing Warner Brothers for $350,000 be-
cause 'the subliminal image constitutes an intentional defect in the movie . . . that . . . can
harm the viewer."' Id.
39. Pearson, supra note 12, at 779.
40. Schiller, supra note 13, at 334.
41. Pearson, supra note 12, at 779; Schiller, supra note 13, at 334. "The 'Black Box' is a
soundmixer-like those used by deejays-that mingles bland music with the desired subli-
minal message." Pearson, supra note 12, at 779. According to Dr. Becker, the "use of subli-
minals would increase in the future: '[Slomeday there will be audio conditioning in the same
way we now have air conditioning."' Id. at 779-80 (quoting Schiller, supra note 13, at 335).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 781.
44. Thomas Albert Bliss, Subliminal Projection: History and Analysis, 5 CoM/ENT L.J.
419, 425-26 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. 10802, 85th Cong. (2d Sess. 1958));
H.R. 11363, 85th Cong. (2d Sess. 1958).
45. Pearson, supra note 12, at 782.
46. Id.
47. See Daus, supra note 9, at 253. However, "the FTC has no specific regulations or
policy concerning subliminals." Schiller, supra note 13, at 359.
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in Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC,48 the FCC attempted to ban "the broadcast
of functional music to the general public, but allowed private subscribers to
receive it."49 The court reasoned that the listening audience had "consented
to listen to the music" being broadcasted and did not consider the issue of the
unconscious listeners' invasion to privacy.o The regulation was overturned
when the court held that "functional [music] can be, and is, of interest to the
general radio audience."" Further action was taken in 1958 by the National
Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters (NARTB) by stating it
banned subliminals, however, this ban did not supply any enforcement me-
chanisms, and the NARTB has never actively searched for subliminals.52
"Courts have [also] dealt with [the issue of] subliminals both directly
and indirectly."53 An indirect analysis can come from the court discussing a
captive audience, the right to privacy, or even deceptive advertising.54 For
instance, the court in Banzhaf v. FCC65 analogized the potential grave conse-
quences cigarettes might have on a person's health with those impacts of
subliminals and the grave consequences the unknown might have.56 Specifi-
cally, the court stated "[i]t is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of
this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it
may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word."57
Furthermore, in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.,58 the court, in finding that a
physician could be influenced subliminally to administer the wrong drug,
stated:
48. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
49. Pearson, supra note 12, at 782 (footnote omitted).
"Functional Music is best known by the trademark of its largest producer, Muzak. It is de-
signed by psychologists to achieve specific psychological and physiological changes in listen-
ers. Depending on the intentions of the designers of a particular program, the music may in-
crease sales in supermarkets, increase the vigilance of military personnel, or reduce the error
rate in a factory."
Id. at 782 n.55 (citation omitted) (quoting Charles B. Kramer, Comment, Judicial Recognition
and Control of New Media Techniques: In Search of the "Subliminal Tort", 14 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 733, 740-41 (1981)).
50. Pearson, supra note 12, at 783.
51. Functional Music, Inc., 274 F.2d at 548-49 (emphasis in original).
52. Pearson, supra note t2, at 783.
53. Id. at 784.
54. Id. at 784-85.
55. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
56. Id. at 1099-1101.
57. Id. at 1100-01. The court recognized the use of subliminals merely as continued and
repetitive advertising which has an effect on the unconscious viewer. See id.
58. 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973) (in bank).
5032012]
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
The record reveals in abundant detail that Parke, Davis made every
effort, employing both direct and subliminal advertising, to allay
the fears of the medical profession which were raised by know-
ledge of the drug's dangers. It cannot be said, therefore, that Dr.
Beland's prescription of the drug despite his awareness of its dan-
gers was anything other than the foreseeable consequence-
indeed, the desired result-of Parke, Davis' overpromotion .... 5
More recently, there have been cases involving people who commit sui-
cide, or attempt to, because of subliminal messages affecting those who al-
ready have a predisposition for depression or suicidal thoughts.' This "sui-
cide zone" creates a compulsion to attempt suicide and illustrates the effect
subliminals have on human behavior.
IV. How SUBLIMINAL MESSAGES WORK
The receipt of subliminal messages is undetectable and unnoticeable,
however, the effects such messages have on the brain are quite the opposite.62
Subliminal messages may be sent through text, images, or sound.63 Each
form of media affects the brain by submitting a signal to the brain, which,
over time, trains it to perform in a particular way.M Generally, subliminal
messages work by flashing the message quickly enough so "that the con-
scious mind [will not] pick up on it, but the rest of [the] brain has time to
decipher." 6 5
While subliminal messages may be used positively-by teaching one's
brain to refrain from bad habits, change old habits, and create new, positive
habits-these messages may result in negative effects on the person who is
receiving the message.66 For example, the power of these messages may
59. Id. at 664.
60. Pearson, supra note 12, at 787-88.
61. Id. A "suicide zone" "occurs when a person has both a personality predisposition and
a situational predisposition to commit suicide." Id. at 788 (quoting Vance v. Judas Priest, No.
86-5844, 1990 WL 130920, at *12 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990)).
62. "What Is Subliminal and How Subliminal Messages Work?", SUBLIMINAL-
ANALYSIS.COM, http://www.subliminalanalysis.com/subliminal-messages.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
63. Id.
64. Id. The example given on SubliminalAnalysis.com involves the "psychological
dependence on [nicotine and] the act of smoking and the craving for tobacco." Id. Sending
subliminal messages to the nicotine-dependent brain will eventually result in elimination of
the craving and the need to smoke. Id.
65. "What Is Subliminal and How Subliminal Messages Work?", supra note 62.
66. Id.
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affect one's mood rather dramatically, resulting in extreme happiness or ex-
treme depression, depending upon the context of the message.67 Studies have
shown that the negative message with emotional meaning is more likely to
be recalled.
Specifically, a United Kingdom study at the University College London
asked participants "to recall and identify words with an emotional value"
after they were visually displayed "for as little as [seventeen] millise-
conds." The results of the study showed that humans are programmed to
respond subconsciously to potential threats.70 While advertisers may use this
information to their advantage and phrase their advertisements using words
that are more likely to be recalled by consumers-and while there are clear
"evolutionary advantages" to a quick response to a threatening message-the
conclusive demonstration "that people are much more attuned to negative
words," may also serve as a severe disadvantage.
V. VIOLENCE AND SICKNESS
Studies show that only 3% of the public is affected by subliminal mes-
sages when considering whether the messaging may result in violence. 72 The
question proposed by doctors has been whether that 3% of the population
suffers from some form of brain damage and if so, whether the lesions on
their brain causing the specific damage lend a hand in the eventual violent
acts that may occur.73 Those who have frontal lobe lesions, specifically, are
more apt to respond violently to messages suggesting as such, and within that
portion of the population, the percentage of those who respond violently to
messages increases to 13%.74
Typically, people respond to messages regarding how they should act,
"what groups they belong to, or what type of person they are," without the
67. Id.
68. David Morgan, Negative Subliminal Messages More Effective, ECONWATCH (Sept.
28, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-5346300-503983.html.
69. Id. The words in the study included positive words-"flower," "peace," "cheerful"-
and negative words-"agony," "despair," "murder." Id. The positive words were recalled
59% of the time, while the negative words were correctly recalled 77% of the time. Id.
70. Id.
71. UCL Study: Subliminal Messaging 'More Effective When Negative', UCL NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/0909/09092801.
72. Unlocking the Secrets and Powers of the Brain: Subliminal Messages and Violence
at 00:13:00, DISCOVER MAG. (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Subliminal Messages and Violence],
http://discovermagazine.com/video/unlocking-secrets-power-of-brain-nsf/subliminal-
messages-and-violence.
73. Id. at 00:21:00-:35:00.
74. Id. at 00:47:00-1:04:00.
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realization they are responding to a message at all.75 "There are groups of
people in society who are being given the message 'we expect you to be vio-
lent,' and [there are] groups of people who are being given the message 'we
don't expect you to be violent.'" 76 These people may be given messages
both explicitly and with unawareness.
A major concern of these messages rests on the impact they will have
on children.78 It is suggested that children are most susceptible to media in-
fluences of violent behavior during "the prime of a child's emotional deve-
lopmental life."79 "[I]n American society today, where image management
has become a lucrative business and a matter-of-fact necessity in commerce,
industry, politics, and personal relationships, style has ripened into an intrin-
sic form of information."so The mass media has begun to tell people who
they are and what they should do, eliminating the need for people to think for
themselves and instead, replacing their thoughts with images that may be
violent in nature.
Competing views exist relating to whether media messages influence
people and create violence in society.82 One view is that the media does not
create violent people and instead, simply offers an aggression outlet for those
who may need one. 83 These same media supporters blame people's overin-
dulgence in media, victimizing those who go out and act subsequent to view-
ing violent messages.8M Contrarily, "many political scientists, educators, and
criminologists and much of the general public" believe that media influences
its audience, providing somewhat of a "cultural training ground" for those
who are receiving messages through television, movies, music, and the like.
Those who take this contrary opinion state that media teaches those in socie-
ty what their roles are and what is expected of them, often communicating
messages that "are confusing, inaccurate, and distorted."86
75. Id. at 1:55:00-:58:00 (quoting Dr. Rebecca Saxe).
76. Id. at 3:00:00-:09:00 (quoting Dr. Rebecca Saxe).
77. Subliminal Messages and Violence, supra note 72, at 3:08-:15.
78. See JUDITH M. SGARZI & JACK MCDEVITr, VICTIMOLOGY: A STUDY OF CRIME
VICTIMS AND THEIR ROLES 70 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Pat O'Mailey & Stephen Mugford, Crime, Excitement, and Modernity, in
VARIETIES OF CRIMINOLOGY: READINGS FROM A DYNAMIC DISCIPLINE 205 (Gregg Barak ed.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 70-71.
83. SGARZI & MCDEVITr, supra note 78, at 71.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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VI. UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING AND THE IMPACT ON BEHAVIOR
What impact, if any, do subliminals actually have on our behavior?
This is a question that is still ripe for controversy. Researchers and scientists
agree that subliminal messages do exist and the brain can receive messages
without being consciously aware of it.87 However, the controversy is sur-
rounded around whether the received messages impact human behavior."
Particularly, researchers want to know "whether subliminal communication
actually has the ability to induce new behavior or whether it can only streng-
then behavior to which an individual is already predisposed." 9 Theories of
the impact subliminals have on human behavior have been presented by var-
ious researchers who have come to diverse conclusions, such as:
1) Individuals are capable of unconsciously receiving information,
and yet can discriminate, recognize and react to the content of such
information, resisting negative content and more readily accepting
positive content.
2) A predisposing behavior or response is not always necessary for
effective subliminal suggestion, and certain new responses may be
induced.
3) Individuals do not react uniformly to subliminal messages pre-
sented at the same level of intensity and duration.
4) Certain personality characteristics may predispose some indi-
viduals to be more easily influenced by subliminal suggestion.
5) Related to the concept of predisposition, the effectiveness of
subliminal communication may be somewhat dependent upon the
motivational and emotional states of the receiver.
87. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 788.
88. Id. at 788-89. Specifically, researchers want to know whether "subliminal persua-
sion" exists. Id. at 788 (emphasis omitted).
89. Id. at 789.
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6) [S]ubliminal persuasion is possible yet inefficient.
7) [Tihe messages do register in some deep recess of the brain and
apparently influence behavior.90
These theories of impact all illustrate how subliminals can affect the viewers'
or listeners' thoughts; however, what impact does it play on others? Have
subliminals been an auxiliary to discrimination, stereotyping, characterizing,
and favoritism? Has television and radio shaped the images, messages,
thoughts, and values of our society? We are incapable and defenseless
against these messages absorbing into our minds because of our inability to
even know we are receiving information.9'
A. Discrimination, Stereotyping, Categorizing, and Favoritism
Subliminal messages that are positive and convey a message that pro-
mote new beginnings and healthy lifestyles have more or less been tolerated
in our society. However, it is just as easy for a subliminal message to convey
a derogatory or prejudicial statement that manipulates the behavior of the
listener towards certain people because of their class, race, or gender. The
court in Vance v. Judas Priest92 argued:
[Subliminals] do not convey ideas or information to be processed
by the listener so that he or she can make an individual determina-
tion about its value. They do not enable an individual to further
his personal autonomy. Instead, they are intended to influence and
manipulate the behavior of the listener without his [or her] know-
ledge.93
Invisible influence-the power of persuasion-in the wrong hands, could
lead to the malicious, unethical, and the immoral molding of one's mind.
Our behavior, one could argue, is part of our conscious mind; however, our
90. Id. at 789-92 (quoting Hal C. Becker, Secret Voices: Messages that Manipulate,
TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71).
91. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 788-89.
92. No. 86-5844, 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990).
93. Id. at *25.
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attitude and the ways it affects our behavior are subconscious. 94 Few people
want the way they act-whether accommodating or aggressive towards a
person-to be prejudiced by mental bias because of news broadcasts, adver-
tisements, and movies. However, this type of situation happens daily, and
it is what psychologists Timothy Wilson and Nancy Brekke describe as
"mental contamination."96 According to researchers, stereotyping, categoriz-
ing, and prejudice are all things that are learned at a young age and are un-
controllable when such an encounter takes place.97 For example, studies
have shown countless times that when an individual is physically attractive,
people-subconsciously-tend to treat them in a more accommodating
way.98 Or, on the contrary, an employer might give an employee a less than
favorable evaluation because of the employee's skin color or gender-even
if the employer did not intend to be persuaded by such stereotypical social
judgments. 99 In both instances, the assessor is influenced by an observed
attribute and is unaware of such influence."*
Furthermore, researchers have speculated that stereotyping is a process
of the subconscious.' 1 A stereotype is an "abstract structure[] of knowledge
or [an] understanding[] that link[s] group membership to a set of traits or
behavioral characteristics." 02 Indeed, one of the most influential cases of
subconscious stereotyping is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.03 Here, Ann
Hopkins was told to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'0
At trial, a social psychologist, Dr. Susan Fiske, testified as an expert witness
that "Price Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping." 05 Dr.
Fiske based her conclusions not only on the sexual comments made by the
94. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 334-35 (1987).
95. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117 (1994).
96. Id. More specifically, "mental contamination" is defined as "the process whereby a
person has an unwanted judgment, emotion, or behavior because of mental processing that is
unconscious or uncontrollable." Id.
97. Id. at 127.
98. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1135 (1999);
see also Wilson & Brekke, supra note 95, at 117.
99. Wax, supra note 98, at 1135.
100. Id.
101. Id.at1136-37.
102. Id. at 1136.
103. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
104. Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id.
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partners, but also comments made by those who hardly knew her or had con-
tact with her.106 The Court, in more or less words, only affirmed the perva-
siveness of unconscious stereotyping by stating, "some of the partners' re-
marks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the
proper behavior of women."'0o
Nonetheless, how can we control something that is invisible? Studies
have shown that an individual's attempt to control or suppress one's own
discriminatory or stereotypical responses commonly leads to an increase in
frequency of the same.os Therefore, the issue of unconscious discrimination
becomes a double-edged sword. On the one hand, we are defenseless against
messages when we do not have the awareness we are receiving them, and on
the other hand, if we are aware of them and attempt to control them, they
only amplify.1 9
B. Activists
Over time, our society has come to accept different walks of life. More
than one would presume that prime time television has been one of the most
skillfully capitalized resources for gaining acceptance in the wider society."o
Activist groups, since as early as the 1950s, have been involved in the strug-
gle to control network television.'1 The theory motivating this struggle is
that people depend on television for most of their information about the
world."2 Television is the most commanding, comprehensive, and control-
ling mass medium in our society.' 13 It has such considerable power to shape
and reinforce the values in American society by just telling a fictional sto-
ry.114 For instance, television bears the ability to transform the "contours of
the real world" and allows our subconscious to confuse such images with
reality."' One advocacy group leader proclaims that television "is an elec-
tronic vending machine, offering sweet-smelling bodies, stuffed, satisfied
106. Id. Gender-neutral remarks were made, describing Hopkins as "universally disliked"
and "consistently annoying and irritating." Id.
107. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 236-37.
108. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 95, at 127.
109. See id.
110. See generally KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, TARGET: PRIME TIME-ADVOCACY
GROUPS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION (1989).
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 6-7.
114. Id. at 6.
115. MONTGOMERY, supra note 110, at 7.
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bellies, and great vacant gaps in our cerebral cortex."' 16 By the early 1980s,
industry leaders finally accepted the fact that advocacy groups were going to
be a permanent part of influencing television programming."'
The portrayals of stereotypical characters in television-such as busi-
nessmen, women lawyers, elderly individuals, homosexuals, union workers,
and minorities-have influenced how we view these characters in the day-to-
day world."' Activists, having knowledge of this influence, have used tele-
vision to their advantage."l9 For instance, pro-abortion activists in 1971 used
a popular television show entitled Maude to educate and influence society
about the dangers of an unconstrained population growth.120 This led to a
number of other activist groups pressuring networks to televise shows con-
cerning their controversial issues in a favorable light.12' By the 1972-1973
television season, networks were broadcasting lesbian seduction, wife-
swapping, homosexuality, and intermarriage-both race and religion-
segments.122 The success of these shows and the slowly progressing accep-
tance of different groups have demonstrated the ability to influence and
change the views of our nation based on the subconscious ability to confuse
the images of television with reality.
VH. THE PUBLIC REACTION
The term "subliminal advertising" is widely known throughout the pub-
lic, and a vast majority understands the basic concept of the use of subliminal
messaging and views it as a successful means of influence by advertisers of
brands. 23 When subliminal messaging first surfaced, the FCC received nu-
merous inquiries and complaints about the technique.124 The majority opi-
nion was that use of such messaging was "sneaky" and worrisome because it
left the public unsure what the government would do with this technique in
its hands.125
116. Id.
117. Id. at 6.
118. See id. at 7-8.
119. Id.at29-31.
120. MONTGOMERY, supra note I10, at 31.
121. See id. at 38-40.
122. Id. at 39-40.
123. Martha Rogers & Kirk H. Smith, Public Perceptions of Subliminal Advertising: Why
Practitioners Shouldn't Ignore This Issue, 33 J. OF ADVERTISING RES. 10, 11 (1993).
124. FCC Information Bulletin on Subliminals, BROADCASTING 101, http://www.broad
castingl0l.ws/subliminal.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
125. Id. Specifically, the public expressed concerns that subliminal messages "could be
used to brainwash Americans with foreign ideologies." Id.
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Shortly after the Vicary study was conducted, a study in San Francisco
determined that 41% of the 324 participants involved were familiar with the
term "subliminal advertising," were of the impression that use of such was
unethical, but 67% of those with awareness stated they would not be deterred
from watching a television program, despite having a belief that such mes-
sages were included in the commercials.126 A later study conducted showed
an increasing public awareness of the term "subliminal advertising" and that
the method of advertising was successful in product sales.2 7
In response to the public's concerns about the use of subliminal messag-
ing and advertising, the FCC provided that the Communications Act was
generally applicable to use of these messages.12 8 Under Section 303 of the
Act, the FCC explained that all communications were controlled and regu-
lated by the Commission, which was "guided by public interest, conveni-
ence, or necessity."' 29 "Section 326 [of the Act] prohibits the FCC from cen-
soring broadcast material, including advertising." 30 However, the govern-
ment has stated that those on the receiving end of messages are entitled to the
knowledge of who is attempting to persuade them.'3 ' The requirement that
all broadcast material "is to be announced as paid for or furnished, and by
whom" is a longstanding requirement, dating back to the Radio Act of
1927.132
In response to the public's concern of unbridled access to its subcons-
cious, the FCC contended that Section 317's applicability would extend to
the prohibition of "subjecting audiences to messages received from undis-
closed sources."l 3 3
Application of Section 317 to sponsored subliminal program
material presented, for example, at five-second intervals, would, in
practical effect, ban unrestricted use of the technique. In addition,
Sections 73.1212 and 76.221 (applicable to broadcasting and cable
television, respectively) of the Commission's Rules require that
sponsored program matter be announced as such. Therefore, it ap-
126. Rogers & Smith, supra note 123, at 11.
127. Id. This later study, and a study which followed, also revealed that those who were
familiar with subliminal messaging were more educated than those who were not. Id. The
researchers recognized a correlation between education and awareness-as the educational
level of the participants rose, awareness did as well. Id.
128. FCC Information Bulletin on Subliminals, supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. FCC Infornation Bulletin on Subliminals, supra note 124.
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pears that sponsored telecast or cable-originated material that is
subliminally projected falls within these rules.134
Despite the rules that existed, broadcast companies continued to air sub-
liminal messages and claimed they never received information from the FCC
regarding the ban of such advertisements.135 As such, the FCC issued a Pub-
lic Notice explaining that "[w]e believe that use of subliminal perception is
inconsistent with the obligations of a licensee, and therefore we take this
occasion to make clear that broadcasts employing such techniques are con-
trary to the public interest. Whether effective or not, such broadcasts clearly
are intended to be deceptive."l36
VIII. LEARNING TO SEE THE INVISIBLE
Subliminal messages are all around, though most are covert.'37 Howev-
er, one can train his or her self to recognize these messages and decipher the
intent of the message, so long as certain steps are followed.13 1
First and foremost, it is imperative that the recipient of the message is
able to identify what the nature of the message is, for example, what particu-
lar item a subliminal advertisement is enticing one to purchase.139 Next, the
audience member should read, view, or listen to the message carefully, start-
ing at the top or beginning of the message and paying close attention to it all
the way through the bottom or the end.'" This will allow the audience mem-
ber to determine whether "the message [is] suggestive, embedded, or
overt."'41 Messages that are embedded in images are typically more difficult
to decipher, while the rare, overt messages are more visible.142
Important while examining a message for subliminals, is the ability to
recognize if anything seems unusual or misplaced.143 In order to best utilize
one's ability to recognize these items, it is critical to be relaxed; otherwise, a
subliminal message is easy to overlook.'" This is because subliminal mes-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. How to Spot Subliminal Ads: Steps on How to Spot Subliminal Ads, STARTUPBIZHUB,
http://www.startupbizhub.com/how-to-spot-subliminal-ads.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. How to Spot Subliminal Ads: Steps on How to Spot Subliminal Ads, supra note 137.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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sages are meant to trigger the subconscious of those who are simply glancing
at or thoughtlessly listening to a form of media.145 Specifically, when look-
ing at advertisements, reading the advertisement in reverse may reveal a
message that was undetectable in the original reading. 14 6 Failure to pay care-
ful attention to the details of the message may result in behaviors in which a
person would not have normally engaged. 47 1In other words, the messages
may remove from a person his or her ability to make a decision about a par-
ticular product or may result in atypical behavior due to his or her failure to
decipher a message. 148
Accordingly, the question becomes: Is it constitutional, or even ethical,
for companies and organizations to include these messages into their media
in order to influence people's performances?
IX. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In 1791, freedom of speech was guaranteed by the First Amendment
with the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 149 The First Amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law .. . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech;" however, this right is not absolute.o50 Speech
may be regulated because of certain ideas it conveys or by limiting certain
types of activities."' It has been argued that subliminal messages are not
speech because they "are not consciously perceived and are not meant to be
heard and discussed, [and] they do not advance the ideals of the Free Speech
Clause."l 5 2 In contrast, subliminal messages, like speech, are intended to
convey a message and have been proven to be effective in such con-
veyance.153 "[T]he central concern of the First Amendment ... is that there
be a free flow from creator to audience . . . ."154 "Freedom of speech is not
limited to political expression or comment on public affairs." 55
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See How to Spot Subliminal Ads: Steps on How to Spot Subliminal Ads, supra note
137.
148. See id.
149. U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal Perception and the
First Amendment: Yelling Fire in a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAmi L. REv. 1243, 1256 (1990).
150. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; Silverglate, supra note 149, at 1246.
151. Silverglate, supra note 149, at 1260.
152. Capps, supra note 9, at 32.
153. Id. at 33.
154. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,77 (1976).
155. Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
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A. Commercial Speech
Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, it
has a somewhat lesser protection for which there are numerous rules and
regulations with which advertisers must comply in order to be afforded the
protection.'5 6 The Supreme Court has defined purely commercial speech as
speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"" [and]
is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas."" 58 If commercial speech "is
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity," then it is protected.15 9
Does the very nature of the word subliminals place them into the category of
"misleading?" The incorporation of subliminals in advertising and still af-
fording them First Amendment protection under commercial speech has long
been a controversial issue.
Advertisements, as early as the seventeenth century, have used people's
emotions and nonverbal conditioning techniques in order to sell their prod-
ucts. 6 Intelligent advertisers appeal to a customer's "emotional or psycho-
logical needs" and portray a product that effectively conditions a consumer
to believe that this product will fulfill his or her needs.'6' So, how is basic
advertising different from advertising with subliminals? Both intend to con-
dition a positive response to a product in order to more effectively sell the
product, and both change the way people think to motivate sales or ratings.
One argument is that where basic advertisements are just intended to trigger
feelings and emotions and portray an artistic expression, subliminals in ad-
vertisements are only intended to trigger a response in favor of such adver-
tisements.162 However, supporters of this view also state, "[a] primary pur-
pose of music is to trigger emotion. Listeners often 'consume' musical emo-
tion purely for private enjoyment, but music can be used manipulatively as
well to enhance work production or to catalyze in store shopping beha-
vior." 63
156. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770-73 (1976); Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 493.
157. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted) (quoting Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
158. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
159. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
160. Silverglate, supra note 149, at 1261.
161. Id. at 1262.
162. See 0. Lee Reed & Douglas Whitman, A Constitutional and Policy-Related Evalua-
tion of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Nonverbal Techniques in Legal Advertising, 1988 BYU
L. REv. 265, 274-75, 285.
163. Id. at 276 (footnotes omitted).
2012] 515
74
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Although our verbal communications are an important factor in human
information, they are not the only form through which we receive informa-
tion.'6" Nonverbal communication, regardless of its categorization as subli-
minal or not subliminal, plays an important role as well.165 For instance,
when you have a conversation with someone, you perceive him or her not
only by what is being said with words, but also by his or her body gesture,
posture, tone of voice, eye contact, and tonal inflections. 166 Advertisements
use this same technique. 67 One study on television advertisements indicated
that:
[F]ewer than half of the commercials examined contained even
one of some thirteen possible categories of product-intrinsic in-
formation. . . . [However], [i]nformation theory holds that "infor-
mation is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the
outer world as we adjust to it, and make our adjustments felt upon
i c,168it."
The question remains unanswered: Are subliminal messages a part of
commercial speech? Advertisers, whether subliminals are used or not, must
still comply with the restrictions and regulations that our government has in
place. Psychological methods of persuasion are used in our everyday life;
the very purpose of an advertisement is to promote sales by altering your
view of a product. Does adding a subliminal message to an advertisement
change this purpose? Does adding an extra invisible influence, among the
many that naturally occur, violate our right to privacy?
B. Right to Be Free from Unwanted Speech
A chain of Supreme Court of the United States cases beginning in the
1940s balanced the right of an individual's privacy with another individual's
right to free speech.'6 9 These cases held that people should be free from un-
wanted speech, thereby restricting the First Amendment freedom of speech
164. Id. at 268.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 268-69.
167. Reed & Whitman, supra note 162, at 274.
168. Id. at 273-74.
169. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 748 (1978) (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (citations omitted); Rowan, 397 U.S.
at 738; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
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so as to only reach a captive audience.o70 However, the Supreme Court has
also held that if the unwanted audience is able to avoid the speech after hear-
ing it, the individual's freedom of speech will prevail. 7 1 Moreover, unless
one can illustrate that "the speech is offensive or objectionable, and the un-
willing listener or viewer is unable to avoid continued exposure to the mes-
sage or is captive in his or her home," then the individual's freedom of
speech will triumph. 2
Are all subliminals offensive? Is unaware speech the same thing as un-
willing speech? After reviewing the history of attempts at subliminal speech,
one can answer both of these questions in the negative.173 Furthermore, the
court has held in many instances that it is "better to err on the side of free
speech" in competing interests.174 For instance, the Supreme Court stated in
Martin v. City of Struthers"' that "[flreedom to distribute information to
every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the pre-
servation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health
regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." 7 6
On the other hand, one of the main purposes of free speech is personal
autonomy. 7 Personal autonomy "is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
By allowing the use of subliminals in an attempt to honor the right of free
speech, are we ultimately defeating one of its main purposes? Although the
speaker is entitled in a subliminal message to communicate his or her free
expression, the listener is denied his or her personal autonomy by not being
able to make his or her own decisions.
To label subliminal messages, as a whole, protected or unprotected
speech would be improper.'79 The more competent approach is to evaluate
each subliminal on a case-by-case basis and discuss each element necessary
170. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49; Lehman, 418 U.S.
at 303-04; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88-89.
171. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-12, 217-18 (1975) (cita-
tions omitted); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22, 26 (1971).
172. Capps, supra note 9, at 37.
173. See discussion supra Part 1l.
174. E.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977).
175. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
176. Id. at 146-47. Further, "[fireedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But
where a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to
its recipients both." Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
177. Pearson, supra note 12, at 794.
178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
179. See Silverglate, supra note 149, at 1264-65.
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to determine whether the speech is protected or unprotected, using a reason-
able person standard.
X. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the concern over subliminals came to the forefront in the mid-
1950s,so the issues surrounding the proper way to regulate them still have a
long way to go. Both federal and state legislation continue in the attempt to
protect the balancing interests of freedom of speech and freedom of privacy,
however, they have yet to settle this war.'8 ' Subliminals have become a
global issue, encompassing the media, the news, our entertainment, and in-
fluencing our everyday decisions and actions.
One of the easiest and probably most effective ways to resolve the is-
sues subliminal messaging may cause is to place warning labels on those
messages that contain them. This would allow an individual the ability to
refrain from hearing the subliminals if they do not wish to, and still allow an
individual to maintain his or her freedom of speech. For example, a simple
statement at the beginning of a CD stating, "this CD contains subliminal
messages," or a brief statement at the start of a television or media broadcast
to the same extent, could be the beginning of the end of this ongoing battle.
Although seemingly one of the simplest solutions, it still poses some prob-
lems. Is there really a way to know if a person fully consents to a message
when they do not know what it involves? Further, although an individual
may consent to hearing the message, he or she has not consented to the effect
the subliminal will have on his or her behavior in the future, or throughout
his or her entire life. Moreover, what if a person begins watching or listen-
ing to a show or the radio in the middle of the program? The warning stating
that this message contains subliminals would be missed and, therefore, the
individual would never consent.
Another simple, yet problematic, approach is to partially regulate sub-
liminals. A committee could be set up to regulate which subliminals are
allowed to be used and which are not. However, how will the government
decide who that committee consists of or which subliminals the committee
should prohibit? Our society can hardly come up with an exact definition of
what a subliminal is, so is there any way to partially regulate something we
cannot yet define?
The government could also try to ban subliminals altogether. However,
this is an unlikely solution as subliminals currently are afforded First
180. See id. at 1266-69.
181. See id. at 1266-67; see also Pearson, supra note 12, at 781-82.
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Amendment protection and a blanket ban would chill the speech of those
attempting to deliver the subliminal message. 18 2 Additionally, there are vari-
ous naturally occurring subliminal messages that happen daily and it would
be impossible to prosecute and deter the use of such subliminals. Moreover,
this would lead to a flooding of our courts if we allowed every painter, musi-
cian, broadcaster, or company to be sued for the invasion of privacy of an
individual whose behavior was affected in some way by a subliminal.
XI. CONCLUSION...
Subliminal message use, research, and regulation have come a long way
since the 1950s. With the greater use of technology and the means to pro-
duce subliminal messages, the use of them is only going to grow with time.
How this invisible influence has shaped the images, messages, thoughts, and
values of our society is a topic at the forefront of our concerns about subli-
minals. Are we incapable and defenseless against these messages absorbing
into our minds because of the lack of awareness that we are even receiving
information? This disputed question lies beyond the concept of communica-
tion and goes into the psychological theories of speech. Our experiences
throughout life shape our existence-should other people be allowed to
shape our experiences through subliminals? This is a question that can only
be answered with time.
Until that time comes, we, as viewing audiences, remain at the disposal
of filmmakers, musicians, advertisers, and other individuals involved in the
creation of media to receive their messages, whether voluntarily or not.
While we choose which movies we sit down to watch, which songs we listen
to, and which channels we change while watching television, the visual and
audio bits that lie beneath the surface of the messages are unavoidable. Until
this dispute is laid to rest, children today remain susceptible to hearing their
favorite cartoon characters urge them to undress in a public theater or seeing
182. See Silverglate, supra note 149, at 1264-65.
183. If you flipped directly from Section 11 of this article to the Conclusion, it is because
you likely recognized the subliminal messages the authors embedded throughout the section
entitled "The History of Attempts at Unconscious Persuasion." Though not a controversial
attempt, inclusion of this message is to show that these messages carry a certain level of influ-
ence over recipients of subliminals. While your freedom of speech was not affected, your
concentration on this article in sequential order was impeded due to the type of mind manipu-
lation this article analyzes. The content of the message embedded in this article is not in-
tended to affect the reader's mood, it is meant to minimally influence the conscious mind-or
subconscious mind, depending on how closely you, as the reader, are paying attention to what
you are reading-to prove the power of a subliminal message, whether visual or audible.
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the word "SEX" flash across the screen as they watch a classic animated
film. But those signals could not possibly be intentional-or could they be?
As long as those in the legal field are unable to answer this question,
movies, television shows, music, and commercials will continue to be pro-
duced, and those responsible for their creation cannot be asked to halt pro-
duction due to a mere possibility that our lives are being affected by some
undetectable and uninvited influence. So, in the meantime, it is lights, cam-
era, action, because as they say, the show must go on!
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing and smart grid technologies increase efficiency and
lower costs to telecommunication and energy consumers.' In addition, smart
grid technology results in lower fossil fuel consumption, and is therefore
considered a green technology. 2 U.S. privacy law has not kept up with the
pace of these technologies, especially in the area of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.' Specifically, search warrants are not required for government ac-
cess of information remotely stored by third party providers in some cases. 4
This area, known in the industry as digital due process, requires reformation
to the existing Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).
Currently, there is proposed legislation on this topic, which was intro-
duced to the Senate on May 17, 2011 as the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act Amendments Act of 2011.6 The proposed legislation includes an
updated requirement for a search warrant for government access of informa-
tion remotely stored by third party providers and addresses some of the
Fourth Amendment protection issues.'
This paper will suggest that the proposed legislation should include
smart grid technology. In addition, this paper will suggest that the independ-
ent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule should be considered
because they may undermine the proposed legislation's goals. The next sec-
1. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, 31 ENERGY L.J. 81, 85-86
(2010); Jitendra Pal Thethi, Realizing the Value Proposition of Cloud Computing: CIO's
Enterprise IT Strategy for Cloud, INFOSys, 2 (2009), available at http://www.infosys.com/cl
oud/resource-center/documents/realizing-value-proposition.pdf.
2. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 89.
3. Nate Anderson, Bringing US Privacy Law into the Cloud Computing Era, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 30, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/
bringing-us-privacy-law-into-the-cloud-computing-era.ars.
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
III 2009); Anderson, supra note 3.
5. Anderson, supra note 3; see Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 2703(a)-
(b)(1).
6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 11 2th
Cong. §§ 1-3 (2011).
7. Id. §3.
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tion of this paper includes a brief and simplified overview of cloud comput-
ing and smart grid technologies. Economic and environmental benefits of
both technologies are introduced in this section. Projections and statistics are
included to provide a perspective of the potential reach of the proposed legis-
lation.
The third section of this paper focuses on the current legal standards re-
garding privacy issues of cloud computing and smart grid technologies.
Constitutional requirements under the Fourth Amendment are discussed.
The outdated provisions of the ECPA are also outlined. This section con-
tains an overview of Katz v. United States8 and the current reasonable expec-
tation of privacy standard. Further, the evasion of the electronic communica-
tions privacy issue by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of On-
tario v. Quon9 is presented. Following the Quon overview, this section ad-
dresses the third party exception doctrine. Finally, this section ends with a
discussion of what would be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud.
The fourth section will provide information on the proposed legislation
that was presented to the Senate on May 17, 2011, which focuses on updat-
ing the ECPA and requiring the government to obtain a search warrant for
access to information stored by third parties beyond the existing 180-day
window. 0 This section recommends that because the energy companies will
face similar issues as smart grid technology becomes universally available,
smart grid technology should be included in the proposed legislation. Addi-
tionally, some exceptions that may challenge the goals of this bill are ad-
dressed in this section. Specifically, the independent source doctrine and the
inevitable discovery rule may provide a circular way around the legislation.
This section will explain both doctrines, and will suggest how these excep-
tions may provide loopholes that undermine the current proposed legisla-
tion's purpose.
The paper concludes with the Obama administration's position on the
changes in the proposed legislation and recaps the economic benefits of the
technologies. The conclusion summarizes the views presented in the third
section.
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
10. Compare Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 § 3,
with Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a)-(b).
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II. OVERVIEW OF CLOUD COMPUTING AND SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES
A. Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a technology that allows for an economically more
efficient use of Information Technology (IT) resources." The "cloud" is a
data hosting method and consists of networks, remote data storage, and re-
mote web-based applications.12  Businesses and consumers use "webmail
services, store data online, or . .. use software" applications having function-
ality in the cloud. 3 The cloud is where the remote IT applications, infra-
structure, and platforms reside, rather than at an in-house data center. 4 The
cloud could be a private network within an organization, a public network
provided by a third party vendor, or a hybrid of both. In a public network,
the applications are hosted by a third party provider and are delivered to the
end user via the Internet.' 6 End users may view their files, pictures, movies,
and emails at their visual display unit, which has access to the cloud." This,
in effect, gives users anywhere access to their applications and files stored by
the third party provider." Once information is stored in a third party cloud,
it may be retrievable years later, even if the end user deletes the informa-
tion.' 9 A few of the major third party cloud-computing providers include
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and AT&T.20
It is estimated that over sixty-nine percent of people in our country use
cloud computing for a variety of services. 2 ' Although there is a growing
trend utilizing cloud computing, the technology behind cloud computing is
11. See Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
12. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government
Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360-61 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 366-67 (2010);
see G Lakshmanan, Cloud Computing: Relevance to Enterprise, INFosYs, 2 (2009), available
at http://www.infosys.com/cloud/resource-center/documents/relevance-enterprise.pdf.
15. Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
16. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 363-64.
17. Blitz, supra note 14, at 367.
18. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2205,
2215 (2009).
19. See David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: An-
other Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 644 (2010); Email,
SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, http://ssd.eff.org/techlemail (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
20. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361; Anderson, supra note 3.
21. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
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not new.2 2 Increases in processor and network speeds, coupled with the abil-
ity to store data inexpensively, provided the technology for cloud computing
by the late 1990s. 23 Following this, virtualization enabled businesses to sepa-
rate their software and hardware and run their applications remotely. 24 Vir-
tualization was the impetus required to make cloud computing economically
attractive and advantageous. 25
Traditionally, many businesses have used an in-house data center IT
model.26 This required businesses to have enough capacity to handle peak
requirements and pay the associated fixed costs of peak capacity.27 Other
fixed costs included the "cost of servers and storage, [in addition to] em-
ployee salaries and overhead." 2 8 Cloud computing offers flexibility and scal-
ability, which enables businesses to only pay for what they actually use, or
their variable costs.29 The result is significant savings to businesses with
respect to the fixed costs associated with hardware, software, facilities, and
staff required for an in-house data center.30
It is projected that cloud computing will grow to account for a total pub-
lic and private network spend of $33.1 billion by 2013.1 There are some
revenue projections as high as "$160 billion over the next few years."3 2 It is
also estimated that cloud computing technology will be deployed for the ma-
jority of IT services by 2020.33
B. Smart Grid Technology
Another technological area that is beginning to experience significant
growth is smart grid technology. 34 With smart grid technology, utility com-
panies are able to read meters remotely, reducing the costs of the staff and
22. Jim Cooke, The Shift to Cloud Computing: Forget the Technology, It's About Eco-
nomics, Cisco, 1 (2010), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/aboutlac79/docs/pov/Shift
toCloud ComputingPOVIBSG.pdf.
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 1.
27. See Cooke, supra note 22, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
30. Cooke, supra note 22, at 2-3.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
33. Cooke, supra note 22, at 7.
34. See Kristi E. Swartz, Energy Caution over Smart-Grid Security Southern Co. Says
New Meters' Full Potential Needs Further Testing. Breaches Could Expose Data, Cause
Blackouts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 4, 2011, at A8.
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transportation required to read a meter on site.35  Energy usage may be
tracked and managed not only by the utilities, but also by consumers.36 The
technology involves a decentralized system, two-way information flow, and
two-way energy flow.37 Smart grid technology requires a collaborative effort
between "the IT industry, the telecom industry, the [I]nternet industry, the
cyber-security industry, the appliance manufacturing industry, the meter
manufacturing industry, and many more industries."38 President Obama an-
nounced $3.4 billion in smart grid investment grants in 2009.39 The United
States Department of Energy predicts that over fifty-two million more meters
will be installed by 2012.0
Experts in this area claim that the technology will result in a more effi-
cient, secure, and reliable system.4 1 It is predicted that with smart grid tech-
nology, electrical vehicles will "reduce our [country's] dependence on for-
eign oil by fifty-two percent."42 Additionally, with smart grid, it is estimated
that overall consumption will be reduced by up to four percent.4 3 A few mil-
lion metric tons of carbon dioxide is projected to be saved by 2030 with the
use of smart grid, making it a green technology. 4 Furthermore, smart grid
technology decreases the possibility of outages with its self healing charac-
teristic, which would contribute to a significant cost savings because it is
estimated that blackouts can account for $135 billion to commercial custom-
ers.45 Finally, it is estimated that 280,000 jobs would be created with the
implementation of smart grid technology.46
III. CURRENT LEGAL AND STATUTORY STANDARDS REGARDING PRIVACY
Privacy concerns affect both the cloud computing and smart grid tech-
nology industries.47 Consumers and businesses may hesitate to subscribe to
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 84.
38. Id. at 93.
39. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces $3.4 Billion Invest-
ment to Spur Transition to Smart Energy Grid (Oct. 27, 2009) (on file with The White House);
Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 161,
161 (2011).
40. Balough, supra note 39, at 162.
41. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 85.
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 88, 89.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 89.
47. Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4.
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services which expose them to the risk of unauthorized access to their private
information.4 8 Given the tremendous impact that the telecommunications
and energy industries have on the economy, it would be ideal to address the
privacy issues now, rather than later.49
A. Privacy Issues and the Fourth Amendment
End users of both cloud based and smart grid technologies are suscepti-
ble to privacy invasion.50 The nature of cloud computing lends itself to the
risk of insecure transmission of data." Even with some forms of encryption,
hackers are still able to access private information.5 2 Risks to the end users
are especially significant "when they [are] connect[ed] to ... public wireless
networks.""
Cloud computing services are not only exposed to cyber security issues
involving potential hackers, but also are exposed to government access to
private files and documents without a warrant in certain circumstances. 54
The Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Digital search and seizure using third party providers is much easier
than retrieving documents from a personal computer.5 6 In a digital environ-
ment, "law enforcement agents can obtain wiretaps, emails, text messages or
real time phone location information."5 It has previously been alleged that
information from a third party cloud computing provider has been directly
transmitted to government servers without a warrant. 8 In some cases, the
government has been accused of having access to the entire network of a
48. See Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4.
49. See Balough, supra note 39, at 161-65.
50. Id. at 165; Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
51. See Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 372.
54. Id. at 361-62.
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
56. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 386-87.
57. Id. at 385.
58. Id. at 385-86.
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provider, which would enable the government to monitor an individual with-
out involving the provider at all. 59
Similarly, there are also privacy concerns with smart grid technology."
It is not absolutely clear just how much information the new and future smart
meters will be able to accumulate. 61 The information obtained by the utility
would include all of the energy consumed within a home and might also in-
clude additional information, such as the energy charged to an electric vehi-
cle.62 The electric vehicle would likely be registered to a user, or a unique
identifier, so the data would follow the vehicle, even if it were charged
somewhere else.63 The information is gathered real-time for smart devices."
There are privacy implications when personal information-such as energy
consumption within the home, and travel habits outside of the home-may
potentially be tracked real-time.65
With smart grid technology, utilities currently use the Internet or other
public networks to transfer the data.66 The experts in the industry recognize
that the smart grid system will be vulnerable to cyber attacks, and to author-
ized access to private information. Additionally, "[u]tilities themselves
[may also] pose a threat to ... data" security through their internal monitor-
ing and maintenance of the smart grid. Other concerns with smart meters
include the possibility of information remaining from previous homeowners,
if not erased from the smart meter, and unauthorized landlord access in a
rental situation.
In the smart grid environment, law enforcement officials have previ-
ously used energy consumption data as an information tool.70 The officials
were able to use excessive energy consumption data to obtain warrants to
access homes where they suspected marijuana might be grown because of the
high energy usage. 7 1 Currently, it is not clear who owns the smart grid da-
ta-the end user or the utility.7 2 Third party cloud computing providers and
59. Id. at 386.
60. Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63.
61. Id. at 165.
62. Id. at 166-67.
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 166.
65. See Balough, supra note 39, at 165-67.
66. Id. at 168.
67. See id. at 169; Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note
1, at 87.
68. Balough, supra note 39, at 169.
69. Id. at 171.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 173.
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utilities similarly face the challenge of unauthorized access of private infor-
mation and Fourth Amendment privacy issues.73
B. ECPA Statutory Requirement
Digital Due Process is a coalition of major carriers including: AT&T,
AOL, Amazon, Microsoft, and others calling for a reform of the ECPA.74
The ECPA is made up of "the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), and the use of pen register information."" Whether the government
is required to obtain a search warrant, or only a court order, is determined by
how the communication is interpreted.76 If the communication is interpreted
to fall under the Wiretap Act, then a search warrant is required. On the
other hand, if a communication falls within the SCA, only a court order may
be required for government access.7 8
The main issue that the Digital Due Process coalition aims to address is
the lack of a warrant requirement for a third party provider to disclose private
communications and information to the government. 79 The coalition bases
its argument on the need for Fourth Amendment protection in the cloud
computing environment.80 Quoting Justice Brandeis, the coalition empha-
sizes that privacy is "the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most
valued by a free people."si
The ECPA does not clearly and effectively define how interception of
modern day communications, such as email, should be treated. 82 By defini-
tion, a cloud computing provider is both an electronic communications ser-
vice and a remote computing service. An electronic communication service
73. Balough, supra note 39, at 165; Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
74. About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?
objectid=37940370-2551-11 DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Who We
Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=DF652CEO-
2552-l1 DFB455000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
75. Andrew William Bagley, Don't Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of
Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 153, 167
(2011).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?
objectid-99629E40-2551-1 IDF-8E02000C296BAl63 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
80. About the Issue, supra note 74.
81. Id.
82. Bagley, supra note 75, at 167-70.
83. See id. at 169.
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provides users with the ability to send and receive electronic information.84
A remote computing service, on the other hand, includes third party remote
storage and applications. Under the United States Code sections 2703(a)
and 2703(b)(1)(B), after 180 days of an electronic communication, the gov-
ernment can compel a third party provider to release content information of
that communication without a warrant and without the higher burden of
probable cause.86
[Section] 2703. Required disclosure of customer communications
or records
(a) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in Electronic
Storage.-A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in
an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the proce-
dures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in
the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by
a court of competent jurisdiction. A governmental entity may re-
quire the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications
services of the contents of a wire or electronic communication that
has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications
system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means
available under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in a Remote
Computing Service.-(1) A governmental entity may require a
provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of
any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is
made applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection-
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if
the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the proce-
dures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in
the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by
a court of competent jurisdiction; or
84. See id. at 167-68.
85. See id. at 168-69.
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a-b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
III 2009); see Bagley, supra note 75, at 168.
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(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the sub-
scriber or customer if the governmental entity-
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena;
or
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsec-
tion (d) of this section;
except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section
2705 of this title.17
The advances in technology have made the ECPA outdated and insuffi-
cient in addressing privacy concerns.8 8 The standards have not been consis-
tently applied by courts and there is no adequate protection of personal in-
formation. 89 The main changes in technology that are not adequately ad-
dressed by the ECPA are email, cell phone location data, cloud computing
and social networking, and smart grid data.90
The ability of the government to obtain electronic communications from
a service provider without a warrant requirement9' demonstrates the problem
that the coalition of Digital Due Process aims to correct. 92 There were seven-
teen class action cases in 200 693 where the major telecommunications com-
panies had allegedly partnered with the National Security Agency (NSA) to
monitor phone calls and voluntarily provide information to the government. 94
The government had access to the information without obtaining a warrant.
The telecommunications companies were given legal protection when Presi-
dent Bush signed legislation granting immunity to the telecommunication
87. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis add-
ed).
88. About the Issue, supra note 74.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Bagley, supra note 75, at 174.
92. See Background, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.
cfm?objectid=C00D74CO-3C03-1 IDF-84C7000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
93. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1333
(J.P.M.L. 2006).
94. See Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2006); In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Tele-
comms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. at 1334.
95. See Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 900, 911; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
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providers when assisting government in the fight on terrorism.96 The NSA
may have continued to intercept email and phone communications into
2009.9'
Turning to the energy industry, the ECPA may provide some protec-
tions if a smart meter is considered to fall within the definitions under the
Wiretap Act, where law officials would have to obtain a warrant for access to
the information." Under the Stored Communications Act, however, the level
of privacy protection will depend on how the smart grid is defined." If the
smart grid is categorized as a remote computing service, then after 180 days
of the data storage, the government could compel the utility to release the
content of the information without a warrant.1"
Given the technology movement toward remote storage of data, it is
predictable that smart grid technology will ultimately be treated similar to
cloud computing, i.e., as an electronic communication service and a remote
computing service."o' The technologies in the industries are converging in
that there is an integration of IT and Operational Technology (OT). 10 2
"There is a strong push to . . . use . . . broadband, instead of utility-owned
wires, for the transfer of smart meter data back to the utilities."tos However,
the technology currently available allows for the direct communication of the
smart meter to the utility." One supplier of smart meters explains:
Gathering real-time data from intelligent endpoints provides
the brainpower that drives the smart grid. [This supplier] outfits a
variety of intelligent endpoints with its Communications Module
to gather and relay this information. The . . . Communications
96. Bagley, supra note 75, at 157 n.16; James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for
Wiretapping: Restrictions Are Eased, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
97. Bagley, supra note 75, at 159.
98. See Balough, supra note 39, at 177.
99. Id. at 179.
100. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
111 2009).
101. See Jesse Berst, Breakthrough Best Practices for Blending IT and OT-Lessons from
Duke and Accenture, SMART GRID NEWS.COM (July 7, 2011), http://www.smartgridnews.com
/artman/publishlBusinessLessons Learned/Breakthrough-best-practices-for-blending-IT-
and-OT----lessons-from-Duke-and-Accenture-3797.html.
102. Id.
103. Balough, supra note 39, at 168.
104. See Intelligent Endpoints with Brains, SILVER SPRING NETWORKS, http://www.
silverspringnet.com/products/intelligent-endpoints.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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Modules support two connections-one into the utility's smart
grid network and one into the consumer's home area network. 05
In other words, the utility is able to gather the real-time data because the
communicating devices, or intelligent endpoints, reside at the end user's
home and at the utility.1" This is analogous to a cloud computing provider
gathering data communicated between a computer residing at a residence and
the cloud. Therefore, it is predictable that the same privacy issues that are
currently faced by the cloud computing providers will be faced by the utili-
ties in the near future with the universal implementation of the smart grid.'
C. Katz v. United States and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The modem standard for privacy with regard to electronic surveillance
is based on Katz.' In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of a phone booth and monitored the peti-
tioner's conversations during phone calls he made while in the phone
booth.'09 The Supreme Court of the United States was asked to address
whether a public telephone booth is a protected area of an individual's right
to privacy."o The Court reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places."' 1 ' The Court stated:
One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
in private communication.112
105. Id.
106. Id.; see News Release, AT&T, AT&T to Offer Wireless Smart Grid Technology to
Utility Companies (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=48
00&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=26613&mapcode=enterprise/mk-att-sustainability.
107. See Balough, supra note 39, at 161-62, 171-72.
108. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511
(2010).
109. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
110. Id. at 349.
Ill. Id. at 351.
112. Id. at 352.
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The standard explained in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz is
followed today and is the reasonable expectation of privacy test.113 The rea-
sonable expectation of privacy standard has two prongs.1 4 Under the first
prong, an individual must subjectively have an expectation of privacy." 5
Under the second objective prong, society would have to recognize it as a
reasonable expectation of privacy."'6
There has been criticism of the subjective nature of the Katz test and
some inconsistent results in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard."'7 For example, in Oliver v. United States,"' the Supreme Court of
the United States held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for activities conducted in fields that could have been seen by
lawful aerial surveillance." 9 In Oliver, two agents approached a farmhouse,
followed a footpath around a locked gate, and entered into a field where ma-
rijuana was grown.120 The Court explained that an expectation of privacy in
open fields is not one that society would recognize as reasonable.121 The
Court held that no expectation of privacy attaches to open fields.122
However, in Bond v. United States,123 the Court distinguished between
visual and tactile observation of property.124 In Bond, a bus passenger's lug-
gage was placed in the overhead storage area.125 A border patrol agent
squeezed the luggage as he walked through the bus.12 6 The Court applied the
two pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test.127 Under the first prong,
the passenger was found to expect privacy because he placed his belongings
in an opaque bag and positioned the bag directly above him.128 Under the
second prong, the Court explained that a bus passenger may expect some
handling of the bag, but not handling in an exploratory manner.129 The Court
113. Solove, supra note 108, at 1511 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)).
114. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
118. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
119. Id. at 178-79.
120. Id. at 173.
121. Id. at 179.
122. Id. at 180.
123. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
124. Id. at 337.
125. Id. at 335.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 338.
128. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
129. Id. at 338-39.
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held that the physical manipulation of the bus passenger's luggage violated
the Fourth Amendment, even though the bag was exposed to public handling
in an overhead compartment.130
Additionally, in Kyllo v. United States,'3 ' law enforcement used a ther-
mal imaging device to detect the heat generated from lamps used for indoor
marijuana growth.132 The Court held that this was an intrusion into the pro-
tected area and would constitute a search.' 33 The Court also emphasized that
this type of technology is not in general public use.'" The Court stated that
the "[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by
other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment." 35 Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that heat waves that are
generated "enter the public . . . if and when they leave a building."'36 Ac-
cording to the dissent, "[a] subjective expectation that [heat waves] would
remain private is not only implausible, but also surely not 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.""3"
Most recently, in United States v. Jones,13 8 the Supreme Court of the
United States reverted to trespass analysis in deciding that the physical at-
tachment of a GPS tracking device on the defendant's vehicle constituted a
trespass of a constitutionally protected "effect." 39 The Supreme Court of the
United States did not apply the Katz test, but explained that "unlike the con-
currence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass
the exclusive test." 4 0 Therefore, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test continues to apply.141
130. Id.
131. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
132. Id. at 29.
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 35 n.2.
136. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)).
138. No. 10-1259, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012).
139. Id. at 4, 10 & n.8.
140. Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).
141. Id.
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D. Supreme Court of the United States Evades Fourth Amendment Issue in
City of Ontario v. Quon
There is not a significant amount of case law applying Fourth Amend-
ment protection in electronic communications.14 2 Some believe that the cur-
rent case law "leaves more questions than answers" regarding whether the
Fourth Amendment applies in government access to electronic communica-
tions.143 The Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity in Quon
to address issue of Fourth Amendment protection with respect to text mes-
saging.'"
In Quon, a city employee claimed that his Fourth Amendment privacy
rights were violated when the city "read text messages sent and received on
[his] pager." 45 The Supreme Court of the United States avoided taking a
stand on the Fourth Amendment issues.14 6 "The judiciary risks error by elab-
orating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging tech-
nology before its role in society has become clear." 4 7 Because the pager
was owned and issued to the employee from the employer, the Court ex-
plained that "prudence counsels caution" in defining privacy expectations of
employees using employer provided communication devices.14 8 Although
the Court acknowledged that cell phone and text message communications
are highly personal, the Court also explained that these devices could be pur-
chased by individuals themselves.149
The Court reasoned that there are exceptions to the general rule of war-
rantless searches, and that "'special needs' of the workplace justify one such
exception."o50 The issue of whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy was not necessary to resolve"' because the Court held that the city's
review of its employee's text messages was reasonable under the exception
regarding "'special needs' of the workplace." 52 Therefore, the reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding electronic communications has not been
clearly addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.'5
142. See Blitz, supra note 14, at 372.
143. Bagley, supra note 75, at 171.
144. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010).
145. Id. at 2624.
146. Blitz, supra note 14, at 373.
147. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
148. Id.
.149. Id. at 2630.
150. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987)).
151. See id.
152. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
153. See id.
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E. The Third Party Doctrine
The third party doctrine is thought by some to be "disguised as an ap-
plication of Katz's 'reasonable expectation of privacy' standard.154 The
logic in support of the third party doctrine is that if an individual discloses
information to a third party, then it is not reasonable for the individual to
have an expectation of privacy.155 The third party doctrine is pertinent to
third party cloud computing providers, and will be pertinent to smart grid
utilities, because data is turned over to and stored remotely by the third party
providers. 156
In Smith v. Maryland,157 telephone numbers dialed from the petitioner's
home were recorded using a pen register installed by the telephone company
at the request of the police.'58 The police did not obtain a warrant or court
order for access to the information.1 59 The Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished a pen register from the listening device in Katz, because
the register only disclosed the telephone numbers that the petitioner dialed
not the conversations.160 The Court reasoned that by disclosing the telephone
numbers to the phone company, the petitioner could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the phone company uses the information to
complete the calls and bill the end user.161
Likewise, in United States v. Miller,'6 2 a bank provided the petitioner's
checks, deposit slips, financial statements and monthly statements to
agents.163 The Supreme Court of the United States differentiated between an
individual's private papers and the bank's business records. M The Court
further explained that the documents contained only information willingly
communicated to the bank.16 5 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he depositor
154. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MicH. L. REV. 561, 561
(2009).
155. Id. at 563; see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), superseded by stat-
ute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697, as recognized in SEC
v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984).
156. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2215.
157. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
158. Id. at 737.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 741.
161. Id. at 742.
162. 425 U.S. 435 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697, as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735
(1984).
163. Id. at 438.
164. Id. at 440.
165. Id. at 442.
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takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to [another]."' 66
Critics of the third party doctrine claim that it is incorrectly applied to
the Katz test.'67 It has been argued that it is reasonable to "expect privacy
[of] bank records, phone records, and other third-party records." 6 8 Another
view is that the third party doctrine gives the government too much power. 6 9
With the advances in technology and public access to the Internet, the third
party doctrine is thought to be insufficient in addressing the modern informa-
tion era.170 An additional criticism is that the doctrine was articulated prior
to data storage in the cloud and should not apply to a third party provider and
its end users.171
On the other hand, benefits of the third party doctrine may often be
overlooked.172 Some contend that the rule ensures "technological neutrality
in Fourth Amendment rules." 73 For example, the third party doctrine pre-
vents criminals from conducting their crimes privately and hiding the public
aspects of those crimes.17 4 Without the third party doctrine, criminals would
be enabled to conceal their crimes.7 s Another argument in defense of the
third party doctrine is that when users divulge information to a third party,
they are impliedly consenting under the Fourth Amendment.17 6
F. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Cloud
The question is, "when do people have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in data stored in the cloud?"'77 Likewise, when will people have a rea-
sonable expectation of data generated from a smart meter? Some view the
Internet as a public space where there can be no reasonable privacy expecta-
tion.' 8 However, several factors support an individual having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using third party providers. 7 9 First, a user account
166. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)).
167. Kerr, supra note 154, at 570.
168. Id. at 571.
169. Id. at 572.
170. See id. at 573.
171. Bagley, supra note75, at 174.
172. Kerr, supra note 154, at 573.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Bagley, supra note 75, at 175.
177. Bamhill, supra note 19, at 621.
178. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2221.
179. See Bagley, supra note 75, at 176-77.
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is typically protected by a password and personal login.180 Password protec-
tion, in itself, would lead one to have an expectation of privacy.'8 ' In addi-
tion, an individual's private account is not accessible to public view.182 Fur-
thermore, the nature of photographs, calendars, and other private files is
highly personal. 83 Moreover, it is reasonable to have an expectation of pri-
vacy when conducting a search for information on the Internet in the privacy
of one's home, or in the privacy of using one's personal devices.
Individuals' privacy expectations are no longer confined to the pro-
tected area of the home, but also include their password-protected activities
and accounts.'8 5 However, "web searches, emails, documents, photos, loca-
tion data, and even evidence of acquaintanceship can be extracted from a
user account." 86 Data from calendars, voicemails and instant message logs
are also retrievable. 87 It has been suggested that this type of information
could even possibly be used for criminal profiling.'88
The third party doctrine has not been adapted for the post-Katz cloud
computing environment, nor has it been adapted for the smart grid era. 89
The third party doctrine must take into account modern society's expecta-
tions that private password protected information, whether stored remotely or
on a desktop, or generated from a smart meter is not accessible to the general
public.190 Some contend that "[1]ooking at expectations is the wrong inquiry"
all together.' 9'
180. Id. at 176.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2219-20.
184. Bagley, supra note 75, at 170-71.
185. Id. at 170.
186. Id. at 161.
187. Id. at 162.
188. Id. at 164.
189. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2219.
190. Id. at 2231-32.
191. Solove, supra note 108, at 1524.
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IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS REGARDING PRIVACY AND
POTENTIAL EXCEPTIONS
A. The Proposed Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act
of 2011
Proposed legislation, introduced in May 2011, attempts to address some
of the privacy concerns with respect to electronic communications. 19 2 The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 aims to
"improve the provisions relating to the privacy of electronic communica-
tions."l93 This paper focuses on sections two and three of the bill:
Sec. 2. Prohibition on Disclosure of Content.
Section 2702(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
(3) A provider of electronic communication service, remote
computing service, or geolocation information service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any governmental entity the con-
tents of any communication described in section 2703(a), or any
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer
of such provider or service.
Sec. 3. Elimination of 180-Day Rule and Search Warrant Re-
quirement; Required Disclosure of Customer Records.
(a) In General.-Section 2703 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) by striking subsections (a), (b), and (c) and inserting the
following:
(a) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in Elec-
tronic Storage.-
(1) In general.-A governmental entity may require the
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service, re-
mote computing service, or geolocation information service of the
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic
192. See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1011, 112th Cong. (2011).
193. Id.
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storage with or otherwise held or maintained by the provider if the
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued and executed in ac-
cordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) that is
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure.
(2) Notice.-Except as provided in section 2705, not later
than [three] days after a governmental entity receives the contents
of a wire or electronic communication of a subscriber or customer
from a provider of electronic communication service, remote com-
puting service, or geolocation information service under paragraph
(1), the governmental entity shall serve upon, or deliver to by reg-
istered or first-class mail, electronic mail, or other means reasona-
bly calculated to be effective, as specified by the court issuing the
warrant, the subscriber or customer-
(A) a copy of the warrant; and
(B) a notice that includes the information referred to in
section 2705(a)(5)(B)(i).
(b) Records Concerning Electronic Communication Service,
Remote Computing Service, or Geolocation Information Ser-
vice.-
(1) In general.-Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection
(g), a governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation
information service to disclose a record or other information per-
taining to a subscriber or customer of the provider or service (not
including the contents of communications), only if the governmen-
tal entity-
(A) obtains a warrant issued and executed in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a
State court, issued using State warrant procedures) that is issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure;
(B) obtains a court order directing the disclosure under
subsection (c);
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to the
disclosure; or
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law
enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the
2012]1 541
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name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of
the provider or service that is engaged in telemarketing (as defined
in section 2325).194
The proposed legislation addresses the search warrant requirement for
contents of electronic communications stored by cloud computing provid-
ers.19 5 However, it does not attempt to include smart grid technology.'96 It is
not clear how the smart meter would be defined.' 97 The proposed legislation
should include consideration for smart meter technology because it seems
that the energy industry will be faced with the same Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy issues as the telecommunications providers.19 8 Otherwise, the courts
will be left struggling with whether a smart meter may be categorized as an
electronic communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation
information service.1 99 It would be a better use of resources to address these
industries and technologies together, based on the synergies of the industries
and the interests of the taxpayers for efficient use of government and judicial
resources.200
B. Exceptions for the Proposed Legislation to Consider
As mentioned previously, the third party doctrine is thought to be insuf-
ficient in addressing the modem information era.20' If the proposed legisla-
tion passes, it will clearly establish a warrant requirement for government
access to the content of stored third party cloud information.202 However, in
addition to the third party doctrine, there are two other exceptions that should
be considered in addressing the modern information era-the independent
source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule.203 If the above proposed
legislation is adopted, and a warrant is required for access to the information
stored in the cloud or with a third party, then the independent source doctrine
and the inevitable discovery rule may undermine its purpose.
194. Id. §§ 2-3.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Balough, supra note 39, at 172.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See Berst, supra note 101.
201. Kerr, supra note 154, at 573.
202. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. §§ 2-3 (2011).
203. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 (1984).
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I. The Independent Source Doctrine
Under the independent source doctrine, evidence that is first discovered
unlawfully, but later is obtained in a lawful manner that is independent of the
first discovery, is admissible.20 In Segura v. United States,205 the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the issue of whether items discovered
by agents under a valid search warrant, following an unlawful entry, should
be suppressed from evidence. 20 In Segura, agents entered into and remained
in an apartment for nineteen hours awaiting a search warrant while the lawful
occupants were taken into police custody.207 After the warrant issued, the
agents discovered drugs, ammunition, cash, and records. 208 The Court held
that the evidence discovered pursuant to the warrant was admissible, and
only the evidence that was discovered prior to the warrant was suppressed.20
The Court reasoned that none of the information on which the warrant was
secured was derived from the initial entry, and the information was known to
the agents prior to the entry. 210 The Court stated that "the exclusionary rule
has no application [where] the Government learned of the evidence 'from an
independent source."'
2 1 1
In Murray v. United States,2 12 federal agents entered a warehouse, with-
out a warrant, to apprehend those who were seen from surveillance within
the warehouse.2 13 The agents forced entry and did not find the individuals,
but they did view burlap-wrapped bales of marijuana in plain sight.2 14 The
agents left the warehouse under surveillance and then obtained a search war-
215rant.21 The search warrant did not rely on the observations made in the first
unlawful entry of the warehouse and was considered to be untainted.216 The
Court explained that the independent source doctrine may apply to evidence
acquired through Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations.217 The
doctrine's aim is to protect society's interest of allowing juries to receive
204. Segura, 468 U.S. at 805.
205. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
206. Id. at 804.
207. Id. at 800-01.
208. Id. at 801.
209. Id. at 813-14, 816.
210. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814.
211. Id. at 805 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
212. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
213. Id. at 535.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 535-36.
216. See id. at 535-37.
217. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.
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evidence of a crime by putting police in the same position they would have
been in if no violation occurred.2 18
"[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and
the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence
of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same,
not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police er-
ror or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the challenged evi-
dence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have
been in absent any error or violation." 219
In Murray, Justice Scalia explained that "[t]o determine whether [a]
warrant was independent of the illegal entry, [the question is] whether it
would have been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred."220
In Hudson v. Michigan,2 2 1 the Supreme Court of the United States also
applied the independent source doctrine.222 In Hudson, there was a valid
warrant, but it was executed in violation of the knock and announce rule.223
Justice Scalia compared the search to the warrantless search in Segura.224 He
stated that "[i]f the probable cause backing a warrant that was issued later in
time [in Segura] could be an 'independent source' for a search that pro-
ceeded after the officers illegally entered and waited, a search warrant ob-
tained before going in must have at least this much effect."225
2. The Inevitable Discovery Rule
The inevitable discovery rule is inferred from the independent source
doctrine.226 The main difference is that with the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, derivative evidence is permissible if the police would have hypotheti-
cally discovered the evidence lawfully. 22 7 The prosecutor must show that by
a preponderance of the evidence, the challenged evidence would inevitably
218. Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
219. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
220. Id. at 542 n.3.
221. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
222. See id. at 600-01.
223. Id. at 588, 590.
224. Id. at 600-01.
225. Id. (emphasis omitted).
226. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988).
227. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
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"have been discovered by lawful means." 228 Probable cause must have been
established for the application of inevitable discovery.229
In Nix v. Williams,230 the location of a body was disclosed to law en-
forcement in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. 23 1 Although Nix is
a Sixth Amendment case, the reasoning may logically apply to Fourth
Amendment cases as well.232 In the inevitable discovery situation, there is a
causal connection between the illegality and the acquisition of the evi-
dence.233
In Nix, a nearby search team was within a few miles of discovering the
body, but was called off after the defendant brought the police to where the
body was buried.234 The Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that it
was inevitable that the body would have been found by the search team.235
The Court justified adopting the inevitable discovery rule based on the ra-
tionale of the independent source exception.236 The underlying reasoning of
both doctrines is to allow evidence that would have been available absent
any unlawful police activity.237 Nix was decided in 1984, at a time the Court
believed that "[a] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain
evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the
evidence sought would inevitably be discovered."238
In one lower court decision, United States v. Rodriguez,239 one of the
defendants, King, made a statement under duress, which led to derivative
evidence.240 The court relied on the inevitable discovery exception, and rea-
soned that "[u]pon consideration of all the circumstances surrounding this
search, I conclude that a team of well trained and experienced law enforce-
228. Id. at 444.
229. See id. at 443-44.
230. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
231. Id. at 435-37.
232. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
388 (5th ed. 2010) ("Although the violation in Nix involved the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the ... analysis applies in the same manner in Fourth Amendment cases."). Addi-
tionally, the inevitable discovery doctrine is inferred from the independent source doctrine,
which does apply to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment cases. Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
233. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
234. Id. at 436.
235. Id. at 449-50.
236. Id. at 444.
237. Id. at 443-45.
238. Nix, 467 U.S. at 431, 445.
239. 606 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1985).
240. Id. at 1374.
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ment officers would have discovered the... evidence without King's assis-
tance." 24I
C. Applying the Exceptions to the Proposed Legislation
In effect, the independent source and inevitable discovery rules are ex-
ceptions that may potentially undermine the proposed search warrant re-
quirement for electronic communications in certain instances.242 There are
main features of electronic communications that differentiate electronic
communications from traditional paper sources and other types of evidence:
Processability, recoverability, and remote storage. 243 "Electronic [e]vidence
[i]s [a]lways [p]rocessable." 244 Traditional paper documents must be manu-
ally searched through, whereas electronic communications may be electroni-
cally searched for within seconds.245 In addition to traditional searching,
modem technology also allows for data mining, where patterns within data
are identified.246 Furthermore, it is possible to recover, preserve, and repro-
duce deleted files in electronic communications.2 47 These features coupled
with cloud computing technology, where files are remotely stored, are char-
acteristics unique to electronic communications.24 8 The outdated inquiries
and standards for the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discov-
ery rule are less burdensome in electronic evidence because of the character-
istics of electronic communications.
1. Application of the Independent Source Doctrine to the Proposed War-
rant Requirement
The question in Murray of whether a warrant "would have been sought
even if what actually happened had not occurred,"249 opens the door in the
electronic world to hack now, get a warrant later.250 The Court in Murray
241. Id. at 1375.
242. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 701 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
243. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litiga-
tion: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364-65 (2000).
244. Id. at 364.
245. Id.
246. Data Mining, DATATRIAGE, http://www.datatriage.com/data-mining.php (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
247. Specialized Hard Drive Data Recovery Services, DATATRIAGE, http://datatriage.com
/harddriverecovery.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
248. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 364.
249. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 n.3 (1988).
250. See id. at 540 n.2.
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explained that the lawfully obtained search warrant did not rely on the obser-
vations made in the first unlawful entry of the warehouse.' In an electronic
communications environment, if there is an unlawful access to electronic
information stored by a third party, followed by a lawfully obtained warrant,
there is a potential argument that the lawfully obtained warrant "would have
been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred."252 The char-
acteristics of electronic communications support the idea that the lawfully
obtained warrant would not have relied on the observations made by the first
unlawful access to the information.253 The reasoning in support of this hypo-
thetical argument is that the second lawfully obtained warrant would have
been obtained based on the search criteria-which for this analysis assumes
was sufficient to give rise to probable cause-used to access the electronic
communication in the first unlawful access.
There are unique processes in place for investigators to conduct a search
through Internet service providers.254 For example, when dealing with Inter-
net service providers, the agent determines what material the provider is to
retrieve, but the agent usually does not conduct the search of the provider's
computers. 255 The agent "serve[s] the warrant on the provider, ... and the
provider produces the material specified in the warrant." 256 In order to navi-
gate through massive volumes of electronic documents,257 the provider would
use the information provided by the agent to conduct the search.5 Next, the
agent reviews the information retrieved, and makes copies of what the agent
believes falls within the scope of the warrant.259 It follows that if an agent
started with sufficient information to give rise to probable cause, and that
information led to search criteria to be used by a provider in order to retrieve
the electronic communications, then the search criteria would always be an
independent source of what is actually retrieved.
For example, in the personal computer environment, if an agent obtains
an IP address from a victim's computer, after a cyber crime has been com-
251. Id. at 541-43.
252. See id. at 542-43 & 542 n.3.
253. Id. at 542-43.
254. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SEC. CRIMINAL
Div., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 133-34 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cyber
crime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
255. Id. at 134.
256. Id. (citing Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) (2006 &
Supp. III 2009)).
257. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 364.
258. U.S. DEP'TOF JUST., supra note 254, at 134.
259. Id.
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mitted, and the agent, pursuant to a subpoena, compels the Internet service
provider to provide the name and address associated with the IP address, and
verifies the address, then with that information the agent typically has prob-
able cause to search the suspect's home computer. 260 Electronic communica-
tions associated with the suspect would also likely be stored in the cloud.261
By analogy, the agent in this example would have the same probable cause to
search the cloud for the electronic communications. In other words, if the
information gives rise to probable cause to search the suspect's home com-
puter, it will also give rise to probable cause to search the suspect's material
stored in the cloud. The sufficient information used to search and acquire the
electronic communication in the cloud would be known to the agent prior to
the search in the cloud.
The independent nature of an electronic communication search is con-
sistent with the reasoning in Segura, where the Court stated that the informa-
tion was known to the agents prior to the entry, and was, therefore, an inde-
pendent source.262 The characteristic of electronic communications being
processable, based on entered search terms, supports the notion that the elec-
tronic communications "would have been sought even if what actually hap-
pened had not occurred."263 Without a focused search at the outset contain-
ing specific information, there would be potentially millions of pages of re-
trievable text stored as electronic documents. 26 Assuming the agent has
sufficient information to give rise to probable cause in formulating the search
criteria, the search would not be based on information found in the material
generated by the search.265
In defending against the criticism that the independent source doctrine
fosters a "search first, warrant later mentality," Justice Scalia notes that:
260. Id. at 65.
In a common computer search scenario, investigators learn of online criminal conduct.
Using records obtained from a victim or from a service provider, investigators determine the
Internet Protocol ("IP") address used to commit the crime. Using a subpoena .. . investigators
then compel the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") that has control over that IP address to iden-
tify which of its customers was assigned that IP address at the relevant time, and to provide (if
known) the user's name, street address, and other identifying information. In some cases, in-
vestigators confirm that the person named by the ISP actually resides at that street address by,
for example, conducting a mail cover or checking utility bills.
Affidavits that describe such an investigation are typically sufficient to establish probable
cause ....
Id.
261. See Couillard, supra note 18, at 2215.
262. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984).
263. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 n.3 (1988).
264. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 366-67.
265. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 254, at 134.
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An officer with probable cause . . . would be foolish to enter the
premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk
suppression of all evidence . .. [and would have] the much more
onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information
gained from the illegal entry affected . . . the law enforcement offi-
cers' decision to seek a warrant ... .266
Based on the processable nature of electronic communications, the bur-
den of convincing a trial court that there was no information gained from the
illegal access to electronic communications may be lessened, because in or-
der to have retrieved the documents there must have been information ob-
tained prior to and independent of the search to conduct the search.267 If the
information used to conduct the search was sufficient to give rise to probable
cause, and the information was used to identify search criteria, then the in-
formation was known prior to and independent of the search. Therefore, the
risk for the officer that Justice Scalia refers to, in effect, may not be as great
as it would be in dealing with others forms of evidence.268
2. Application of the Inevitable Discovery Rule to the Proposed Warrant
Requirement
At the time Nix was decided, electronic communication as we know it
today did not exist. The reasoning in Nix that "[a] police officer who is faced
with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a
position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be dis-
covered"269 does not apply in an electronic communication world where evi-
dence can be backed up, restored, "mined" for patterns and irregularities, and
remotely stored.270 Stored data, on a third party computer, may be backed up
by the third party for disaster recovery purposes, which allows for restoral of
data to a previous date.27 1 Additionally, even if an end user deletes an elec-
tronic file, it can still technically be recovered with computer forensic ser-
vices.272 Furthermore, with data mining technology available, patterns in
data will reveal information that otherwise would not be obvious.273
266. Murray, 487 U.S. at 540 n.2, 540.
267. Cf id. at 540, 542 n.3.
268. See id. at 539, 540.
269. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984).
270. See, e.g., Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644; see Data Mining, supra note 246.
271. See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
272. Specialized Hard Drive Data Recovery Services, supra note 247.
273. Data Mining, supra note 246.
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Data mining is a special process used to search electronic stored
information (ESI). The results of the data mining process will help
direct future actions in the discovery process prior to litigation.
Generally data mining refers to searching large volumes of data for
patterns and irregularities in the data. The patterns and irregulari-
ties found, in turn, trigger yet more detailed searches within the da-
ta. 274
In order to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine, the prosecutor only
has the burden of a preponderance of the evidence showing that the elec-
tronic communication and its contents "would have been [found] by lawful
means."275 Again, assuming there is sufficient information to obtain a war-
rant, an agent has the technical ability to process, recover, or access a remote
copy in the cloud.276  In electronic communications, these characteristics
increase the likelihood that the electronic communication and its contents
would have been found with a lawfully obtained warrant.277 This may sug-
gest that an officer would be placed in a position to accurately calculate
whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered, which under-
mines the court's reasoning in Nix.278
In applying Rodriguez, where the judge believed that a well trained
team would have discovered the evidence regardless of King's statements,279
there is a circular reasoning in electronic communications because of the
processable, restorable, and remotely stored cloud characteristics.280 In the
case where there is sufficient probable cause for a search, a well trained team
would almost always have been able to discover documents that are stored in
the cloud. 281 The reasoning that applies in the inevitable discovery doctrine
becomes circular when applied to electronic communications.282
For example, an inevitable discovery argument may arise when a law-
fully seized device contains information that may also be stored in the cloud,
such as email account information.283 A potential argument is that the mate-
rial relating to that account information is stored in the cloud and would be
274. Id.
275. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
276. See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
277. See id.
278. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
279. United States v. Rodriguez, 606 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (D. Mass. 1985).
280. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
281. Compare Rodriguez, 606 F. Supp. at 1374-75 with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
282. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
283. See Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defen-
dant Bickle's Emails at 15, United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-CR-565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL
3798225 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011).
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inevitably discovered.28 In one such case, emails were obtained from Mi-
crosoft by the government with a warrant. 285 The defendant claimed that the
warrant lacked probable cause to believe that the email account would con-
tain relevant evidence.286 The government responded that even if the warrant
lacked probable cause, the court should deny the motion to suppress based on
inevitable discovery.287 The government had lawfully seized the defendant's
cellular telephone which had email information stored on it.2 88 The govern-
ment argued that "[tlo the extent that [the] email account information stored
on the defendant's seized telephone overlaps with [the] email account infor-
mation obtained through the search [through Microsoft] at issue here, the
[c]ourt should not suppress that information." 289 The court did not need to
address the inevitable discovery issue. 290 Nevertheless, the government's
argument was that inevitable discovery should apply where the email ac-
count information was unlawfully obtained from the cloud provider, because
the email account information was lawfully obtained through another device,
and would have inevitably lead to the information in the cloud.29'
The aforementioned processable, recoverable, and remotely stored
characteristics support the idea that where probable cause exists, the elec-
tronic communication and its contents would have been inevitably found
with a lawfully obtained warrant, regardless of a prior unlawful access.292
The underlying aim of both the independent source doctrine and the inevita-
ble discovery rule is to protect society by putting police in the same position
they would have been in if no violation occurred.293 The nature of electronic
communications and applications in the cloud may put police in the same
position as they would have been in if no search warrant violation had oc-
curred because of the unique characteristics of electronic communications. 294
284. See id.
285. United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-cr-00565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 3798225, at *I (D.
Nev. June 21, 2011).
286. Id. at *1-2.
287. Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defendant
Bickle's Emails, supra note 283, at 15.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 16.
290. See Bickle, 2011 WL 3798225, at *5, *22-23.
291. Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defendant
Bickle's Emails, supra note 283, at 15.
292. See id. at 15-16 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
293. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541 (1988).
294. See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644-45.
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The Obama administration opposes changes to the existing ECPA,
which would make it more difficult for the government to obtain access to
the content of electronic communications. 29 5 "[T]he Obama administration
testified that imposing constitutional safeguards on email stored in the cloud
would be an unnecessary burden on the government. Probable-cause war-
rants would only get in the government's way."296 Nevertheless, the econ-
omy would benefit if more users felt secure about cloud computing, and stor-
ing their information with third party providers.29 7
Cloud computing decreases IT costs and increases overall efficiencies,
which has a positive impact on the financial health of corporations. 2 98 Finan-
cially healthy corporations can hire more people, who in turn will have more
disposable income to spend, which will benefit the economy. The size of the
cloud computing industry, especially if looked at in combination with the
energy industry, is significant enough to have an impact on the economy.299
However, consumers do not want compromised Fourth Amendment rights
and will hesitate to convert to a technology where the government has access
to the content of their stored electronic communications.
The counter argument to the current administration's position is pre-
sented by the Digital Due Process coalition, arguing that Fourth Amendment
privacy issues are not sufficiently protected under the ECPA and calling for
reform.o' In particular, the lack of a search warrant requirement, for access
to the content of communications stored for more than 180 days, leaves con-
sumer data susceptible to government access. 302 The legal protections have
not kept up with technology, and the proposed legislation is a step toward
providing Fourth Amendment protection to consumers.30 3 As more consum-
295. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting
Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 3, 5, 6 (2010) (statement
of James A. Baker, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/1 11-2/09-22-10-baker-electronic-comm-privacy-act.pdf;
David Kravets, Justice Dept. to Congress: Don't Saddle 4th Amendment on Us, WIRED (Apr.
7, 2011,4:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatleve/2011/04/fourth-amendment-email-2.
296. Kravets, supra note 295.
297. See Cooke, supra note 22, at 3.
298. See id.
299. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
300. See Balough, supra note 39, at 103; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4; see also About the
Issue, supra note 74.
301. See Our Principles, supra note 79.
302. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. III
2009).
303. See id. §§ 2-3.
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ers are comfortable with storing their private information with third party
carriers, the projected growth may be realized.
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation leaves behind smart grid tech-
nology.304 Because of the synergies in telecommunications and energy in-
dustries, it is predictable that the same Fourth Amendment issues will arise
when smart grid technology is universally deployed.305 The economy would
benefit from the deployment of smart grid-it is estimated that 280,000 jobs
will be created.30 In order for this to occur, consumers will need to feel
comfortable with privacy protections.307 Additionally, the use of smart grid
technology would improve the environment.30 s Judicial, government and
technical resources would be more efficiently used if both industries were
addressed together, and the proposed legislation included a warrant require-
ment for government access to the content of smart grid information.
Further, in order to address all the Fourth Amendment privacy issues,
the current bill should consider how the independent source doctrine and
inevitable discovery doctrine might apply to electronic communications.
Maybe safeguards aimed at avoiding these exceptions could be incorporated
into the proposed legislation. The processable and recoverable characteris-
tics of electronic communications, coupled with remote storage in the cloud,
support the circular reasoning of these doctrines. There will be minimal risks
to the "search now, warrant later" mentality. Law enforcement agents may
be able to get around the search warrant requirement because they will be
able to easily meet the threshold inquiries of these doctrines. Consequently,
the proposed warrant requirement may be just a futile effort and may be
meaningless in certain instances. The proposed legislation might better ad-
dress Fourth Amendment privacy concerns if it considered the exceptions of
the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines.
304. See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1011, I12th Cong. (2011).
305. Balough, supra note 39, at 172.
306. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 89.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deeply rooted in this nation's foundation is the concept that "a man's
house is his castle,"' the use of which he should be free to restrict through
freedom of contract.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that
"the public policy of this state and this nation favors the fullest liberty of
contract and the widest latitude possible in the disposition of one's prop-
erty."3 The ability to maintain ownership of, and control over, property is
consistent with the American dream: "Owning a home of one's own has
always epitomized the American dream. More than simply embodying the
notion of having 'one's castle,' it represents the sense of freedom and self-
determination emblematic of our national character."4 The realization of this
dream necessarily comes at the expense of certain freedoms associated with
property ownership and the ability to restrict its use.
In modern America, and quite notably in Florida, the exercise of prop-
erty use restriction is most evident in the common-interest community
(CIC).6 A CIC is often governed by a mandatory association7 commonly
1. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 162
(London, Bookfellers in Fleet-Street & Holborn 1669); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 390 (1914) ("The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,' is made a part of our
constitutional law ... and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen." (quot-
ing THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1871))).
2. See Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1024 (2009) (discussing freedom of contract
and disposition in the context of real property law).
3. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
4. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1296 (Cal. 1994) (in bank)
(Arabian, J., dissenting).
5. See infra Part IV.A-B.
6. The Restatement refers to residential communities as "common-interest communi-
ties":
A "common-interest community" is a real-estate development or neighborhood in which indi-
vidually owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot
be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal
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known as the community association.' This private entity is charged with
enforcing the community's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restric-
tions (CC&Rs)9 while retaining the power to promulgate new rules and regu-
lations.'o Armed with the power of legal enforcement, community associa-
tions can compel compliance with private land use restrictions recorded in
the community's CC&Rs, subject to constitutional, statutory, and public pol-
icy limitations."
Issues often arise when homeowners challenge the validity of these
covenants. As private entities, community associations are not bound to
comport with the protections and limitations of the Constitution-either Fed-
eral or State-absent state action.12  Consequently, restrictive covenants 3
(1) to pay for the use of, or contribute to the maintenance of, property held or enjoyed in com-
mon by the individual owners, or
(2) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides services or facilities to the com-
mon property or to the individually owned property, or that enforces other servitudes burden-
ing the property in the development or neighborhood.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000).
7. FLA. STAT. § 720.301(9) (2011). These associations are "mandatory" because mem-
bership is a condition of purchasing a parcel in a CIC governed by an association. Id.
8. This article refers to the private associations that govern CICs as "community asso-
ciations," as this term is recognized by Florida Statutes and Florida courts. See id. §
468.43 1(1); Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 463 (Fla. 2002).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 6.2 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998). The Restatement refers to the declaration of CC&Rs as "governing documents," which
it defines as "the declaration and other documents, such as the articles of incorporation or
articles of association, bylaws, and rules and regulations, that govern the operation of a com-
mon-interest association, or determine the rights and obligations of the members of the com-
mon-interest community." Id.
10. See infra Part II.B.l.
I1. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
12. Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions . . . On Free
Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 739, 744 (2006). Through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, much of the Bill of Rights has been selectively incorporated to apply to
the states. Id. However, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action. Id. There-
fore, "in order for [the conduct of] a [community association], a private actor, to be held to
constitutional standards, a court would need to determine that [its conduct] was in fact . . .
state act[ion]." Id. See infra Part V for a more elaborate discussion of state action and the
tests employed.
13. A restrictive covenant is "[a] private agreement, usu[ally] in a deed or lease, that
restricts the use or occupancy of real property, esp[ecially] by specifying lot sizes, building
lines, architectural styles, and the uses to which the property may be put." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 421 (9th ed. 2009). It is a type of real covenant and is a subset of the larger
category of "servitudes," which is defined as "[an encumbrance consisting in a right to the
limited use of a piece of land or other immovable property without the possession of it." Id. at
1492. This article refers to land use restrictions primarily as "restrictive covenants" because it
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recorded in a community's CC&Rs may, and often do, abridge certain con-
stitutional guarantees otherwise enjoyed relatively unfettered under the re-
gime of a local or state government. 14 Despite the negative connotation as-
sociated with the notion of contracting away one's constitutional rights, these
restrictions are often necessary to support the interests of homeowners who
purchase property governed by a community association with the prospect
that the development scheme and other aesthetic" and practical "vested ex-
pectations" will be protected.16  This article will analyze these issues and
conclude that the importance of one's ability to covenant to mutually restrict
the use of property in a CIC is an important freedom and a voluntary choice
that should not be abridged by characterizing the conduct of community as-
sociations as state action.17
In reaching this conclusion, a systematic approach will be presented.
Part II of this article will discuss the rapid growth of community associations
and their role in the CIC while focusing on the voluntary nature of member-
ship. It will focus primarily on Florida due to the pervasive presence of
community associations in its real property landscape and their explosive
growth that has outpaced the country's average over the past few decades.' 8
Its scope will be limited to Florida's relatively young homeowners' associa-
focuses on the manner in which a property owner may restrict, or limit, the use of his or her
property.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism,
and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L.
203, 205 (1992). Examples of aesthetic controls are "set-back requirements and architectural
standards." Id.; Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 838
(describing aesthetic values "as limits on paint color, yard art, structural changes, fences,
building materials, and the like"); see infra Part III.
16. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of
Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the Face of Vested Expec-
tations?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1081, 1082, 1126 (1998) (discussing the importance of
protecting the homeowner's vested expectations-subject to "the balance of community val-
ues and concerns of individual freedom"-of her property governed by a community associa-
tion, while tolerating reasonable change as a necessary aspect of the complex, evolving nature
of community associations).
17. See infra Part VI. While some commentators refer to the state action inquiry as seek-
ing to discern whether the entity itself is a state actor, that characterization is largely mis-
placed because the inquiry actually seeks to determine whether "the specific conduct of which
the plaintiff complains" is "unconstitutional conduct [that] is fairly attributable to the State."
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18. See infra Part II.A; see also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
AssocIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994) (most commu-
nity association governed CICs "are concentrated in the sunbelt states, including Florida").
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tion law." Part III of this article will discuss the private land use control
mechanisms, the types of restrictive covenants that commonly burden prop-
erty in CICs, and the desirable nature of many of these restrictions as well as
some detrimental consequences. Part IV of this article will discuss the inter-
play between the freedom to contract and the right to restrict one's property
use rights and rights in other contexts. Part V will analyze Florida's case law
on homeowners' associations and the state action doctrine. It will attempt to
reconcile the holdings and extract from these cases the state action tests em-
ployed by the various Florida courts. It will then apply these tests to the
characteristics of homeowners' associations and distinguish them from mu-
nicipalities. It will illustrate how characterizing homeowners' associations
as "quasi-governmental" entities would jeopardize the ability of homeown-
ers' and community associations alike to impose and enforce such restric-
tions on the use of property located within a CIC. Part VI of this article will
conclude that the property owner's freedom to contract outweighs the negli-
gible loss of constitutional rights and that the conduct of private community
associations are not, and should not be, considered state action.
II. COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PROLIFERATION, ROLE, AND
VOLUNTARY CHOICE
The importance of this issue is underscored by the dramatic increase in
the number of residential communities governed by community associa-
tions.20 The consequence of this trend concerns the prospective home-
owner's autonomy: a transaction involving real property-burdened by use
restrictions and subject to others' property rights-that is the product of "vol-
untary market transactions."2 1 The role community associations play helps
19. Florida's condominium law, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article,
has had more years to develop. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF'L REGULATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE 3 (2004) [hereinafter HOA TASK FORCE], available
at http://www.ccfj.net/DBPRTFfinalreport.pdf. For example, condominium associations are
subject to regulatory oversight, more in-depth statutory regulation, and more defined unit
owner protections. See id. Additionally, statutory recognition and governance of homeown-
ers' associations in Florida was not codified until 1992. Id. By contrast, Florida's condomin-
ium law was codified in 1963. Russell McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied,
17 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964).
20. See Frank Rathbun, Industry Data, COMMUNITY Ass'Ns INST., http://www.caionline.
org/info/research/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
21. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law:
Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1525, 1543 (2007); see infra Part II.C.
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protect the CIC homeowner's investment and expectations following these
transactions. 2 2
A. Proliferation in the United States & Florida
Included under the community association umbrella are homeowners'
associations, condominium associations, cooperatives, and other associations
that govern planned communities. Over the past four decades, the number
of community associations nationwide has grown exponentially. 24  From
representing a modest 10,000 communities, which encompassed 701,000
housing units and housed 2.1 million residents in 1970, the number of com-
munity associations has skyrocketed to governing 309,600 communities of
24.8 million housing units and 62 million residents.25 Presently, one in five
Americans lives in a CIC governed by a community association.26 Just as
significantly, close to one in five housing units in the United States is gov-
erned by a community association.27 The proportion of community associa-
tion governed housing units to the total number of housing units in the Unit-
ed States has increased significantly over the past decade.28
While these nationwide statistics are substantial, their magnitude is sur-
passed by Florida's real property market and its affinity for community asso-
ciations.29 However, calculating the number of community associations in
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. Rathbun, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.; American FactFinder: 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing
Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population
and Housing Characteristics], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=DEC 10_DPDPDPI&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
There are 62 million residents living in association-governed communities. Rathbun, supra
note 20. Considering the population of the United States was approximately 308.75 million as
of 2010, the result is one in five Americans living in a community governed by a community
association. See 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra.
27. There are 24.8 million housing units represented by community associations.
Rathbum, supra note 20. This accounts for almost one-fifth of the 131.7 million housing units
in the United States. See 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteris-
tics, supra note 26.
28. Rathbun, supra note 20; 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Char-
acteristics, supra note 26; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERIsncs: 2000, US CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2000), http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/01
000.pdf. In 2000, there were 115.9 million housing units in the United States, and only 17.8
million of them were represented by community associations. Rathbun, supra note 20;
UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra.
29. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Florida is more difficult than it would appear. Although homeowners' asso-
ciations are required by Florida law to file articles of incorporation with the
Division of Corporations in the Department of State,30 "[t]he number of
homeowners' associations . .. in Florida is [largely] unknown." 3  This un-
certainty is the result of several factors. First, it is difficult to distinguish
chapter 720 corporations, which are homeowners' associations, from other
not-for-profit entities registered with the Division of Corporation's data-
base.32 Second, homeowners' associations are not required by Florida law to
present any significant data to the Division of Corporations that would assist
in calculating their numbers.33 Finally, the Department of Business and Pro-
fessional Regulation (DBPR) does not require homeowners' associations to
submit projected development plans that would indicate their homeowners'
association status or provide the number of housing units within their devel-
opments.'
Notwithstanding this difficulty, estimates place the number of Florida
homeowners' associations in the range of 14,30035 to 27,000,36 with private
industry research statistics falling within this spectrum. Combined with
Florida's 20,000 condominium associations, 38 a modest estimate of commu-
30. FLA. STAT. § 617.0203 (2011); PETER M. DUNBAR & CHARLES F. DUDLEY, THE LAW
OF FLORIDA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 10 (7th ed. 2007).
31. COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., REP. No. 2008-148, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 5 (2007), available at http://archive.flsenate.
gov/data/Publications/2008/Senate/reports/interimjreports/pdf/2008-148rilong.pdf.
32. Compare id., with OFFICE OF PROGRAM POL'Y ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY,
REP. No. 10-20, LIMITED DATA IS AVAILABLE REGARDING NUMBER OF MANDATORY
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS; OrTIONS EXIST FOR INFORMATION GATHERING AND STATE
OVERSIGHT 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20], available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/ I 020rpt.pdf.
33. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., supra note 31, at 6.
37. See 2011 2nd Qtr Florida Community Association Reference Directories,
SUNSHINELIST.COM, https://www.sunshinelist.com/201 I Q2-directories.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2012) (estimating that there are about 16,237 homeowners' associations in Florida by
analyzing association filings).
38. COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., supra note 31, at 6. Other sources estimate a higher
figure. For example, private industry research estimates that there are 22,320 condominium
associations in Florida. See 2011 2nd Qtr Florida Community Association Reference Directo-
ries, supra note 37. An analysis of Florida's DBPR yields a total of 26,773 condominium
associations licensed with the DBPR. See Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile
Homes, FLA. DEP'T OF BUS. & PROF'L REG., http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/sto
/file.download/Iscdownload.shtml (follow "North Florida Counties" hyperlink, "Central
Florida East Counties" hyperlink, "Central Florida West Counties" hyperlink, "Dade and
Monroe Counties" hyperlink, and "Broward and Palm Beach Counties" hyperlink and add
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nity associations in Florida exceeds 40,000. Limiting the scope solely to
homeowners' associations nevertheless produces impressive results: In a
state of 18.8 million people,39 Florida's estimated 6 million homeowners'
association residents" means one in three Floridians lives in a community
governed by a homeowners' association.41 Outpacing the country's average
number of persons living under a community association, Florida is a prime
forum for this analysis. 4 2
The dramatic increase in Florida's population and housing compounds
this issue. Florida's population grew by approximately 15% over the last
decade.43 During the same period, the overall U.S. population growth was
9.7%," outpaced by Florida's population growth by about 5%.45 A similar
together the total number of entries) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). A review of DBPR's data
spreadsheets reveals that the likely result of this higher statistic is the listing of multiple con-
dominium building associations separately, despite being governed by the same master asso-
ciation. See id.
39. American FactFinder: 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing
Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, [hereinafter 2010 Florida Profile of General Popula-
tion and Housing Characteristics], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages
/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_DPDPDP1&ProdType=table (last visited Apr. 15,2012).
40. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3.
41. Compare id., with 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Charac-
teristics, supra note 39.
42. See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Cove-
nants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 179 (2003) (finding that "[t]he greatest proportion of
homeowner associations can be found in Florida, California, and Texas"); Steven Siegel, The
Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in
Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 461, 469 (1998) (asserting that community associations "constitute nearly all new
residential development in . . . Florida"); Suarez, supra note 12, at 742-43 (finding that com-
munity associations are most common in a handful of states, including Florida); Karen Ellert
Pefia, Comment, Reining in Property Owners' Associations' Power: Texas's Need for a
Comprehensive Plan, 33 ST. MARY's L.J. 323, 328 (2002) (finding that community associa-
tions "account[] for nearly all new home developments in ... Florida").
43. Florida's population grew from just under 16 million in 2000 to almost 18.8 million
people in 2010. Compare FLORIDA CENSUS 2000 PROFILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-fl.pdf, with 2010 Florida Profile of General
Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 39.
44. Compare UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS:
2000, supra note 28, at 1, with 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Charac-
teristics, supra note 26.
45. See FLORIDA CENSUS 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2; 2010 Florida Profile of Gen-
eral Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 39; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF
GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra note 28, at 1; 2010 U.S. Profile of
General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 26.
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housing trend has emerged." In 2010, the total number of housing units in
Florida was just shy of 9 million, 47 reflecting an 18.9% increase in total hous-
ing units in just ten years,48 and outpacing the 15% increase in population.49
Because the average household and family size remained virtually un-
changed between 2000 and 201 0,50 the housing boom during the earlier part
of the decade"' is likely the cause of Florida's housing market growing at a
greater pace than its growth in population. This is supported by the disparity
between Florida's 17.5% vacant housing unit rate5 2 and the U.S. average
vacant housing unit rate of 11.4%.53
Considering most of Florida's new development is governed by com-
munity associations, 54 this tremendous growth in housing and the corre-
sponding increase in population signifies that a large portion of prospective
homeowners will be faced with the decision of whether to purchase in a
community governed by an association. While a housing market recovery in
Florida may still be on the distant horizon, the glut in housing inventory, 5 at
least some of which is concentrated in community associations, will eventu-
ally find its way into the hands of homeowners faced with a familiar choice:
Restrict one's use of his or her property and enjoy the benefits of a commu-
nity association56 or depend exclusively on a local municipality or city for the
provision of such services.
46. See FLORIDA CENSUs 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2; 2010 Florida Profile of Gen-
eral Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 39; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF
GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra note 28, at 1; 2010 U.S. Profile of
General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 26.
47. 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note
39.
48. Compare id., with FLORIDA CENSus 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2. In 2000, there
were 7.3 million housing units in Florida. FLORIDA CENSus 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2.
49. Compare id., with 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Charac-
teristics, supra note 39.
50. Compare 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics,
supra note 39, with FLORIDA CENSUs 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2.
51. See Toluse Olorunnipa, South Florida Is More Diverse and Growing More Slowly,
Census Figures Show, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 17, 2011 (discussing Florida's 2000-2010 hous-
ing boom).
52. 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note
39.
53. 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 26.
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
55. See Les Christie, Shadow Inventory Threatens Housing Recovery, CNN MONEY (Jan.
20, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/20/realestate/shadow-inventory-rise/
index.htm.
56. See infra Parts 1I.B, III.A.I.a.
57. See infra Parts II.B, III.A.2.
2012]1 563
121
: Nova Law Review 36, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
B. The Role of the Community Association
While CICs have become a common fixture in Florida, their legal char-
acteristics are quite unique. These include "common ownership of prop-
erty, mandatory membership in the [community] association, and the re-
quirement of living under a private regime of restrictive covenants enforced
by fellow residents."59 Aimed at "promot[ing] the community concept and
protect[ing] the community's property values,"60 community associations
manage and maintain CIC facilities "rang[ing] from park-like open spaces to
streets, lighting, water and sewer facilities and recreational facilities." 61 En-
forcement of the community's CC&Rs is among their primary role, though
their overarching purpose serves to protect CIC homeowners' investments
and expectations.62 While varying in size and complexity,63 the basic struc-
ture of community associations remains relatively similar, and it will be dis-
cussed in the context of the Florida homeowners' association-the focus of
this article.
1. An Introduction to the Florida Homeowners' Association
As a starting point, the basic definition of the homeowners' association
sheds light on its basic structure. Florida defines a "homeowners' associa-
tion" as:
a Florida corporation responsible for the operation of a community
or a mobile home subdivision in which the voting membership is
made up of parcel owners or their agents, or a combination thereof,
and in which membership is a mandatory condition of parcel own-
ership, and which is authorized to impose assessments that, if un-
paid, may become a lien on the parcel. 4
However, this definition is largely inadequate in delineating the purpose
and nature of the Florida homeowners' association and its role in the residen-
58. MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at I1, 19-20.
59. Id. at 19.
60. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 2.
61. James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associa-
tions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1135, 1139 (1998).
62. Brower, supra note 15, at 205-06.
63. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER AssocIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 99 (3d ed. 2000).
64. FLA. STAT. § 720.301(9) (2011).
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tial community. Created by the community's CC&Rs,65 the Florida home-
owners' association is a corporation, primarily not-for-profit," charged with
operating the community. 7 It is statutorily authorized "to enforce the cove-
nants and restrictions contained in the governing documents of the commu-
nity." 6 8 The community includes all property owned by residents individu-
ally and "common areas owned or leased by the [homeowners'] association,"
and all property within the community is bound by these CC&Rs.69 Conse-
quently, all current and future owners in the community are bound by them.70
The homeowners' association's ability to provide beneficial services
and to protect homeowners' investments necessarily entails a cost for home-
owners beyond forgoing certain land use rights." Accordingly, homeown-
ers' associations impose assessments72 to each parcel owner, pro rata, to
share the costs of the provision of services and the maintenance of the com-
mon areas. 73 In order to keep up with evolving societal and residential needs,
homeowners' associations often need to implement change.74 Empowered by
its bylaws,' 5 it may promulgate new rules and regulations. 7 6 However, this
power is not absolute: While the CIC's recorded CC&Rs "are clothed with a
very strong presumption of validity,"77 subsequent rules and regulations
adopted by the board of directors are subject to the standard of reasonable-
65. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 5.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 4.
70. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 7-8, 90. These restrictive covenants are said
to "'run[] with the land' as a set of permanent restrictions governing [the community's] use."
Id. at 7.
71. See id. at 2-3.
72. Florida defines "assessment" as
a sum or sums of money payable to the association, to the developer or other owner of com-
mon areas, or to recreational facilities and other properties serving the parcels by the owners of
one or more parcels as authorized in the governing documents, which if not paid by the owner
of a parcel, can result in a lien against the parcel.
FLA. STAT. § 720.301(1).
73. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 6.
74. Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community Associations:
Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent, 5 J.L. EcON. & POt'Y 225, 230 (2009)
("[Community] governance must be responsive to the evolving preferences of property own-
ers" in order "[t]o accommodate the changing needs of a community.").
75. The bylaws of a homeowners' association, as defined in its articles of incorporation,
establish its basic structure, procedures, and rule-making abilities. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, Supra
note 30, at 10-11.
76. Id. at I1.
77. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
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ness.7 8 Additionally, the business judgment rule 79 applies to the boards of
Florida corporations; each director must perform his or her duties in good
faith as would a reasonable prudent person given the circumstances, and in a
manner reasonably in the best interests of the corporation.80 Each director
also has a fiduciary duty to the residents of the CIC governed by the home-
owners' association.8 '
For all but the smallest CICs, homeowners' associations are a necessary
and desirable means of managing property held in common amongst home-
owners.82 In Florida, homeowners' associations are charged with the signifi-
cant responsibility of maintaining facilities and managing the community in
a manner residents may not experience in an ungoverned community." In-
deed, Florida recognizes the importance of these associations and their po-
tential benefits to homeowners: In enacting chapter 720, Florida Statutes,
the legislature indicated the desire "that homeowners associations not be
subject[] to extensive state regulation"" in order "to protect the rights of
property owners and association members without unduly impairing the as-
sociation's ability to perform its functions." 85
C. The Voluntary Nature of Mandatory Association Membership
Much ink has been spilled debating the consensual nature of mandatory
association membership.86 As a general consensus of these opposing views,
78. Id. at 639-40 (distinguishing CC&Rs which are presumptively valid from board-
promulgated regulations which are restrained by the reasonableness standard); DUNBAR &
DUDLEY, supra note 30, at I1-12, 88.
79. "The business judgment rule is a principle of substantive corporate law that presumes
a corporate director has acted in good faith." James F. Carroll, The Business Judgment Rule in
Florida-on Paper and in the Trenches, 80 FLA. B.J. 55, 55 (2006).
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(1) (2011).
81. Id. § 720.303(1); DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 40-41.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.3 cmt. a. (2000).
83. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 2.
84. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3 & n.9.
85. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 3.
86. See Brower, supra note 15, at 222, 246-47 (discussing the essential premise of com-
munity association membership as fully voluntary, subject to arguments of buyer ignorance
and the inability to understand covenanting documents); Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom
by Restricting Speech: Why the First Amendment Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common
Interest Communities, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 409, 424 (2011) (characterizing the voluntary relin-
quishment of some constitutional rights in exchange for the expansion of other benefits as "the
very essence of democratic freedom."); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associa-
tions, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (1982) ("[M]embership in a private organization is whol-
ly voluntary."); Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44 (discussing the voluntary nature of
"[c]onsensual transfers of partial interests" in land); Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125
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the dividing line seems to be drawn between accepting the notion that con-
structive notice equates to one's voluntary choice of restricting property
use, and the view that consent cannot be voluntary where homeowners lack
bargaining power" to negotiate these restrictive covenants or lack the facul-
ties to understand them or even be cognizant of their existence.89
However, the decision to purchase in a CIC governed by a homeown-
ers' association is not the Hobson's choice 90 that some of these commenta-
tors have alleged.9' Granted, it might often be the case that many homeown-
ers, as laymen, do not appreciate the nature of these restrictions or the extent
to which they might limit their constitutional rights.92 It might also be the
case that the potential homebuyer might not be aware of the restrictions he or
she is buying into. 93 Nevertheless, studies suggest that "87% of residents
were told the home they were considering was part of a community associa-
tion." 94 For those who are not, the law in Florida holds that ownership of a
(explaining that the original community association agreement is the product of informed
decision making). But see Laura Coon, Sign Restrictions in Residential Communities: Does
the First Amendment Stop at the Gate?, 19 CoMM. LAW. 24, 24 (2001) ("Prospective home-
owners may agree to such restrictions by choosing to live in such communities, but their
choice is often made in the face of limited housing options."); MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at
135 (referring to community associations as "ostensibly voluntary in membership."); Siegel,
supra note 42, at 469 (Because of the dominance of community associations and their steady
increase in proliferation, "the notion of individual homebuyer autonomy, and especially indi-
vidual homebuyer consent to the complex and comprehensive [CIC] servitude regime, is
illusory.").
87. See, e.g., Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 310-12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1966) (discussing the concept of "constructive notice" and how purchasing property subject to
a recorded declaration of CC&Rs constitutes such notice, regardless of whether an immediate
deed contains the restrictions contained in the recorded declaration).
88. See Brian Jason Fleming, Note, Regulation of Political Signs in Private Homeowner
Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. REV. 571, 586 (2006).
89. Margaret Farrand Saxton, Comment, Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas: Access for
Solicitors in Common Interest Communities, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2004). Some
governing documents are exceedingly complex and often cannot be understood by the average
homeowner. Id. While it is the responsibility of the seller to disclose the existence of these
documents, it is not required that the buyer actually looks at or understands them. See Hagan,
186 So. 2d at 310-12; DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8.
90. A "Hobson's choice" is "[a]n election by compulsion or without freedom of choice; a
choice without an alternative." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 561 (3d ed. 1969).
91. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 74; Siegel, supra note 42 at 469.
92. See Brower, supra note 15, at 246-47. "[E]mpirical evidence [suggests] that most
purchasers neither read nor understand [governing] documents." Id.
93. Id. at 246-48.
94. CmTY. Ass'NS INST., WHAT Do AMERICANS SAY ABOUT THEIR OWN COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONs 6 (2009), available at http://www.caionline.org/info/researchlDocuments/
nationalresearch_2009.pdf.
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parcel burdened by a recorded declaration of restrictive covenants imputes
upon the owner knowledge of such restrictions. 95 Certainly there is a reason
the law presumes constructive knowledge of recorded CC&Rs: It is impos-
sible to ascertain whether someone is genuinely unaware of a restrictive cov-
enant.96  Unfortunately, candor is not a defining feature of human nature.
Therefore, due diligence is rewarded,97 whereas the imprudent proceeds at
his or her peril. To allow a homeowner to successfully challenge the validity
of a restrictive covenant on the basis he or she does not understand the nature
or existence of the restriction would be to reward his or her ignorance.
The imputation of knowledge of restrictive covenants supports sound
public policy. 98 By presuming homeowners are aware of their property rights
and abridgments thereof, the potential detriment the lack of knowledge of
restrictive covenants may have upon their rights and ability to use their prop-
erty should serve as an incentive for homeowners-and citizens in general-
to be more cognizant of their rights. 99 Although some argue that encouraging
residents' awareness and education of their property rights is insufficient to
protect their interests, the mutually beneficial nature of the covenant-
restricted CIC compensates for this, as it is designed to promote the overall
interests of its residents."
Subscription to the restrictive covenants burdening a parcel in a CIC is
the product of a voluntary market decision, just as the creation of these re-
strictions is the product of free choice tempered by sophisticated, informed
decision-making and market considerations.' 0' As one scholar noted, "the
original association agreement was the result of a true market decision by
parties with the necessary knowledge and sophistication to make an informed
95. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8, 88. Florida's Marketable Record Title Act
protects a homeowners' association's declaration of CC&Rs from circumvention by an unin-
formed homeowner by nevertheless binding his or her property by its restrictive covenants
through the doctrine of constructive notice. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.02-.03 (2011).
96. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1546. This is because unlike constructive notice, which
is imputed, actual notice is "[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1164 (9th ed. 2009).
97. The diligent homebuyer, apprised of all restrictions burdening his or her property, is
rewarded in the sense that he or she has the ability to make an informed decision in selecting a
parcel whose characteristics suit his or her tastes and preferences. Korngold, supra note 21, at
1545.
98. Cantora, supra note 86, at 423-24.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 424.
101. See Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125; see also Fennell, supra note 15, at 832
("[Community associations] are often viewed as representing a laudable shift in the direction
of consumer choice.").
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choice." 02 It was the intention of the original drafters of these restrictive
covenants to maintain the image and community they desired to build, craft-
ed to embrace societal factors and market considerations as a reflection of
the desired development scheme.103 Just as those before them desired to
achieve, new purchasers, while perhaps unaware of particular restrictions,
choose to be a part of this community and reap the benefits these restrictions
affect through compliance." This voluntary choice of communal belonging
is accompanied by the use restrictions necessary to achieve and perpetuate
the desired development scheme.'0o
While free, unrestricted use of property is generally favored,'0 effect is
given to the original intent of the developer or homeowners who desire to
mutually restrict the use of property in order to achieve a development
scheme that will continue for years to come. 0 7 For those potential home-
owners seeking to purchase, whether they wish to buy into this development
scheme or seek housing unburdened by restrictive covenants, they neverthe-
less retain their freedom of choice. 08 Some might argue, and with merit, that
the proliferation of homeowners' associations and community associations in
general leaves prospective homeowners with fewer options.'" Compounded
by the fact that one in five Americans, and more significantly, one in three
Floridians, lives in a community association,"o it would seem that the deci-
sion has already been made for many of these consumers. Despite the asser-
tion that the lack of available housing unburdened by restrictive covenants
may result in involuntary acquiescence to those covenants,"' these prospec-
tive buyers are not bereft of their freedom to choose their homesteads. It is
just as possible that the lack of available housing unburdened by restrictive
102. Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125.
103. Brower, supra note 15, at 205-06.
104. Id. at 224 ("Accordingly, common interest developments cannot protect residents'
investments and socially based preferences unless members are assured that their choices and
agreements will confine themselves and others, both now and in the future.").
105. Id. at223-25.
106. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
107. Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
("Where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate
grantees, imposing restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or im-
provement, such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee . . .
108. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 832; see also Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1520.
109. Brower, supra note 15, at 248 (discussing the scarcity of unrestricted housing as a
result of the great increase in number of CICs); Fennell, supra note 15, at 829 ("In many parts
of the country today, a homebuyer who wishes to purchase a new home is likely to find that
home in a private development governed by a homeowners association.").
110. See discussion supra Part II.A.
111. See Brower, supra note 15, at 248.
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covenants is the product of a housing market modeled after consumer de-
mand and social preference, leaving immaterial their non-acquiescence to
those specific restrictions of whose effect they desire to be a part anyway.1 12
The voluntary nature of mandatory homeowners' association member-
ship is more apparent when distinguished from the contrary, involuntary na-
ture of city or municipality membership." 3 A homeowner acquires member-
ship in a homeowners' association by purchasing a parcel of land in a CIC
governed by one."4 By contrast, "statutory procedures for incorporating a
new city invariably authorize a majority (perhaps only concurrent or extraor-
dinary majorities) to coerce involuntary minorities to join their organiza-
tion.""' While the decision of which city or municipality will become their
domicile may be a voluntary choice, residents do not have the same freedom
of choice they have regarding homeowners' association membership." 6 Res-
idents can choose to forego association membership by moving into a com-
munity not governed by one, but they cannot avoid membership in a city or
municipality, no matter where they live.' '7 This comparison leads into the
premise, discussed later, that homeowners' associations should not be lik-
ened to municipalities." 8
III. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND FLORIDA'S HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION
A short drive through the traditional CIC should make apparent the
need for, and impact of, restrictive covenants. From the uniformity in struc-
tural aesthetics" 9 to the well-manicured common areas, the system of restric-
tive covenants is evident.12 0 Beginning in the early twentieth century, restric-
tive covenants emerged as developers' primary means of implementing their
subdivision plans.12' By recording a master declaration of CC&Rs, the de-
112. See id. at 239 (Under a "market theory of consent," which refers to the collective
choice of societal values, "people acknowledge and appreciate the risks and advantages of
[community] association[s] . . . when they shop for family residences. Thus, by definition,
their decision to purchase in a [CIC] means that they have determined they are better off, or at
least no worse off, in a community with those restrictions than in one without them.").
113. See Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1520.
114. See supra text accompanying note 64.
115. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523.
116. Id. at 1520.
117. See id.
118. See infra Part V.B.
119. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
120. See id. at 830.
121. McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 36.
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veloper restricts the use each future parcel owner can make of his or her
property in order to preserve the community concept.12 2 At first glance, the
most noticeable objects for preservation are aesthetic values, where restric-
tive covenants impose "limits on paint color, yard art, structural changes,
fences, building materials, and the like."1 23 More covert are those covenants
obligating homeowners to pay assessments and those "providing for the op-
eration, maintenance or management of the association or the property.""2
Through these various private land use controls, property owners can mutu-
ally restrict the use of property 25 that will bind present and future owners
alike.126 These restrictions, while limiting the use one can make of his or her
property, are often desirable.127 They can, however, have detrimental conse-
quences for those who fail to educate themselves on the substance of the
restrictive covenants to which they subscribed when they purchased their
property.128 Overall, the entity responsible for enforcing these restrictive
covenants is a necessary device.
A. CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, and the Florida Homeowners'
Association
In recognizing the importance of voluntary consumer autonomy, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Bas-
so, 129 that restrictions recorded in a declaration of CC&Rs "are clothed with a
very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each indi-
vidual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restric-
tions to be imposed."'30 This holding supports the policy underlying the vol-
untary nature of restrictive covenants."' It further held that these restrictions
"will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in
122. See id.; Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
123. Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
124. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 88-89.
125. Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Each
homeowner has the right to enforce these restrictions against one another. Id. A "restriction,"
in the real property context, is a "limitation . . . placed on the use or enjoyment of property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (9th ed. 2009).
126. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8 ("When covenants run with the land, a
person who assumes ownership of a parcel of the land also assumes ownership with the pre-
sumed knowledge of the covenants.").
127. See infra Part Ill.A.I.a.
128. See infra Part Ill.A.I.a.
129. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 639.
131. See supra Part II.C.
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their application, in violation of public policy, or that they abrogate some
fundamental constitutional right.",3 2 While some commentators have vividly
epitomized homeowners' associations as supreme arbiters having limitless
power and absolute authority to capriciously enact rules at a whim, 33 these
characterizations are misplaced and largely embellished.
The limitations on an association's board of directors is apparent in the
Basso decision: It distinguished a CIC's CC&Rs from those rules and regu-
lations "promulgated by the association's board of directors,"'3 qualifying
the latter with the standard of "reasonableness," which confines the board's
rule-making discretion to those "reasonably related to the promotion of the
health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners." 35
Further protection from arbitrary or exceedinglyl36 unreasonable restric-
tions can be found in federal and state statutes.'13  For example, the Federal
Fair Housing Act (FHA), which applies to both state and private actors-
such as homeowners' associations-provides that "it shall be unlawful ...
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin." 38 Additionally, Florida prohibits certain covenants that
give unilateral association decision making power to emancipated develop-
ers'39 and preempts covenants that infringe upon a homeowner's right to fly
an American flag.'
132. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
133. See Sharon L. Bush, Beware the Associations: How Homeowners' Associations
Control You and Infringe upon Your Inalienable Rights!!, 30 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2003)
(contending that homeowners' associations, whose "[elmotionally entrenched board members
... make up their own rules" while "wielding a big stick," control every aspect of homeown-
ers' lives, likening them to "giant bulldozers that ravage the rights of homeowners"); Paula A.
Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Meta-
phor and Paradox, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1111, 1130 (2007) (asserting that "homeowners associa-
tion boards can devolve into mini-autocracies").
134. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639.
135. Id. at 640; see also FLA. STAT. § 720.304(1) (2011) ('The entity or entities responsi-
ble for the operation of the common areas and recreational facilities may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations pertaining to the use of such common areas and recreational facilities.").
136. This qualifier is necessary, considering "a use restriction in a declaration ... may
have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts." Basso,
393 So. 2d at 640 (emphasis omitted).
137. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 720.3075(l)(a).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
139. FLA. STAT. § 720.3075(l)(a).
140. Id. §§ 720.304(2)(a), .3075(3).
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At the end of the day, the restrictions embodied in a community's
CC&Rs and the later promulgated rules and regulations serve the homeown-
ers. Whether that service is to their benefit or detriment depends on many
factors, such as the complexity and nature of their community and its opera-
tions,141 the level of awareness and understanding homeowners have of the
restrictive covenants that burden their properties, and the zeal of the associa-
tion's board of directors.142  But ultimately, the homeowners' association
charged with enforcing these CC&Rs, rules, and regulations is a necessary
vehicle. 14 3
1. Private Land Use Controls'" and the Enforcing Entity
a. Desirable for Many, Detrimentalfor Some: Perception is Through the
Lens of the Media
The ability to control the manner in which one's community functions
and appears is a useful device, not only in theory. As discussed, the desire
for uniformity and consistency is satisfied through imposition of private land
use controls and the subsequent enforcement thereof.14 5 The corollary bene-
fits of these private land use controls, steadfastly enforced by a governing
entity, are numerous.146 In some communities, residents enjoy certain ameni-
ties and facilities, such as "a golf course, a swimming pool, tennis courts,
[and] a clubhouse." 47 Through economies of scale,'48 residents may enjoy
141. For example, the residents of an exclusive golf and country club community, which
would likely require a complex regime of restrictions and regulations in order to function, may
support the passing of more stringent rules, whereas the residents of a modest suburban com-
munity comprised of homes and insignificant common areas may support more relaxed meas-
ures. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 841-42. One commentator colorfully described a declara-
tion of CC&Rs as "a fat package many pages long and full of elaborate restrictions that, taken
as a whole, dictate to a large extent the lifestyle of everybody in the project." McKENZIE,
supra note 18, at 21.
142. Restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations are worth no more than their ability to be
enforced. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1135 ("Under the standard CIC originat-
ing documents, a key mandate of [the] board[] [of directors] is to enforce the developer-
imposed servitudes scheme and to mete out penalties against homeowners who fail to com-
ply.").
143. See infra Part III.A.2.
144. This article discusses private land use controls, such as restrictive covenants, as op-
posed to public controls, such as zoning ordinances, which are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.
145. Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
146. See id. at 841-42.
147. Id.
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these amenities and facilities they would otherwise be unable to afford or
maintain.149 In addition to benefitting from a harmonized aesthetic and de-
velopment scheme,5 o homeowners in a CIC governed by a community asso-
ciation benefit from increased property values."' In fact, 70% of homeown-
ers living in association-governed CICs believe their communities' rules
enhance their property values.152 Similarly, 71% of these residents rate their
experience living under the governance of these community associations as
positive.'53 Overall, this survey confirmed the following findings:
* Residents are satisfied with their community associations.
* Association board members strive to serve the best interests of
the community.
* Community managers provide value and support to associa-
tions.
* Association rules protect and enhance property values.
* Homeowners value the return they get for their association as-
sessments.
148. A production analogy is helpful here: "Economies of scale" is referred to as
"[s]avings achieved in the cost of production by larger enterprises because the cost of initial
investment can be defrayed across a greater number." Definition of: Economies of Scale,
GEOGRAPHY-DICTIONARY.ORG (2008), http://geography.geography-dictionary.org/Geography-
Dictionary/Economies ofScale. Similarly, in the community association, such costs may be
defrayed amongst numerous homeowners, thereby achieving an efficient provision of services
otherwise out of the financial reach of the average homeowner.
149. Fennell, supra note 15, at 842; see also Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44 (dis-
cussing the market efficiency of pooled resources to provide amenities for CIC residents).
150. See Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Govern-
ments: "The State Will Make the Call", 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 513 (1996).
151. Id.; Suarez, supra note 12, at 743; Lara Womack & Douglas Timmons, Homeowner
Associations: Are They Private Governments?, 29 REAL EsT. L.J. 322, 323 (2001). But see
Korngold, supra note 21, at 1544 (contending that use restrictions burdening a parcel might
decrease its value but that such loss is offset by the mutual nature of such restrictions binding
other lots in the community).
152. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 5. By comparison, only 2% of homeowners
thought the rules harmed their property values, 2% were not sure, and 27% perceived no dif-
ference. Id.
153. Id. at 2. By contrast, only 12% of residents had a negative experience, and 17% were
neutral. Id.
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* Residents do not want . . . government intervention in their
communities.154
This research suggests that homeowners are satisfied with the restrictive
covenants binding the use of their property and the association responsible
for enforcing them.'
Beyond those values ascertainable by survey, the historical develop-
ment of CICs promoted certain ideals, still important today.'5 6 They "were
seen as serving important, then emerging and still valued social policies-
protection of the family home, fostering a positive communal setting for
families and children, efficiently offering recreation facilities at a shared
cost, and use of democratic principles of self-governance."' Some of the
restrictions used to craft these CICs, and their place in Florida communities,
will now be discussed.
Some restrictive covenants concern the makeup of the community.'
Aesthetic policies such as building restrictions serve to protect the integrity
of the community's appearance and development scheme.'"9 Examples of
structures and improvements that have been ordered removed by Florida
courts as not conforming to a community's CC&Rs include: "unauthorized
carports," porches,' decks,16 satellite dishes,16 ham radio antennas,'" ra-
dio tower/antennas,165 docks,166 exterior awnings, 67 sheds and similar struc-
154. Id.
155. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 3.
156. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1571-72.
157. Id. at 1572.
158. See Brower, supra note 15, at 205.
159. See id.
160. Pelican Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Murphy, 554 So. 2d 1179, 1180, 1182 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
161. Europco Mgmt. Co. of Am. v. Smith, 572 So. 2d 963, 965, 968 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
162. Miami Lakes Civic Ass'n v. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d 271, 271, 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
163. Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d
144, 144-45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Esplanade Patio Homes Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Rolle, 613 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Emerald Estates Cmty. Ass'n v. Gorodetzer, 819 So. 2d 190, 191, 195 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
165. Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
166. Johnson v. Tlush, 468 So. 2d 1023, 1024-25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per cu-
riam); O'Brien v. Gale J. Apple, Inc., 253 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
167. Eastpointe Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Cohen, 505 So. 2d 518, 518, 521 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987).
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ures,168 improper fencing,'69 concrete walls,170 an exterior wall plaque,17 ' and
a portion of a dwelling encroaching on a setback line'72 between parcels."7
However, their enforcement depends on the existence of a recorded CC&R
regulating an aesthetic scheme.17 4 Indeed, one Florida court held that:
In the absence of an existing pattern or scheme of type of architec-
ture which puts a prospective purchaser on notice that only one
kind of style will be allowed, either in the recorded restrictions or
de facto from the unified building scheme built on the subdivision,
[a homeowners' association] board does not have the power or
discretion to impose only one style over another, based purely on
"aesthetic concepts." 75
This limitation preserves homeowners' autonomy in deciding which ar-
chitectural scheme they desire to buy into and ensures that an imprudent
board of directors will not be successful in enforcing arbitrarily-adopted
building or aesthetic restrictions 76 not contemplated by the community's
CC&Rs-the restrictions to which homeowners voluntarily acquiesced by
purchasing in the community. 177 Restricting aesthetic values, such as the
color residents can paint their houses and the materials used in additions or
repairs serves an important purpose: to avoid unsightly and devaluing con-
sequences.'78
The effect these aesthetic and architectural controls have on homeown-
ers is not always favorable, and the association often gets a bad rap for en-
forcing them.'79 Unfortunately, the media exposure given to homeowners'
168. McMillan v. Oaks of Spring Hill Homeowner's Ass'n, 754 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
169. James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074, 1075, 1078 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
170. Velickovich v. Ricci, 391 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
171. Lakeridge Greens Homeowners Ass'n v. Silberman, 765 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
172. Daniel v. May, 143 So. 2d 536, 537-38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
173. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 107.
174. Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowner's Ass'n, 511 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987).
175. Id. (footnotes omitted).
176. See, e.g., Voight v. Harbour Heights Improvement Ass'n, 218 So. 2d 803, 806 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (per curiam).
177. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523; see discussion supra Part II.C.
178. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 843-44, 872 (discussing aesthetic values by analogy of
ugly yard art and the resulting aesthetic dismay and diminution of property value due to loss
of the community ambiance).
179. See, e.g., Callies et al., supra note 42, at 185 ("Increasingly, [homeowners'] associa-
tions are described as rigid, uninspired, and excessively concerned with compliance and con-
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associations is not normally cast in favorable light.'" The result is often an
over-dramatization of otherwise reasonable restrictions in homeowners' as-
sociations across the state, focusing on the specific peculiarities of the violat-
ing homeowner. 8 ' For example, a homeowner in an upscale subdivision in
Tampa, Florida neglected to consult his copy of his community's CC&Rs
before building a backyard tree house for his son.' 82 Because the tree house
was six feet taller than the restrictive covenants permitted, the homeowners'
association warned of its intentions to pursue legal action against the offend-
ing homeowner.183 This story would likely not have made it in a newspaper
save for one fact: The son for whom the tree house was built had leuke-
mia.' The restriction undoubtedly served an aesthetic purpose to which this
homeowner subscribed, and the board cannot make an exception merely out
of compassion for the homeowner's unfortunate circumstances because such
an act could compromise its ability to enforce the restriction in the future."'
Similarly, in Sanford, Florida, a homeowner tragically lost his wife,
child, and home when a plane crashed into his house.186  The homeowner
rebuilt his house without architectural approval from his homeowners' asso-
ciation, and it turns out the location of the new house and materials used in
trol . . . as members balk at overzealous restrictiveness and rules that are perceived to be
heavy handed.").
180. See, e.g., CMTY. Ass'NS INST., supra note 94, at 3. Research suggests that anecdotal
reports provided by the media feed the negative connotation associated with homeowners'
associations:
Conflict makes headlines, and that's what most Americans read in newspapers and see on tele-
vision about community associations. Unfortunately, there is little news in harmony. We
don't see stories about the tens of millions of homeowners who are satisfied and content in
their communities. We don't read many media profiles about association board members who
lead their associations quietly and effectively. We don't see stories about managers and other
professionals who provide invaluable guidance and support to their community association cli-
ents.
Id.
181. See Amy Herdy, It's Rules vs. Reason in Neighborhoods, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2000, at I B; Dave McDaniel, Sanford Plane Crash Victim Hits Rebuilding Snags,
WESH.coM, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.wesh.com/news/17432965/detail.html?rss=orl&psp=
news.
182. Herdy, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. If a pattern of selective enforceability is demonstrated, the association may
not be able to enforce that regulation. Chattel Shipping & Inv., Inc. v. Brickell Place Condo.
Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Wlhen selective enforcement has in
fact been demonstrated, the association is said to be 'estopped' from applying a given regula-
tion." (citing White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979))).
186. McDaniel, supra note 181.
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its construction were inconsistent with other houses in the neighborhood.187
Although the homeowners' association threatened litigation should the
homeowner fail to rectify the inconsistencies, it is not clear whether the
community's recorded CC&Rs addressed the architectural or aesthetic
scheme allegedly violated.'88 The compassion any reasonable person would
have for the homeowner in the face of such a tragic accident seems to shroud
the fact that he violated the architectural covenant-presuming the CC&Rs
addressed the issue-while simultaneously depicting the homeowners' asso-
ciation, whose job it is to enforce these covenants, as callous and cold-
hearted.189
Just down the Atlantic coast in Jupiter, Florida, a condominium associa-
tion' 90 recently passed a rule requiring residents who own dogs to pay a $200
fee.' 91 The purpose of this fee seems quite bizarre: It will pay for dog DNA
sampling, testing, and registration of each owner's dog's DNA profile, and
help defray the cost of pet waste cleanup.192 Faced with the recurring issue
of feces and urine "in elevators, in stairwells, on carpets and in the lobby, as
well as [the] common areas outside" resulting in a $10,000 to $12,000 annual
cleaning and repair expense, the association considered this approach its best
option. 93 Carrying with it the threat of a $1000 fine-and a property lien in
the event of nonpayment-for those owners whose dog's DNA matches
samples of feces collected in these areas, the regulation has been criticized
by many owners.' 94 Legitimate or not, the press-induced awareness of these
types of regulations feeds the stereotype that associations and their boards
are too cavalier with their rule-making power.'95
187. Id.
188. See id. This is important because it concerns the enforceability of the restriction. See
supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
189. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1136 ("[Homeowners' association] boards
have the capacity to proceed vigorously and even arbitrarily against dissenters, rule-benders
and rule-breakers of both good and bad faith.").
190. While an in-depth analysis of condominium associations is beyond the scope of this
article, it suffices to say they function very similarly to homeowners' associations. See HOA
TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 3.
191. Bill Dipaolo, DNA Samples Will Determine If Jupiter Residents Aren't Picking up
Behind Their Pooches, PALM BEACH POST, June 29, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.
com/news/dna-samples-will-determine-if-jupiter-residents-arent-I 568967.html.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1136 ("[C]oupled with too many rules and
too few checks on the rulers," homeowners' associations boards superfluously "use missiles to
kill mice.").
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Concerning another aspect of the community makeup, many Florida
communities cater to senior adult living,'96 restricting ownership and occu-
pancy to adults fifty-five years of age or older.'97 This type of community is
desirable for retirees, though "[pireserving the common scheme and continu-
ity for a senior adult community necessitates the enforcement of age restric-
tions that prohibit children from becoming permanent residents in the com-
munity."'98 While a restriction barring children from residing in the commu-
nity would be unconstitutional if arbitrarily enforced,'" the FHA provides
that a community may do so subject to certain limitations.200 As with any
restriction, there are always those few who end up between a rock and a hard
place. In a Clearwater, Florida age-restricted retirement community, a young
girl was living with her grandparents because her mother was unfit to care
for her.20 ' However, the community's CC&Rs dictated that no person
younger than fifty-five may live in the community. 20 2 Accordingly, the asso-
ciation brought an action to evict the young girl as a measure of enforcing
the restrictive covenant.203 While it appears a deal between the grandparents
and the association to allow the girl to remain in the household under some
obscure temporary zoning exemption may be imminent,20 it is nevertheless a
painful reminder of the difficult decisions homeowners' association boards
must make and the unfortunate circumstances that can result from enforcing
196. See, e.g., Florida Active Adult Communities, RETIREMENT LIVING INFO. CTR., http://
www.retirementliving.com/florida.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (listing hundreds of adult,
retirement, and senior age-restricted communities in Florida).
197. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 97.
198. Id.
199. White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1979) ("[A] restric-
tion against residency by children under the age of twelve . . . is not constitutionally prohibited
unless unreasonably or arbitrarily applied.").
200. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 97. For example, a community may restrict its
residents to persons sixty-two years of age and older if that is its intent, or it may restrict resi-
dents to fifty-five years of age and older so long as "at least 80% of the parcels are occupied
by at least one person [fifty-five] years of age or over." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2) (2006)
(a provision of the FHA); FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(b) (2011) (employing language virtually
identical to the FHA).
201. See Stefanos Chen, The Minor Threat: Age-Restricted Communities Evicting Chil-
dren, AOL REAL EsT. (Jan. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2012/01/06/the-
minor-threat-age-restricted-communities-evicting-children.
202. Retirement Community Fights to Evict 6-Year-Old Girl, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 21,
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/21/retirement-community-figh-n-328396.
html.
203. See id.
204. Chen, supra note 201.
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restrictive covenants in emotional situations.205 What must necessarily be
factored into this equation are the rights of the other residents in the commu-
nity to enforce the restriction by which they freely contracted to abide, and
those rights are considerably important.20
Homeowners acquiesce to many of these aesthetic and community-
makeup restrictions at the expense of certain liberties otherwise protected by
the First Amendment. 207 These are significant because they may apply both
to owners' parcels and common areas, though Florida offers certain protec-
tions to use of common areas involving freedom of assembly and expression:
"The right of a parcel owner to use the common areas includes the right to
peaceably assemble in the common facilities and the right to invite public
officers or candidates for public office to appear and speak on the common
facilities."208 While the Supreme Court of the United States has addressed
the issue of political speech in the form of political signs on a homeowner's
property in violation of a municipal ordinance-which the Court found to be
unconstitutional-its holding does not apply to homeowners' associations
because their conduct does not amount to state action.2 9 An illustration of
free speech restriction in action comes from the City of Coral Springs in
south Florida, where a homeowner whose community was governed by a
homeowners' association displayed a magnetic American flag and the words
"God Bless America" on his garage door.2 '0  Because his community's
CC&Rs prohibited the display of signs of any type without prior approval,
205. See Retirement Community Fights to Evict 6-Year-Old Girl, supra note 202 ("[T]he
president of the homeowners' association looks positively gleeful as he discusses the prospect
of getting sheriffs to forcibly remove the small girl."). While the board president may have
been less than compassionate, he has a duty to the other residents to enforce the rules and
regulations that attracted them to the retirement community. See id. Recognition of this duty
often gets lost in the emotionally-charged media rendition of the story. See id.
206. See infra Part IV.A.
207. Coon, supra note 86, at 24; Fleming, supra note 88, at 583. Absent state action,
private individuals may covenant to mutually restrict First Amendment rights such as freedom
of speech and other political expression. Coon, supra note 86, at 24; Fleming, supra note 88,
at 583.
208. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 75.
209. Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Develop-
ments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENvt.
L. 233, 240-42 (2006) ("Purely private conduct, absent state action, is not subject to the First
Amendment's protections."); see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994); Coon,
supra note 86, at 24 ("The most significant hurdle in establishing and vindicating free speech
rights for private community residents who want to post political signs on their property is the
state action requirement for all constitutional claims.").
210. Lisa J. Huriash, Coral Springs Homeowners Association Orders Cop to Remove His
'God Bless America' Sign, TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Aug. 28, 2010.
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the association demanded that the homeowner remove it. 2 11 While such a
patriotic sign may emblemize the essence of America, the rules to which the
homeowner covenanted prohibiting any type of signs cannot be undermined
by the content of that sign, and selective enforcement will always be the
danger of acceding to one type of sign over another.212
Another area of controversy may come as a surprise after reading the
FHA protections, which apply to both public and private actors.213 Among
other things, the FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion "in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provi-
sion of services or facilities in connection therewith."214 However, issues
may arise with religion-neutral restrictions, which do not favor one religion
over another, but rather espouse a religion-free environment. 215 Because this
has not been found to come within existing statutory protections, and judicial
interpretation of the state action doctrine does not, and should not, permit
characterization of the conduct of homeowners' associations as state ac-
216 1tion,26 the legislature seems to be the only means of change.217 For example,
in a recent Florida case, condominium unit owners brought an action for de-
claratory relief and to enjoin a condominium association-imposed ban on the
use of common areas, which included an auditorium being used to hold reli-
gious services.2 8 The court held that the owners' right to assemble 2 19 is not
absolute, and that "the statute itself permits the reasonable regulation of that
right." 220 It found that the association's ban on religious practice in common
areas was a reasonable regulation of that statutory right. 22 1 This holding
211. Id.
212. Id.; DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 96 (discussing the importance of uniform
enforcement and the consequences of selective enforcement).
213. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
214. Id. § 3604(b).
215. Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments in Common Interest Communities,
38 PEPP. L. REv. 57, 58 & n.9 (2010); Brower, supra note 15, at 219 ("[R]estrictions on the
transfer of units have limited some prospective purchasers to persons compatible with the
current social, racial, religious, moral, or philosophical composition of the community.").
216. See infra Part V.
217. Carmella, supra note 215, at 58.
218. Neuman v. Grandview at Emerald Hills, Inc., 861 So. 2d 494, 495-96 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
219. See id. at 498. "No entity or entities shall unreasonably restrict any unit owner's right
to peaceably assemble or right to invite public officers or candidates for public office to ap-
pear and speak in common elements, common areas, and recreational facilities." FLA. STAT. §
718.123(l) (2011).
220. Neuman, 861 So. 2d at 498.
221. Id.; see also Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n,
456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (finding prohibition of religious services in
common areas did not violate the FHA because access to common areas was not denied for
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highlights the ability of a homeowners' association to promote the best inter-
ests of the community as a whole, and that regulation of religious practice in
common areas may serve that collective interest.222
As a result of their decision to voluntarily covenant to abide by a com-
munity's CC&Rs, homeowners have a vested expectation 223 that such restric-
tions will be followed and enforced. 224 They moved into a CIC with the de-
sire to restrict many aspects of the community in order to maintain its attrac-
tive aesthetic appearance,225 and to protect, further, and support their "in-
vestment-backed expectations."2 26 After all, such rules and regulations "cre-
ate and maintain the atmosphere and lifestyle that attracted the[se] residents
in the first place."227 In fact, 82% of homeowners believe they receive a fa-
vorable return on their investment.228 If these residents desire to enjoy their
neighborhood unblemished by signs dotting every lawn expressing various
political or religious views, or to be free from being subjected to religious
practice in common areas, why jeopardize their ability to contract away those
rights in the name of state action at the expense of their freedom of con-
tract?2 9 While there will always be situations where restrictions end up
harming a handful of residents, for the countless others eager to enforce
them, it is not fair or equitable to waive them for one person. Such selective
enforcement could lead to a court declaring the covenant unenforceable,
thereby destroying the vested expectations and investments of all the other
homeowners in the community. 230
other purposes and the prohibition applied evenly to all residents of all religions as a total
exclusion).
222. See Carmella, supra note 215, at 64 ("CIC residents who want to live in a religion-
free environment . .. may have the general right to expect the absence of ... visible religious
symbols and religious uses. They might consider the public manifestation of religion to be
ugly, messy, offensive, divisive, discomforting, or even threatening.").
223. See infra Part IV.
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
226. Brower, supra note 15, at 205; see also Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Dis-
contents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Governmentfor "the Nice", 37 URB.
LAW. 335, 342 (2005) (considering "at least [sixty-four] percent of Americans invest all that
they have into the purchase of a home, the stakes are high indeed.").
227. Evelyn C. Lombardo, Comment, A Better Twin Rivers: A Revised Approach to State
Action by Common-Interest Communities, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 1151, 1151-52 (2008).
228. CMTY. Ass'Ns INsT., supra note 94, at 6.
229. Characterizing the conduct of homeowners' associations as state action would jeop-
ardize their ability to enforce covenants restricting free speech or religious practice because
they would then be subject to the Constitution. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see
also infra Parts IV-V.
230. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 96.
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2. The Homeowners' Association: A Necessary Mechanism
With budget shortfalls, the decline in provision of municipal services
gives rise to an increase in popularity of homeowners' associations. 231
Where municipalities are unwilling or unable to provide services desired by
homeowners, a private entity steps in to do just that.232 Where public police
presence can fall short of homeowner expectations, homeowners' associa-
tions can provide an increased sense of security that gates out crime and em-
ploys private security officers to offer a safer community.233
As a remedial measure, CIC homeowners "employ [homeowners'] as-
sociations to correct the deficiencies and abuses, as they perceive them, of
public governments," thereby compensating for the inadequate provision of
services by cities and municipalities.234 The desire for supplanting govern-
mental control in their communities is evident: 87% of homeowners in gov-
erned communities do not want more governmental control over their asso-
ciation.235 Overall, residents are satisfied with the services homeowners'
231. See David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Privatization and the Providing of Public
Facilities Through Private Means, 21 J.L. & PoL. 477, 477 (2005) (describing the privatiza-
tion of services formerly provided by local governments as the result of budget shortfalls);
McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 11 ("[F]inancially strapped local governments . . . found [com-
munity association governed] housing appealing because it had features of private infrastruc-
ture, allowing communities to grow and add property-tax payers at reduced public cost.");
Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1238
(1982).
232. That private entity, the homeowners' association, can provide these services through
collection of assessments that are in addition to property taxes homeowners would normally
pay to a city or municipality. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Commu-
nities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. Po' y 479, 490 (2009) ("As private developers became willing
and able to handle infrastructure that traditionally was provided for by government-laying
out streets, burying sewer lines, fixing street lights, and collecting garbage-local govern-
ments discovered that it was financially beneficial for them . . . that these expensive tasks be
performed by the ... [homeowners' association].").
233. See Callies et al., supra note 42, at 181-82 (noting that gating out nonresidents can
provide a sense of security and safety, and that "private [security] officers outnumber public
police officers three to one." (quoting John B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and
the Fourth Amendment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1127, 1129 (1997) (internal quotations marks
omitted))); Callies & Suarez, supra note 231, at 492 ("CICs promise privacy, exclusivity, and
the perception of safety."); Pehia, supra note 42, at 327 (observing that homeowners' associa-
tions "fill[] [the] perceived gap in [municipal provision of safety and security] service[s] by
employing security guards and constructing entrance gates").
234. Brower, supra note 15, at 205; see also Pehia, supra note 42, at 327 ("[A]s cities
skirted maintenance duties associated with community developments by refusing to accept the
responsibility of the communities' road systems, [homeowners' associations] stepped in as a
necessary private vehicle for providing .. . road and esplanade maintenance.").
235. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 5.
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associations provide.236 While some criticize the privatization of CICs as
resulting in "the possibility that those affluent enough to live in [CICs] will
become increasingly segregated from the rest of society," 2 37 those residents'
tax dollars are not beyond the reach of the local government serving the same
society. 238 Therefore, if anything, CIC residents may be contributing to soci-
ety at a rate greater than their non-CIC neighbors, because they "still must
pay local property taxes for local government services, whether or not they
avail themselves of such services, and even though they already pay extra for
their private community's services."239
Finally, the homeowners' association, as an enforcing entity, provides
homeowners with economical representation when it comes to enforcing
restrictive covenants.2' Even before litigation is contemplated, Florida
homeowners' associations are statutorily authorized to impose fees24 1 for
noncompliance and suspend the offender's rights to use common areas and
facilities "for a reasonable period of time." 242 These benefits would not be
realized by a CIC resident not governed by a homeowners' association be-
cause his or her only recourse would be to sue the offender to enjoin the vio-
lation."
236. See id. at 2.
237. McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 22.
238. Callies & Suarez, supra note 231, at 493.
239. Id.
240. In the sense that in the absence of a governing association, a homeowner in a CIC
with the power to enforce a mutually-restrictive covenant is left with no other remedy for the
breach thereof but a lawsuit against the offending homeowner, the ability of a homeowners'
association to spread the cost of litigation through assessments to all homeowners is an eco-
nomical way of representing each individual homeowner's interest without the individual
burden of litigation costs. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions and
the Inevitability of Mass Aggregate Litigation, 24 Miss. C. L. REv. 285, 287-88 (2005) (dis-
cussing the economic benefits that mass collective litigation provides to groups such as home-
owners' associations).
241. So long as the governing documents permit, the association may levy fees of up to
$100 per violation. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 94.
242. Id.
243. In the absence of an association acting as an agent of the homeowners for enforce-
ment purposes, a homeowner with the right to enforce a mutually-restrictive covenant is free
to enforce that covenant on a theory of breach of covenant, but must proceed without the
benefits of spreading the cost amongst other homeowners. See Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc.,
186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Ha. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) ("Where the owner of a tract of land subdi-
vides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate grantees, imposing restrictions on its use
pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement, such restrictions may be enforced
by any grantee against any other grantee . . . .").
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IV. THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE RIGHT TO RESTRICT THE USE OF
ONE'S PROPERTY
A. The Freedom of Contract
As a basic premise, freedom of contractW in the real property context
involves the liberal ability of a grantor to deliver to a grantee a bundle of
possessory rights while simultaneously retaining certain lesser, non-
possessory rights." Put more simply, it involves the ability of a property
owner to sell some of his or her property subject to use restrictions such as
"single-family residence only" or "no commercial development" while re-
taining the power to enforce such restrictions.246 The importance of this lib-
erty is embodied in an opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida which rec-
ognized, as public policy of the state and nation, the liberal freedom and au-
tonomy one has in the disposition of his or her property.247 To this end, a
property owner should be free to tailor her property rights and use restric-
tions as she sees fit, subject of course, to statutory, constitutional, and public
policy limitations.248
Concerns about the extent to which this freedom may affect the rights of
residents are evident when considering the consequence restrictive covenants
may have on future owners.249 Because the exercise of "personal autonomy
of some . . . entails joining other like-minded persons in homogenous com-
munities," the result may end up "suppress[ing] the individualism of its
members to preserve the counter-societal nature of the association."250 How-
244. This is also termed "liberty of contract." See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d
732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc). An in-depth discussion of the freedom of contract and its
historical underpinnings is beyond the scope of this article.
245. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543.
246. See 21 C.J.S. Covenants as to Use of Real Property § 24 (2006) ("A restrictive cove-
nant is a negative covenant that limits permissible uses of land. The purpose of restrictive
covenants is to allow for uniformity in a given, planned development and to maintain or en-
hance the value of adjacent property by controlling the nature and use of surrounding proper-
ties.").
247. Sinclair Ref. Co., 65 So. 2d at 733; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
248. Sinclair Ref Co., 65 So. 2d at 733; see also Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso,
393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Restrictive covenants "will not be invali-
dated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of pub-
lic policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.").
249. Because restrictive covenants run with the land-provided they satisfy parties' intent,
privity, touch and concern, and other jurisdiction-specific requirements-they are enforceable
against successors in interest; or more simply, subsequent grantees. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Real
Covenants § 20 (2005).
250. Brower, supra note 15, at 219.
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ever, notwithstanding these concerns, the law should respect the voluntary
choice a subsequent purchaser makes in purchasing a parcel of land subject
to a use restriction.2 5' Although the initial decision invokes the landowner's
exercise of free choice and control over the property to his or her personal
satisfaction in a manner that may not comport with efficiency or societal
ideals, "[fluture purchasers with notice [of such restrictions] 'buy into' those
expressions of liberty, and these choices are deemed to be theirs as well." 2 52
Other concerns express discomfort with the notion of burdening a parcel
of property with abridgements of certain constitutional rights of residents and
non-residents alike.253 These abridgements may include restrictions on pub-
lic assembly,254 the right to free speech and political expression, 255 and the
right to travel.25 While these restrictive covenants could last perpetually,
they are the product of free autonomous decision making that addresses the
needs and desires of the property owner in an efficient manner, employing
servitudes as that vehicle.257 As one scholar eloquently stated:
[O]ne of the most powerful traditional justifications for freedom of
contract is that we should give people the freedom to make ar-
rangements that suit their individual interests; social welfare im-
proves when we enforce mutually advantageous agreements, and it
suffers if we prevent people from tailoring property rights in ways
that serve their mutual interests.258
Who are we to interfere with these private agreements tailoring the
rights affecting the use of private property? Recognizing this important free-
dom is not only "sanctioned by society ... to promote efficiency .. . [and] to
safeguard individual freedom," 259 it also serves to protect against a modern-
251. Komgold, supra note 21, at 1548. This respect for individual choice is subject to
"overriding public policy consideration[s]." Id.
252. Id. at 1547-48.
253. See David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating
the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 767 (1995) (arguing
that because of community associations, "nonmembers must forfeit their right to live in cer-
tain areas, their right to move about freely, their constitutional guarantees of equal protection
and due process, and their right to a fair share of the public fisc.").
254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, supra note 42, at 469-70
("restrictling] public assembly on [CIC] streets").
255. See supra text accompanying notes 207-12.
256. Kennedy, supra note 253, at 770 & n.49.
257. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44.
258. Singer, supra note 2, at 1028.
259. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982).
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ized feudal system of oppressive "serfdom." 20 In recognizing this auton-
omy, "[c]ourts now consistently view servitudes as vehicles capable of facili-
tating the autonomous choices of individuals and enhancing the value of
land."26 1
The freedom to restrict the use of property is already tempered by the
FHA262 and other statutory protections, and constitutional and public policy
limitations. 263 Legitimate criticisms of the consequences produced by un-
checked restrictive covenants having a discriminatory impact on residents
and nonresidents alike were answered by Congress in enacting the FHA to
protect access to housing for racial minorities who were historically dis-
criminated against.264 The FHA provides "a means to redress private acts of
discrimination" in housing matters, and prior versions were modified "by
including more protected characteristics, providing a more expansive and
detailed list of prohibited conduct, and creating an administrative and judicial
enforcement mechanism." 265 FHA moderation lessens the likelihood of dis-
criminatory impact in housing transactions, and the courts will not enforce a
restrictive covenant in discord with its protections, provided the challenger
satisfies the statutory prerequisites.26
Limiting a property owner's freedom to restrict the use of her property
threatens market efficiency 267 and endangers his or her vested expectations. 26 8
This is because property owners whose CIC properties are burdened by use
restrictions purchased them subject to these restrictions with the expectation
that they will enjoy the corollary benefits. 2 69 Therefore, judicial enforcement
260. Id. A serf is "[a] person in a condition of feudal servitude, bound to labor at the will
of a lord." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (9th ed. 2009); see also Laura T. Rahe, The Right
to Exclude: Preserving the Autonomy of the Homeowners' Association, 34 URB. LAW. 521,
527 (2002) (Americans have revered property rights because, "as the horrors of communist
regimes past and present demonstrate, the elimination of private property means the destruc-
tion of other liberties.").
261. Fennell, supra note 15, at 837.
262. See supra text accompanying note 138.
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
264. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants
Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (2008).
265. Id. at 29.
266. In order to proceed with an FHA housing discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove
either "disparate treatment or disparate impact." Angel M. Traub, Comment, The Wall Is
Down, Now We Build More: The Exclusionary Effects of Gated Communities Demand Strict-
er Burdens Under the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 396 (2000).
267. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-45.
268. See Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1085 ("[T]here are clearly expectations that
[property] owners have when they invest.").
269. See id. at 1105.
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of these restrictive covenants should continue unhindered, save for those
falling within statutory and public policy considerations, because "[p]eople
will not likely enter such efficiency maximizing transactions unless they are
confident that the legal system will enforce them."270 Further advancing this
view, one scholar warns of the dangers of restricting the freedom of contract:
From both the libertarian and efficiency point of view, there
seems to be nothing to gain (and a lot to lose) by limiting freedom
of contract or freedom of disposition. Restrictions on disaggrega-
tion of property rights can only decrease freedom and well-being
by preventing individuals from entering mutually beneficial ar-
rangements. And anyone who wants to reassemble a fee simple
(full ownership rights) can simply bargain with the owners of each
of the sticks, just as one could try to buy four contiguous parcels of
land to develop a large project.271
In undertaking the purchase of real property, the individual homebuyer
is in the best position to determine which rights he or she wishes to acquire
and forego, and in the absence of extreme overriding considerations, the law
should refrain from interfering with one's freedom of choice.272
B. The Right to Restrict the Use of One's Property and the First Amend-
ment: Hypocrisy by Analogy
The Supreme Court of Florida observed "that the right to own, use, oc-
cupy, and dispose of property is a privilege guaranteed to a citizen."273 As
discussed, property owners in a CIC may, and often do, restrict their free
speech as a tradeoff for creating and maintaining the community image they
so desire.274 As controversial as that may seem, there are many other accept-
able means of contracting away one's right to free speech.275 In everyday
transactions, people enter into "contracts of silence" 276 such as confidentiality
270. See Komgold, supra note 21, at 1545.
271. Singer, supra note 2, at 1024.
272. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1548.
273. Harris v. Sunset Islands Prop. Owners, Inc., 116 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1959).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 207-12.
275. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 (1998) ("In a legal regime that provides for freedom of contract,
parties are generally free, absent public policy or First Amendment restraints, to commit to
being silent about almost anything.").
276. A "contract of silence" is a "contract in which a party has made an enforceable prom-
ise to keep quiet about something." Id. (footnote omitted).
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agreements, 277 non-compete agreements, 278 agreements containing employee
"gag" provisions,279 agreements "protect[ing] privacy and reputational inter-
ests,"280 and government confidentiality agreements 28 1 "in exchange for some
valuable benefit."2 82 As a seeming contradiction, some commentators con-
demn the ability of a CIC to mutually restrict property owners' First
Amendment rights while paying no attention to those agreements in other
contexts.283 So why, then, can individuals restrict their First Amendment
rights in some, but not all, areas of free contract? In either context, the ex-
change is freedom for benefit, and it is difficult to discern much of a differ-
ence. Homeowners restrict their rights to certain First Amendment freedom
of speech protections in exchange for the collective benefit that their com-
munities will be more aesthetically pleasing, more desirable to suit their
tastes and preferences, and that their property values will increase as a re-
sult.284 With contracts of silence, individuals restrict their First Amendment
right to free speech in order to protect some pecuniary or confidential interest
in exchange for some economic benefit. 285 While it could be argued that the
277. A confidentiality agreement is "[a] promise not to disclose trade secrets or other
proprietary information learned in the course of the parties' relationship . . . [and is] often
required as a condition of employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 339-40 (9th ed. 2009).
278. A non-compete agreement involves "[a] promise, usu[ally] in a sale-of-business,
partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated
time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer." Id. at 420.
279. Garfield, supra note 275, at 265.
280. Id. at 272.
281. Id. at 274.
282. Cantora, supra note 86, at 424.
283. See Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
947, 960-61 (1998) (arguing that the lack of access to private CICs for non-resident citizens is
greatly reduced by the Supreme Court of the United States' refusal to extend the state action
doctrine to these communities in the face of "more and more of the nation's residential streets
[that] are now off-limits in private gated communities."); Coon, supra note 86, at 24 ("[F]ew
[community associations] will satisfy the state action requirement, thereby silencing an oppor-
tunity for political speech by a growing number of Americans."); Suarez, supra note 12, at
741 ("The loss of speech rights is one of the most severe constitutional deprivations among
free people, yet the courts have limited ability to protect private CIC residents and non-
residents against it."); Chadderdon, supra note 209, at 264 (positing that in the context of First
Amendment rights, "the restrictions imposed by quasi-governmental bodies like [homeown-
ers' associations] do, indeed, today make it harder for millions of citizens to communicate and
express themselves to their neighbors."); Zelica Marie Grieve, Note, Latera v. Isle at Mission
Bay Homeowners Ass'n: The Homeowner's First Amendment Right to Receive Information,
20 NOVA L. REV. 531, 556 (1995) (criticizing a homeowners' association's aesthetics-
conscious decision to ban satellite dishes as an infringement on homeowners' First Amend-
ment right to receive information).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
285. Cantora, supra note 86, at 424; Garfield, supra note 275, at 269.
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potential impact on third parties that arises out of restricting free speech is
greater in the property context than in contracts of silence, the loss of third-
party access to information as a result of the latter suppresses speech no less
than the former. 86 Property as an institution should be afforded the same
independence in contracting as with any other private contract.287 The same
critics who condemn the ability of property owners in a CIC to restrict free
speech rights would undoubtedly covet their right to privately contract away
their free speech rights in a similar contract of silence unrelated to real prop-
erty.
V. STATE ACTION AND THE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION: FLORIDA'S
JURISPRUDENCE
The Constitution's explicit distinction between the public sphere288 and
private property28 9 is a testament to the notion that it did not contemplate
private conduct as falling within its purview.29 0 Therefore, as a threshold
issue, state action is required before the strictures of the Constitution-
specifically the First and Fourteenth Amendments-will apply to private
entities."' This doctrine stands for "the principle that only government ac-
tors are subject to constitutional rules."292 This is because "[o]ne great object
286. See Cantora, supra note 86, at 425; Garfield, supra note 275, at 270, 363.
287. See Cantora, supra note 86, at 425.
288. The Constitution addresses Congress in the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "any State [from] depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
289. The Constitution protects private property rights. U.S. CONST. amend. III (no quar-
tering of soldiers in a private home without the owner's consent); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."); U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No
person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
290. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) ("Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not." (citations omitted)); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("[P]rivate conduct abridging indi-
vidual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it."); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.").
291. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13; Coon, supra note 86, at 24.
292. John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 569, 573 (2005).
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of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as
they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."293
We subject states and local governments, such as cities and municipali-
ties, to the constitutional protections and limitations because of the power
they lawfully possess to coerce and control the rights of their citizens. 294
They have broad regulatory authority that has the propensity to infringe upon
the constitutional rights of these residents whose acquiescence to those
abridgements and choice of residency does not resemble the voluntary nature
of private community association membership. 295 The acts of homeowners'
associations should not be held to the same scrutiny. This is because the
abridgement of rights in a community association is the product of the volun-
tary exercise of freedom of contract2 96 and its conduct cannot fairly be
deemed that of the states'.297 Indeed, "private autonomy is a fundamental
notion implicit in American law: maintaining a separation of private and
public spheres of activity." 29 8
With important rights and freedoms at stake on both sides of the scale, it
is imperative that fair and careful analysis be given to balancing the rights of
individuals to freely contract away their own rights-and the ability of the
governing homeowners' association to further promulgate rules and regula-
tions consistent with this intent-with the corollary abridgment of constitu-
tional rights that may not be "primarily the product of consumer choice" 299 or
those that affect nonresidents.3 " Whatever balance is struck between these
competing values, one thing remains constant: Absent "an overriding public
policy consideration,"30 ' constitutional scrutiny will not interfere with private
conduct without state action.302 In maintaining a focus on Florida jurispru-
dence and homeowners' associations, this analysis will focus on Florida cas-
es and the state action tests recognized by them. It will then apply them to
293. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
294. See Frank 1. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sover-
eignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977).
295. See id.
296. See supra Parts l.C, IV.A.
297. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); see infra Part V.B-C.
298. Brower, supra note 15, at 217.
299. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 468.
300. See Kennedy, supra note 253, at 761.
301. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1548.
302. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (stating that to
determine whether conduct constitutes state action and is therefore subject to constitutional
scrutiny, courts "ask[] first whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority; and second, whether the
private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor."
(citations omitted)).
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the typical homeowners' association and explain why they do not, and
should not, apply.
A. Florida Cases and State Action Tests
Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
several tests or theories under which private conduct may constitute state
action and thereby be subjected to the Constitution.303 Although these tests
are known by various names using less than consistent language, one com-
mentator gleaned seven distinct tests from the Court's state action jurispru-
dence: the "public function" test, the "state compulsion" test, the "nexus"
test, the "state agency" test, the "entwinement" test, the "symbiotic relation-
ship" test, and the "joint participation" test. 304 Aside from the conceptual
mess that the seven potential tests leave for the lower courts, the problem is
further complicated with the inconsistent application of this doctrine: While
some cases expressly address the issue of state action,305 other courts fail to
address the issue or assume state action is present. 306 A few of the tests that
are recognized by Florida courts-and worded as their case law dictates-
will now be presented and analyzed.
1. Judicial Enforcement
The state action doctrine has been held to apply to all branches of gov-
ernment.307 In the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer,308 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that state court enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant prohibiting the sale of a burdened parcel to a person not of the
"Caucasian race" constituted state action, which thereby violated the Equal
303. Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 Mo.
L. REV. 561, 565-67 (2008).
304. Id.
305. See infra Part V.A.
306. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 463 (Fla. 2002); see White
Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351-52 (Fla. 1979) (analyzing due process and
equal protection claims against a condominium association without specifically addressing the
issue of state action); Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d 144, 145-
46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (ignoring the issue of state action while resolving a home-
owner's First Amendment violation claim against a homeowners' association on grounds that
"the right to install a satellite dish" was not a fundamental right).
307. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) ("The
federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through
its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of government.").
308. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 309 While this case serves as
the foundation for the judicial enforcement test, it has been the subject of
310differing interpretations. While some courts have interpreted the holding
narrowly as applying only to judicial enforcement of racially restricted cove-
nants,3 ' others have read it more broadly to include judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants involving other constitutional matters.312 Notwithstand-
ing this split in interpretation, the dangers of the latter interpretation are ap-
parent: Extending Shelley beyond racially restrictive covenants "would ef-
fectively eviscerate the state action requirement because private property
owners, for the most part, enforce their property rights through court ac-
tions."313 Because these conflicts have made their way into Florida case law,
they will be discussed in turn.
In Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc.,3' decided eleven
years after Shelley, the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with a similar
task.315 On review of whether to enforce a restrictive covenant prohibiting
the sale of property in a subdivision to any non-Caucasian or Jewish per-
son, 316 the court followed the reasoning of Shelley, and recognized that:
When ... a state court on the petition on [sic] one who seeks to en-
force such covenants undertakes to inject judicial validity into the
restriction and thereby through the medium of a judicial decree en-
309. Id. at 4-5, 19-21.
310. See id. at 4, 20. Compare Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam), Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1]86, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995),
and Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001),
with Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
and Franklin v. White Egret Condo., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1088-89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (Mager and Cross, JJ., concurring).
311. See Loren ex rel. Aguirre, 309 F.3d at 1303 ("Shelley has not been extended beyond
race discrimination." (alteration in original)); Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191 ("Shelley ... has not
been extended beyond the context of race discrimination," and "the concept of state action has
since been narrowed by the Supreme Court [of the United States]."); Golden Gateway Ctr., 29
P.3d at 810 ("Although the United States Supreme Court has held that judicial effectuation of
a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, it has largely limited this holding to the
facts of those cases." (citations omitted)).
312. See Gerber, 757 F. Supp. at 1341 (reading Shelley to include judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants involving First Amendment free speech issues); Franklin, 358 So. 2d at
1088-89 (Mager and Cross, JJ., concurring) ("State action is ... a broad concept and the
actions of state courts and of judicial officers performing in their official capacities have long
been regarded as state action.").
313. Golden Gateway Cir., 29 P.3d at 811.
314. 116 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
315. See id. at 623-24.
316. Id. at 623.
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forces the restriction in violation of the rights of the property own-
ers, such action by the state court constitutes state action violative
of the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.317
The court was careful to narrow its holding to the specific facts of the
case,318 which is consistent with the prevailing view of Shelley.319
In Quail Creek Property Owners Ass'n v. Hunter,320 a homeowner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a restrictive covenant prohibiting the display
of signs of any kind on any property in his subdivision.321 Relying on a first
district case, the second district followed the lead of Shelley-extended by
Harris-and held that "neither the recording of the protective covenant in the
public records, nor the possible enforcement of the covenant in the courts of
the state, constitutes sufficient 'state action' to render the parties' purely pri-
vate contracts relating to the ownership of real property unconstitutional."3 22
Despite this clear, logical extension of Shelley, a later case muddied the
water. In Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium, Inc.,323 a con-
dominium unit owner challenged a restrictive covenant that barred the dis-
play of an American flag except on certain holidays as violative of the First
Amendment right to free speech. 324 Although during the pendency of this
case the Florida Legislature amended a statute to permit the display of a flag
and expressly preempt any conflicting restrictions,325 its applicability was
prospective, leaving the court to consider the constitutional issues.326 The
court expressly relied on Shelley while disagreeing with Quail Creek,327 hold-
317. Id. at 624.
318. "All that we here determine is that the original requirement of membership in the
specific exclusion of Jews constituted an illegal and unenforceable restraint on these appel-
lants . . . . As to them the requirement could not be enforced. This opinion is not to be given
any broader interpretation." Id. at 625.
319. See Cantora, supra note 86, at 426 ("[A]lmost all courts and commentators today
agree that the Shelley decision should be interpreted very narrowly."); Siegel, supra note 42,
at 493 ("[V]irtually all courts and commentators agree that the reach of the Shelley doctrine
should be restricted.").
320. 538 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
321. Id. at 1289.
322. Id.
323. 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 757 F. Supp.
1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
324. Id. at 885-86.
325. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(4) (2011).
326. Gerber, 724 F. Supp. at 886.
327. Id. "This Court cannot agree with [Quail Creek's] conclusion that judicial enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants is state action and judicial enforcement of covenants
which restrict one's right to patriotic speech is not state action." Id. at 886-87.
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ing that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants contained in a declara-
tion of condominium that prohibited the display of an American flag except
on designated holidays constituted state action, thereby bringing it within the
ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment through which the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech was selectively incorporated to apply to the states.328
On reconsideration, the same court vacated in part on other grounds, and
reaffirmed partial summary judgment as to the issue of state action.329 The
court reiterated its reliance on Shelley, and opined that it "found and contin-
ues to find that judicial enforcement of private agreements contained in a
declaration of condominium constitutes state action and brings the heretofore
private conduct within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, through
which the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is made applicable to
the states."330 This extension of Shelley did not enjoy any camaraderie in
later cases or even in other jurisdictions.33 1 Perhaps the most perplexing in-
consistency with Gerber's reasoning is its misplaced reliance on Shelley:
While Gerber posits to rely on Shelley's principle that judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, Gerber found state
action before the state, through its judiciary branch, even acted;33 2 whereas
Shelley overturned an actual judicial decree that enforced the restrictive cov-
enant at issue.333
Recognizing that the issue of whether judicial enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant curtailing First Amendment rights constitutes state action "is
not well settled," M the court in Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Community Ass'n335
was faced with a homeowner seeking to enjoin his homeowners' association
from enforcing a restrictive covenant prohibiting the display of his political
328. Id. at 886.
329. Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
330. Id. at 1341.
331. See supra note 311 and accompanying text; Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191
(1 Ith Cir. 1995); Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810
(Cal. 2001); Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass'n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821-23 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (criticizing Gerber on several grounds: Its reliance on Shelley is unfounded, because
"Gerber found state action before the state acted"; "old-fashioned patriotism, rather than old-
fashioned legal reasoning, is the source of the Gerber opinion's persuasive force"; and the
court agreed with Quail Creek, declaring that "Gerber is not good law").
332. See Goldberg, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
333. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1948).
334. Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Cmty. Ass'n, No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997 WL
33635315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997).
335. No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997 WL 33635315 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997).
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signs.336 While the facts in this case resembled Quail Creek and Gerber, it is
distinguishable to the extent that the homeowners' association in Sabghir
purportedly relied upon a municipal ordinance barring the display of political
signs in enforcing its restrictive covenant. 337 Relying on this additional vari-
able, the court denied the homeowners' association's motion to dismiss, find-
ing it unwarranted "based upon the mere allegation of no state action.
Whether or not the fact that the homeowner seeking relief was a candidate
for a judicial office played any role in the court's decision to deny the motion
to dismiss on grounds of no state action, the court held that, "[a]t a minimum,
the [homeowner] is entitled to offer proof on the matter."339
In Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser,340 a homeowner brought a suit
against her homeowners' association seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a
restrictive covenant prohibiting the display of signs on her property. 341 Apart
from other FHA claims, the focus of the state action issue involved the
homeowners' association's refusal to waive the restriction to allow the
homeowner to place a "For Sale" sign on her property in what she claimed
was a violation of her First Amendment guarantee of free speech.34 The
Second Circuit implicitly refused to follow Gerber's purported extension of
the judicial enforcement doctrine, holding that the homeowners' association
was not acting under the color of state law despite the threat of judicial en-
forcement of a restrictive covenant restricting the ability of a homeowner to
place a sign on her property.343 In further recognizing that "Shelley has not
been extended beyond race discrimination," Loren's holding would appear to
abrogate the earlier, divergent Gerber decision, though it did not expressly
do so.34
2. Public Function
While much of the state action doctrine in Florida's case law focuses on
Shelley and its progeny, the public function test has been expressly recog-
nized by Florida courts as one avenue to finding state action in the conduct
336. Id. at *1.
337. Id. at *2.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. 309 F.3d 1296 (11 th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
341. Id. at 1300.
342. Id. at 1298.
343. See id. at 1303.
344. See id.
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of private individuals.34 The public function doctrine34 was originally es-
poused in Marsh v. Alabama,34 where the Supreme Court of the United
States overturned the trespass conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who was
distributing religious literature on the private streets of a company-owned
town.4 The Court found that the town, while owned by a private corpora-
tion, functioned no differently than a public municipality, as it consisted of
"residential buildings, streets [and sidewalks], a system of sewers, [and] a
sewage disposal plant," employed the services of a county sheriff to "serve[]
as the town's policeman," and operated a "business block," which included a
"community shopping center . . . freely accessible and open to the people in
the area and those passing through."39 In Hudgens v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board,350 the Court read Marsh narrowly, holding that a private entity is
the "functional equivalent of a municipality," for the purpose of finding state
action under the public function doctrine, where it has taken "all the attrib-
utes of a town [including] residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant, and a 'business block' on which business places are
situated." 35' This "remains the prevailing federal constitutional standard for
determining whether a private community is the functional equivalent of a
municipality."35 2
In Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n,353 residents of a mobile
home park brought an action against their homeowners' association and its
directors for various alleged violations of their civil rights.35 4 They pro-
ceeded under two different theories of state action: public function and state
involvement.15  The court explained that "[u]nder the public function test,
state action will be found where the functions of a private individual or group
are so impregnated with a governmental character as to appear municipal in
345. See, e.g., Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Cmty. Ass'n, No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997
WL 33635315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997) ("In view of the state action requirement set out
by the Supreme Court, constitutional challenges may only be brought against private organiza-
tions where such organizations are performing public functions ..... (citation omitted)).
346. This doctrine is known by various names, including the "functional equivalent of a
municipality theory." Siegel, supra note 42, at 471.
347. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
348. Id. at 503, 509-10.
349. Id. at 502-03, 507-08.
350. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
351. Id. at 516, 520 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)).
352. Siegel, supra note 42, at 474-75.
353. 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
354. Id. at 1381.
355. Id.; see infra Part V.A.3 (discussion of state involvement theory).
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nature."5 In a concise opinion, the court concluded that "[a] homeowner's
association lacks the municipal character of a company town." 357 Because
homeowners governed by a homeowners' associations "own their property
and hold title to the common areas pro rata," and homeowners' associations
provide services not as a replacement of, but rather supplemental to, those
provided by cities and municipalities, homeowners' associations do not
"act[] in a sufficiently public manner so as to subject its activities to a state
action analysis."3 58 This case conforms to the prevailing view of the public
function doctrine that a homeowners' association would have to operate all
of the Marsh/Hudgens municipal characteristics in order to consider its con-
duct state action.359
3. State Involvement
The third main state action theory recognized by Florida courts is the
state involvement test,3  which draws its roots from a line of Supreme Court
of the United States cases.361 As Brock recognized, "[u]nder the state in-
volvement test, there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged activity such that the activity may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself."362 In considering the residents' second state action the-
ory, the Brock court found that "the association's maintenance, assessment,
and collection activities are not sufficiently connected to the State to warrant
a finding of state action."363 Despite extensive state law regulating the activi-
ties of homeowners' associations,6 the court found insufficient state in-
356. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381.
357. Id. at 1382.
358. Id.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 345-52.
360. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381.
361. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (holding that state regu-
lation of private utility companies was not sufficient state involvement as to constitute state
action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-73 (1972) (holding that the grant-
ing of liquor license does not translate private group's discrimination into state action because,
"where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have 'significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discriminations."' (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380
(1967))); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (holding that the
state was sufficiently and significantly involved in discrimination by its restaurant lessee,
which refused to serve a black patron).
362. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357).
363. Id. at 1382.
364. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 720 (2011).
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volvement, "either directly or indirectly," to fairly attribute the acts of the
homeowners' association to those of the state.365
B. Application
In applying these three tests to the traditional homeowners' association,
it becomes apparent that its conduct cannot fairly be said to qualify as state
action. First, under the judicial enforcement test, Shelley's impact on Flor-
ida's jurisprudence and its evolution thereof suggests that Florida courts
view the enforcement of restrictive covenants as not constituting state ac-
tion.366 This reading of Shelley does not commit the enforcement by home-
owners' associations of restrictive covenants to state action designation ab-
sent the threat of enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.367 A broader
reading proffering a contrary view would threaten the ability of private indi-
viduals to contract to restrict the use of property.368 Even more alarming,
such a reading "would obliterate any public-private distinction and open up
nearly every private action to constitutional restrictions as state action merely
because private actions can and will be enforced by state judiciaries." 369
Therefore, because courts will inevitably be called upon by homeowners'
associations to enforce restrictive covenants, "Shelley is of limited use for a
precedent-based, stare decisis application" to cases involving homeowners'
associations.70 Because Shelley never contemplated judicial enforcement to
extend beyond the context of racially restrictive covenants, to find otherwise
would result in "other constitutional values involving private contracts [to]
be forsaken."37 1 After all, what significance remains in a private covenant
restricting the use of land absent the power of judicial enforcement?
Second, under the public function test, Florida courts have provided a
clear and simple answer: Homeowners' associations simply lack the tradi-
tional characteristics one would attribute to a city or municipality.372 While
some argue that the increased privatization of municipal services by CICs is
within the concerns Marsh had in finding a company-town a state actor, 37 3 it
365. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382.
366. See supra Part V.A.1.
367. See id.
368. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
369. Id.
370. Mark A. Rogers, Comment, Community Association Law: Administrative Law as a
Solution by Analogy, 53 EMORY L.J. 1457, 1473 (2004).
371. Id.
372. Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1381-82 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
373. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 541.
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is difficult to fit CICs and those associations governing them within this
analogy.374 Brock explains that the provision of these services does not re-
place those provided by municipalities, but rather supplements them. 3 75 In-
deed, that homeowners' associations may and often do provide and control
utilities also supplied by local government, does not propose to translate that
activity into a public function. 6 In addition, homeowners' associations pos-
sess powers that are less intrusive and less extensive than those possessed by
state and local governments. Furthermore, "governments are distinguished
by their acknowledged, lawful authority-not dependent on property owner-
ship-to coerce a territorially defined and imperfectly voluntary membership
by acts of regulation, taxation, and condemnation, the exercise of which au-
thority is determined by majoritarian and representative procedures."378 The-
se factors demonstrate the difficulty in analogizing homeowners' associa-
tions to local government.379
Finally, under the state involvement test, Brock tells us that statutory
regulation of homeowners' associations is not state involvement significant
enough to signal the state action doctrine.380 Aside from statutory regulation,
"there is no other significant connection between states and [homeowners'
associations]." 3 8 1 Certainly, statutory regulation that provides homeowners'
associations with certain authority cannot be viewed as a state delegation of
powers "that have traditionally been associated exclusively with sover-
",382
eignty.
This deficient analogy that fails to liken the acts of homeowners' asso-
ciations to those of the state is consistent with the current state of the law in
Florida.383 According to an expert with over thirty years of experience prac-
ticing community association law in Florida, "[t]he law does not consider
there being state action in association affairs, no matter what test is being
374. See, e.g., Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381-82.
375. Id.
376. Cantora, supra note 86, at 425.
377. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523.
378. Michelman, supra note 294, at 1167.
379. See Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382; Cantora, supra note 86, at 425; Ellickson, supra note
86, at 1523; Michelman, supra note 294, at 1167.
380. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382.
381. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
382. Id. at 425.
383. Telephone Interview with Jay Steven Levine, Founding Att'y, Jay Steven Levine
Law Grp. (July 19, 2011). Mr. Levine has been practicing community association law for
over thirty years and runs his practice out of multiple offices, the main of which is located in
Boca Raton, Florida. Id.
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used. This is also the prevailing view of most attorneys in this area of prac-
tice.""
C. Why Quasi-Governmental Status for Homeowners' Associations is
Dangerous
As it stands, under the current state action tests, the acts of homeown-
ers' associations remain without state action designation.8 In response,
some commentators propose a per se rule that would characterize homeown-
ers' associations as a new form of government, classifying them as "quasi-
386 n hrbgovernmental" entities, and thereby subjecting their conduct to the Consti-
tution and its protections and limitations.8
However, such an extension of the state action doctrine would be dan-
gerous. Because such a proposition would submit the acts of homeowners'
associations to the state action doctrine, the result would intrude upon the
rights of homeowners to covenant for the restriction of property rights in a
CIC and frustrate the homeowners' association's ability to regulate and en-
force them.388 It would strip any meaning from restrictive covenants, and
essentially, the freedom of contract.3 8 9 This strongly militates against such a
per se rule.390 As an alternative, one commentator proposed a multi-part state
action balancing test, which necessarily takes into consideration many perti-
nent factors relevant to the nature and operation of CICs and homeowners'
associations.39 1 Concededly complex,39 this unwieldy test, if adopted by
384. Id.
385. See Cantora, supra note 86, at 425; Rahe, supra note 260, at 546 ("[F]uture litigation
will determine when, and if, a homeowners' association becomes a state actor.").
386. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 253, at 763 (suggesting community associations are
quasi-governmental in nature).
387. See MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 135-36 (advocating that homeowners' associations
function as private governments); see also Kennedy, supra note 253, at 764 (advocating a per
se classification treating homeowners' associations as state actors); Siegel, supra note 42, at
561-63 (arguing for recognition, under a complex multi-factor test, of homeowners' associa-
tions as state actors in order protect the constitutional rights of their residents).
388. See e.g., Siegel, supra note 42, at 469-71. For example, as private actors, community
associations may restrict First Amendment rights, including the ability "to impose a ban on
posting signs inside or outside a home, to restrict public assembly on their streets, [and] to
prohibit the distribution of newspapers on their streets." Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted). By
classifying homeowners' associations as a new form of government, these restrictions would
likely violate First Amendment rights protected by the Constitution and therefore be invalid.
See id. at 469-71.
389. See id.
390. See id. at 469-70.
391. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 555-57. These factors include:
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courts, would likely "breed uncertainty and inconsistent rulings across the
state" as well as "substantially increase the cost of litigation."9 Addition
ally, "[p]ractitioners won't be able to advise their clients with any confidence
as to whether they are outside or inside the parameters of this test." 394
VI. CONCLUSION
Private contracting autonomy involving the creation of, and subsequent
voluntary acquiescence to, restrictive covenants should not yield to the stric-
tures of the Constitution. Neither should the homeowners' association's abil-
ity to enforce these covenants be impaired by characterizing such conduct as
state action merely because the same would be an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of rights if performed by state or local government. These private con-
tracts are the product of voluntary market transactions whose regulation is
sufficient under current statutory and public policy considerations.3 95 Aside
from well-established restrictions on the freedom of contract such as FHA
protections and the unwillingness of courts to enforce racially restrictive
covenants, if courts were to impose limitations in other circumstances, how
would such a restriction be administered? To what extent would we erode
1. The nature and extent of RCA property, including the number of housing units; housing
tenure; and the ownership of streets, facilities, and real estate: Does the RCA encompass a
substantial tract of land that incorporates streets and other infrastructure?
2. The nature and extent of RCA services to RCA residents, including street cleaning, trash
collection, snow removal, street repair, sewage treatment, park administration, and security:
Are these services a supplement to municipal services or a substitution for such services?
3. The nature and extent of RCA authority over RCA residents: Does the RCA exercise com-
prehensive land-use powers over a substantial number of landowners such that the land-use
scheme is the functional equivalent of municipal zoning? Does the RCA levy and collect
mandatory assessments on real property that amount to the functional equivalent of municipal
real estate taxes?
4. The availability of comparable non-RCA housing in the local housing market: Is the choice
to live in an RCA truly voluntary?
5. The local government in-kind contributions of services to RCAs or local government con-
tributions of taxpayer funds in connection with RCA services: Are the contacts between gov-
ernment and an RCA so pervasive as to warrant a finding of state action even if the RCA oth-
erwise were deemed not to be the functional equivalent of a municipality?
6. Nonresident access to RCA property: Does the RCA hold open portions of its poperty [sic],
such as streets, retail establishments, or common areas, to members of the public?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
392. Id. at 558. However, the author hedged this concession by referencing several other
valid tests relating to constitutional doctrine which are similarly complicated but are neverthe-
less applied by the courts. Id. at 558-60.
393. Telephone Interview with Jay Steven Levine, supra note 383.
394. Id.
395. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543.
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such an important liberty in the name of protecting rights voluntarily
abridged in exchange for other benefits?
Classification of homeowners' associations as per se quasi-
governmental entities whose conduct is subject to the state action doctrine-
and accordingly the Constitution-would threaten the enforceability of re-
strictive covenants, rendering meaningless even those most desirable.396 In
deed, such a proposition would entail "transferring property from the private
sphere to the public . . . result[ing] in the . . . deprivation of Americans'
property rights."397 It would also result in an exponential increase in litiga-
tion; countless suits for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief would
result because those covenants restricting free speech would then become
unconstitutional as enforced by the homeowners' association.39 ' The home-
owners' association would lose its efficacy in enforcing covenants, support-
ing homeowners' expectations, and protecting their investments should its
conduct be characterized as state action.
As to private restrictive covenants burdening parcels in the numerous
CICs across the country, the state action doctrine largely has no applicabil-
ity.399 Therefore, as to the homeowners' association-the entity responsible
for enforcing these covenants-the state action doctrine similarly has little
thrust in curtailing those responsibilities. Consequently, the state action doc-
trine does not, and should not, apply to homeowners' associations. The free-
dom of contract and the free use of property outweigh a contrary proposition.
396. Chadderdon, supra note 209, at 264; Kennedy, supra note 253, at 763-64, 789-91.
397. Rahe, supra note 260, at 527.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 368-71.
399. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
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